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How Revenue and Information Shape Citizen
Political Behavior
Laura Paler
Many developing countries exhibit deficits in governance, including corruption, rent-seeking, the
suboptimal provision of public goods, and weak accountability. This dissertation uncovers the
micro-foundations of political failure by evaluating how government revenue windfalls and infor-
mation asymmetries affect the will or ability of citizens to curb rent-seeking and hold politicians
accountable. The first chapter provides one of the first causal, micro-level tests of the prominant
claim that windfalls lower demand for good governance in comparison to taxation. It also sheds
light on the relationship between revenue and information by examining whether windfalls and
taxes produce differences in how citizens become politically informed. The second chapter turns
attention to the role of information and examines how new information on government spending
affects citizen political participation and incumbent support. The final chapter analyzes whether
windfalls induce citizen groups to engage in rent-seeking behavior to appropriate wealth in more
divided societies. To identify causal effects at the individual level, I employ experimental and
quasi-experimental research designs and original survey and behavioral data from two separate,
large-scale field projects conducted in Indonesia. Overall, the dissertation deepens understanding
of the causes of political failure by examining not only whether windfalls and information asymme-
tries have adverse effects on citizen political behavior but also when and why.
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3 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Many developing countries exhibit deficits in governance, including corruption, rent-seeking, the
suboptimal provision of public goods, and weak accountability. Bad governance implies a failure
or inability on the part of citizens to constrain politicians from opportunistic behavior and secure
efficient public goods provision. If good governance in democracies depends on citizens selecting
honest and hard-working politicians, or removing dishonest and lazy ones from power, the question
arises: Why do citizens often fail to curb corruption and rent-seeking?
This dissertation focuses on two of the leading political economy explanations for what causes
political failure. One prominent explanation centers on where government gets its revenue from.
Natural resource rents and other types of windfall revenue are widely believed to be bad for good
governance, especially in comparision to alternate sources of revenue like broad-based taxation
(Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006; Leite and Weidemann, 1999; Caselli and Michaels, 2009;
Moore, 1998). The notion is that windfalls undermine the incentives of both politicians and citizens
to ensure that resources are used optimally for the public good. An alternate explanation is that
political failure arises not from a lack of citizen will to curb rent-seeking but rather from a lack of
ability to do so. This inability is attributed to the existence of information asymmetries between
politicians and the public. Without information on politician preferences and actions in office,
citizens are ill-positioned to take political action to elicit better performance (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn,
1999; Besley, 2006).
The negative impacts of windfalls and information asymmetries on governance and development
have already been studied extensively. Yet, important questions remain as to how they cause
political failure through their impact on citizens. The three chapters in this dissertation shed
light on the micro-foundations of political failure by evaluating how revenue and information affect
the will or ability of citizens to curb political rent-seeking. They employ experiments and quasi-
experiments as well as original survey and behavioral data to identify the causal impact of windfalls,
taxes, and information on citizen political attitudes and actions at the individual level.
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1.2 The Literature
Where a government gets its revenue from affects whether it works in the best interest of its
citizens. This notion is at the heart of a substantial political economy literature on the so-called
‘resource curse’, the paradox that windfalls of revenue from oil, gas or other natural resources often
undermine development rather than enable it. Scholars have linked natural resource windfalls
not only to corruption, rent-seeking, and the sub-optimal provision of public goods (Leite and
Weidemann, 1999; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006) but also to a
host of related detrimental outcomes, including poor economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 2001);
the weakening of accountability in democracies (Moore and Rakner, 2002; Gibson and Hoffman,
2007); the perpetuation of autocratic regimes (Ross, 2001, 2004); and civil war onset and duration
(Humphreys, 2005).
Scholars have also argued that windfalls from other types of revenue are similar to those from
natural resources and result in many of the same outcomes. These other types of revenue include
foreign aid (Moore, 1998; Dalgaard and Olsson, 2006) and, for local governments, central govern-
ment transfers (Treisman, 2000; Brollo et al., 2010). What natural resource, foreign aid, and central
transfer windfalls have in common is that they are large, typically discretionary, inflows of revenue
that go directly to government and do not arise from the broad-based production of goods and
services in the economy (Dalgaard and Olsson, 2006).
At the heart of this literature is the idea that windfalls undermine the incentives of both politi-
cians and citizens to ensure that resources are used optimally for the public good. Perhaps the
dominant explanation in political science is that windfalls reduce government dependence on do-
mestic taxation, weakening citizen motivation to constrain politicians from opportunistic behavior
(Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Huntington, 1991; Ross, 2001, 2004). Others theorize that windfalls
actually increase the incentives for citizens to appropriate wealth for personal gain. Drawing on
rent-seeking contest models developed by Tullock (1980), this literature claims that windfalls induce
citizens, as members of interest groups, to engage in rent-seeking competition that dissipates any
potential benefits (Tullock, 1980; Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1998, 1999; Svensson,
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2000).
Still others focus on how windfalls alter politician incentives. Robinson et al (2006) theorize
that long-run resource booms increase the value of holding office, which induces politicians to use
patronage to secure re-election. Brollo et al (2010) predict that revenue booms exacerbate informa-
tion asymmetries and make it easier for politicians to steal, which in turn attracts more dishonest
types to run for office and makes it easier for dishonest incumbents to get re-elected. Political
failure in the principal-agent tradition arises in part because citizens are unable to use elections
to constrain politicians from rent-seeking behavior. Information also plays an important role in
this framework. For Robinson et al (2006) whether politicians can engage in rent-seeking depends
on whether citizens have access to information to monitor rent-seeking behavior. Others go so far
as to claim that windfalls actually exacerbate information asymmetries between politicians and
citizens (Gadenne, 2011; Devarajan et al., 2011; Brollo et al., 2010). This emphasis on information
highlights the need to investigate whether windfalls undermine development through incentive or
information channels. Overall, a central challenge for the broader resource curse literature—from
which this dissertation departs—now lies in identifying which explanations find empirical support,
in what contexts, and how different mechanisms relate.
This emphasis on information in the windfall literature draws on an already expansive literature
in the political agency tradition that has long noted the dangers of information asymmetries to
effective accountability (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1999; Besley, 2006). A growing empirical literature
has demonstrated that improving access to information indeed affects whether and how citizens
vote (Chong et al., 2011; Banerjee et al., 2011), improves public goods provision (Reinikka and
Svensson, 2003), and reduces the re-election probabilities of corrupt incumbents (Ferraz and Finan,
2008). Yet, important questions remain about how citizens use information to make political
decisions and mitigate opportunistic behavior by politicians. For instance, how do prior beliefs
condition the impact of information on citizen political behavior? And, how do different and
potentially conflicting dimensions of information affect citizen political participation and incumbent
support? These questions highlight the need for additional research on how information shapes
citizen political behavior directly as well as through its relationship to revenue.
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1.3 Dissertation Overview and Empirical Approach
The dissertation consists of three chapters—each written as stand-alone papers—that shed light on
the micro-foundations of how windfalls and information shape citizen political behavior. Chapter
2 aims to clarify mechanisms behind the resource curse by providing one of the first causal, micro-
level tests of the prominant claim that windfalls, compared to taxes, produce less citizen demand
for good governance. It also sheds light on the relationship between revenue and information
by examining whether windfalls and taxes produce differences in how citizens become politically
informed. Chapter 3 turns attention to the role of information and examines how new information
on government spending affects citizen political participation and incumbent support. Chapter 4
returns the focus to windfalls, this time analyzing whether windfalls induce citizen groups to engage
in rent-seeking behavior to appropriate wealth in more divided societies. In doing so, it highlights
the importance of context to considering why windfalls are beneficial in some instances and harmful
in others.
The three chapters are based on two distinct, large-scale field projects implemented in Indonesia
during nearly two years of fieldwork conducted between 2007 and 2010. Chapters 2 and 3 are based
on a set of experiments embedded into a public awareness campaign conducted in Blora—a resource
rich and transfer-dependent district in Central Java. The experiments employed behavioral exercises
to create distinct tax and windfall environments and to vary citizens information on government
spending. The main data source is an original individual-level survey undertaken during the same
visit. The campaign and survey were conducted with 1,863 randomly sampled and assigned citizens
from 93 villages in Blora. The setting for Chapter 4 is a community-driven reconstruction project
implemented in post-conflict Aceh, Indonesia. This chapter employs a regression discontinuity
and original survey data from civilians, former combatants, and village heads to identify whether
windfalls induce groups to engage in rent-seeking competition.
The emphasis on experimental (or quasi-experimental) research designs and original micro-level
data accomplishes two things. First, experiments not only ensure that outcomes are driven by the
causes of interest (revenue or information) but also make possible the isolation and testing of specific
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mechanisms. This is the case in Chapter 2, where I designed the revenue experiment specifically
to test the validity of the claim that windfalls produce weaker demand for good governance than
taxes. Doing so required designing the revenue experiment to minimize the alternate possibility
that windfalls undermined citizen political action by exacerbating information asymmetries.
Second using original micro-level data makes it possible to dig deeper into how revenue and
information affect citizen political behavior at the individual level. In addition to providing key
outcome measures, the survey data also provides a more in-depth picture into underlying mecha-
nisms. This is particularly important for Chapter 2, which examines different explanations for why
taxation creates greater demand for good governance. Moreover, the surveys provide pre-treatment
covariates to examine how treatment effects vary. This is central to Chapter 3, which explores how
prior beliefs on government spending condition the effect of information, and for Chapter 4, which
analyzes how pre-existing divisions between civilians and former combatants conditioned the effect
of aid windfalls.
As a newly decentralized democracy grappling with many development problems—corruption,
natural resource management, a history of separatist conflict—Indonesia presents a relevant and
interesting context in which to explore how revenue and information affect citizen political behavior.
There is a well-known tradeoff here though. Conducting the field research at the local level made it
possible to undertake detailed tests of hypotheses drawn from leading theories of political failure,
but the approach inevitably raises questions about external validity. In seeking to test the validity
of precise mechanisms, this dissertation aimed first and foremost to identify the effects of windfalls
and information with a high degree of internal validity.
1.4 Chapter Summaries
Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to
Restrain Government
Chapter 2 presents the first micro-level, causal test of what has become a general claim in political
science: That windfalls undermine—and taxes strengthen—citizen incentives to hold government
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accountable. I test this claim by embedding a novel revenue experiment into a public awareness
campaign conducted in Blora—resource rich and central transfer dependent district in Indonesia.
The experiment created distinct tax and windfall environments using an exercise in which the tax
group paid a simulated tax to the district government and was primed on the share of taxes in
total district revenue. The windfall group did not pay a simulated tax and the share of budget
government that came from windfalls was primed. To isolate and test the claim that windfalls
produce weaker demand for good governance, I designed the experiment to minimize any possible
information asymmetries that arise from windfalls. Moreover, the experiments vary different aspects
of taxation to shed light on why taxes create stronger incentives than windfalls to take political
action.
The chapter’s second goal is to investigate how windfalls and taxes might also affect the ways in
which citizens become politically informed. Specifically, I investigate whether taxes (compared to
windfalls) motivate citizens to acquire information on government or affect how individuals process
information on government performance. To explicitly test this latter possibility, I embedded
an over-lapping experiment into the public awareness campaign in which the treatment group
obtained new information on actual government spending while the control group received placebo
information only.
The campaign was conducted with 1,863 randomly sampled and randomly assigned citizens in
Blora district in collaboration with the Indonesian NGOs PATTIRO and LPAW. The project was
implemented in the months leading up to district head elections in June 2010. The main outcomes
of interest—scrutiny, political participation, and reduced support for the incumbent—are measured
through both a survey and participation in a postcard campaign. The postcard campaign offers
a revealed preference measure of actual willingness to take political action at a small cost and, as
such, overcomes the concerns associated with social desirability bias in costless survey responses.
This paper makes three contributions. It provides among the first evidence that taxes, compared
to windfalls, can motivate political action. The results show that the tax group was more willing
to monitor government and more likely to withdraw support from the incumbent, although there
is little evidence that members were more willing to participate in politics. Second, the paper
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uncovers the micro-foundations for why windfalls and taxes produce different incentives, showing
that participants were moved by an increase in the perceived share of taxes in total revenue, which
resulted in greater feelings of ownership over the budget. Finally, it reveals that different sources
of government revenue also affect how citizens become politically informed: Windfalls decreased
the motivation to seek out information on government but did not make citizens more tolerant of
wasted revenue. These last findings have important implications for understanding the endogenous
sources of pressure for transparency as well as the efficacy of using exogenous (e.g. donor funded)
information interventions to promote accountability in windfall contexts.
How Does Information Affect Political Behavior?
Chapter 3 turns its focus to examining how new information affects citizen political behavior,
namely political participation, incumbent support, and willingness to remain informed in the future.
To evaluate how citizens use information to make political decisions, this chapter digs deeper into the
information experiment conducted with 1,863 randomly sampled citizens in Blora (detailed in the
previous section). The information experiment provided the treatment group with new information
on government spending while the control group received placebo information only. Importantly,
the information treatment contained different dimensions of information: On the budget share that
politicians spent on goods and services, on routine administration, and on themselves. I use rich
pre-treatment survey data on participants’ prior beliefs on government spending to analyze how
the impact of new information varies at the individual level.
The results—measured in the same survey and postcard campaign described above—show that
information caused a substantial increase in perceptions that politicians were performing worse
than previously expected. Yet, information only caused higher levels of participation and reduced
support for the incumbent when participants received bad news on at least one information dimen-
sion. These results suggest the importance of considering how multiple and potentially competing
information dimensions could affect political behavior at the individual level. The findings also
show that initially providing better information increased willingness to remain informed in the
future, and this effect was bigger for those who originally did not want the information. For those
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interested in whether one-off information interventions have sustainable effects, this finding indeed
indicates that an initial reduction in information costs could lead to information-seeking in the
future.
Is Bigger Always Better? How Windfall Size Affects Welfare and Conflict
Chapter 4 examines whether the impact of windfalls on development depends on the underlying
degree of power competition in society. Drawing on the rent-seeking contest literature (Tullock,
1980; Tornell and Lane, 1998; Svensson, 2000), it investigates whether bigger windfalls deliver more
benefits in homogeneous and cooperative societies and are dissipated when there exist multiple
powerful and competing groups. The chapter does this by looking at how social fragmentation
between former combatants and civilian victims conditioned the effectiveness of aid windfalls at the
village-level in post-conflict Aceh, Indonesia. While windfalls were primarily intended for civilian
victims, it is possible that bigger inflows incentivized former combatants to appropriate the wealth
in villages where relations with citizens were already contentious as opposed to those in which they
were cooperative.
To determine whether bigger windfalls induced appropriation, undermined economic benefits,
and exacerbated social divisions, I exploit the fact that villages were assigned to varying-sized
windfalls on the basis of arbitrary cutoffs in two continuous measures of eligibility. I use a regression
discontinuity and original survey data from civilians, former combatants, and village heads in 212
villages to identify the causal effect of windfall size.
The main results show that, in villages where the combatant group was strong and relations
with civilians contentious, former combatants were more likely to appropriate the windfall than
in low competition villages. Yet, contrary to the predictions, bigger windfalls did not result in
fewer economic benefits or more social tensions for civilians in high competition villages, despite
appropriation by former combatants. This raises questions about why bigger windfalls did not
deliver even greater benefits to civilians in low competition villages compared to high competition
ones, as predicted. Overall, in showing that the effect of windfalls varied across villages that were
more and less predisposed to group competition, this chapter emphasizes the importance of context
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to understanding the relationship between windfalls and development. It also highlights the need
for future research on how social divisions mediate the relationship between aid windfalls and
development when the revenue is targeted to benefit certain groups.
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation
In sum, this dissertation explores the micro-foundations of how revenue and information shape the
political behavior of citizens. In doing so, it seeks to shed light not only on the role of citizens in
contributing to political failure but also on the possible avenues by which corruption, rent-seeking
and ineffective accountability can be mitigated. The chapters in this dissertation proceed in the
order just outlined. Chapters 2 and 4 are accompanied by online appendices that contain additional
analysis and exposition. The Appendix (Part II) contains the complete script and illustrations for
the public awareness campaign that is the focus of the first two chapters. Chapter 5 concludes by
summarizing the main findings and highlighting what broader lessons can be learned by considering
the chapters together about how windfalls and information impact citizen political behavior.
CHAPTER 2. KEEPING THE PUBLIC PURSE 12
Chapter 2
Keeping the Public Purse: An
Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and
the Incentives to Restrain
Government
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2.1 Introduction
Where a government gets its revenue from is widely believed to affect whether it works in the best
interest of its citizens. Natural resource wealth, foreign aid, and other types of windfall revenue
hold out the promise of development and better welfare for citizens.1 Yet, all too often, windfalls
are associated with a host of detrimental outcomes, including poor economic performance, the
under-provision of public goods, corruption, and weak transparency and accountability (Sachs and
Warner, 2001; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006; Leite and Weidemann,
1999; Caselli and Michaels, 2009; Brollo et al., 2010; Ross, 2001).
An enduring explanation for this phenomenon is that windfalls free politicians from the need
to finance government through taxation, resulting in a more politically quiescent population and
weaker restraints on opportunistic politicians (Moore, 1998; Ross, 2004).2 When a government
in need of tax revenue confronts a population capable of protest or evasion, politicians have an
incentive to elicit compliance by making policy or governance concessions (Levi, 1988; North and
Weingast, 1989; Bates and Lien, 1985; Timmons, 2005). By now it is almost a truism in political
science that taxation mobilizes citizens to demand such concessions, as Huntington (1991, 65)
asserts: “The lower the level of taxation, the less reason for the public to demand representation.”
Policymakers have similarly embraced this notion: “When governments can survive on natural
resource rents, they do not need to tax their citizens. In turn, citizens do not expect or demand
public services, clean government, or even basic accountability.”3
Yet, there is good reason to treat this claim as an hypothesis rather than a conclusion. For one,
while there is ample support that windfalls and taxes produce variation in political mobilization,
there is little micro-level, causal evidence that this can be attributed to differences in demand for
good governance. Such evidence is particularly important given that some have advised caution
1While the literature on the resource curse has highlighted the negative link between oil and mineral wealth and
development, both foreign aid and central transfers have also been characterized as windfall revenue. Windfall
revenue generally accrues directly to governments as large discretionary inflows of income that do not arise from the
standard production of goods and services in the economy (Dalgaard and Olsson, 2006).
2Both economic and political economy explanations for how windfalls, particularly natural resources, undermine
development abound. For review articles on the resource curse, see Ross (1999) and Rosser (2006).
3The Center for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org, last accessed November 2010.
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in embracing this claim (Herb, 2003, 2005). On one hand, taxation (or the lack thereof) has
been used to explain the rise of parliamentary institutions in early modern Europe (North and
Weingast, 1989; Tilly, 1992; Root, 1994; Downing, 1992); persistent authoritarianism in the rentier
states of the Middle East (Mahdavi, 1970; Beblawi, 1987); and pressure for democratization and
responsive policy-making in contemporary developing countries such as China (Bernstein and Lu,
2003) and Poland, as well as cross-nationally (Ross, 2004). Recently, however, Haber and Menaldo
(2011) use detailed cross-national time series analysis to argue that natural resources do not cause
authoritarianism. Others have pointed out that revenue booms often bolster citizens’ expectations
and create upward pressure for government spending (Alesina, Tabellini and Campante, 2008;
Kakonge, 2011). One way to adjudicate conflicting national and cross-national evidence is to turn
to the micro-foundations for empirical support, but the impact of windfalls and taxes on individual
psychology has not yet been demonstrated. Without such evidence, the fundamentally micro-level
claim that taxation produces stronger incentives that windfalls to hold politicians accountable
remains unsubstantiated.
A second reason to question this claim is that there exists a compelling alternative mecha-
nism by which taxation facilitates political action: Better information. According to this view,
windfalls undermine accountability by exacerbating information asymmetries between government
and citizens. This argument draws on a substantial political agency literature that has long noted
the dangers of an uninformed public to accountability (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1999; Besley, 2006).
Windfalls potentially deepen information asymmetries because they give politicians ‘more room to
steal’ while still pleasing uninformed voters (Brollo et al., 2010) or because politicians are freer
to spend resource rents on patronage when transparent institutions are weak (Robinson, Torvik
and Verdier, 2006). By this view, taxation comes with information benefits that windfalls lack; for
instance it reduces uncertainty about the size of the total budget or facilitates comprehension of
public finances in per capita terms (Gadenne, 2011; Sandbu, 2006; Devarajan et al., 2011). This
literature implies that the most direct way to mitigate the detrimental effects of windfalls is to
improve citizens’ access to information.
The main goal of this paper is to provide the first individual-level, causal test of what has
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become a general claim in political science: That taxes strengthen—and windfalls undermine—
citizens’ motivation to hold government accountable. I do this by embedding a novel revenue
experiment into a public awareness campaign conducted in a resource-rich district in Indonesia.
The experiment created distinct tax and windfall environments using an exercise in which the
tax group both paid a simulated tax to the district government and was primed on the share
of taxes in total government revenue. Those in the windfall group did not pay a simulated tax
and the share of the government budget that came from windfalls was primed. Importantly, the
experimental design minimizes the possible information benefits of taxation in order to isolate and
test the claim that taxation produces a stronger incentives to take political action. Moreover, by
varying different aspects of taxation in known ways, the experiment not only sheds light on whether
taxation motivates political action but also why.
The second goal of the paper is to redress the fact that stronger motivation and better in-
formation have so far been presented as alternate and distinct mechanisms for explaining why
taxation facilitates political action. Importantly, the motivational effect of taxation could have
important implications for how citizens become politically informed, suggesting that these mecha-
nisms might in fact relate. One possibility investigated in the paper is that taxation affects whether
people acquire information by motivating citizens to become politically informed or to demand bet-
ter transparency from government. Another possibility is that, once people are in possession of
information on government performance, revenue conditions how they process that information.
Notably, revelations of misused funds could provoke more political action when citizens pay taxes
(Sandbu, 2006; Ross, 2004). I test this latter possibility by embedding an over-lapping informa-
tion experiment into the public awareness campaign in which the treatment group obtained new
information on actual government spending while the control group received placebo information
only.
The campaign was conducted with 1,863 randomly sampled and randomly assigned adults from
93 villages around Blora district. Since Indonesia’s ‘big bang’ decentralization in 2001, districts like
Blora have acquired both significant resources and authority to manage local development. Virtu-
ally every district relies on windfall revenue in the form of central transfers, with some districts—like
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oil- and gas-rich Blora—beneficiaries of substantial additional revenue from natural resources.4 The
campaign itself was conducted in partnership with Indonesian NGOs and implemented by trained
canvassers in the three months preceding district head elections in 2010.5 The main outcomes of
interest—measured through both a survey and participation in a postcard campaign—are the effects
of taxation on monitoring, political participation, and withdrawing support from the incumbent
(sanctioning).
The main results show that taxation, compared to windfalls, can indeed affect political action.
The tax treatment caused a five percentage point increase in the share of participants willing to
monitor the budget. It also produced a six percentage point rise in using the postcard to signal
dissatisfaction to the incumbent. Interestingly, the tax treatment did not lead to more political
participation as measured both by turnout in the postcard campaign and in the survey. This
suggests that, at least in the context of this experiment, the perceived benefits of taking action
induced by taxation did not exceed the costs of more overt and costly types of political participation.
The fact that taxation did cause more monitoring and sanctioning can be attributed to the shift in
the perceived share of taxes and windfalls in the budget induced by the treatment, which affected
feelings of ownership over the budget and the relevance of the budget to daily life. These findings
provide not only the first micro-level evidence that taxation can produces stronger incentives than
windfalls to constrain government but also insights into why this is the case.
The findings also shed light on how taxation might affect the link between information and
accountability. By showing that taxation increased the willingness to monitor government, these
results take a step towards explaining where a more politically informed public comes from in
the first place. In so doing, they imply that any information benefits of taxation might not be
intrinsic but rather attributable to motivation after all. Yet, once in possession of better information
on government spending, the windfall group was not more tolerant of misuse. The information
4Focusing on the sub-national level in Indonesia is consistent with recent research that has suggested that the resource
curse is not only a national but also local phenomenon and that central transfers to local governments are revenue
windfalls(Brollo et al., 2010).
5The threat of a local resource curse was a central concern for the two Indonesian partner organizations, PATTIRO
and LPAW. These organizations have been working with district leaders in Blora since 2008 to promote transparency
in oil and gas revenues and the use of resource windfalls for social and economic development.
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treatment caused a notable 44 percentage point increase in the share of participants who felt that
government performed worse than initially believed, but the magnitude of the effect was about the
same in both the tax and windfall groups. This indicates that the information did not provoke a
more negative evaluation of government performance in the tax environment. Moreover, revelations
of misused funds did not induce more monitoring, participation, or incumbent sanctioning in the
tax than the windfall group; if anything, the effect of information on political action was as great,
if not greater, in the windall group.
This last finding has important implications for a growing empirical literature studying the
effects of information on political behavior and accountability. Recent studies have demonstrated
that exogenously improving access to information—through the efforts of government, the media or
civil society—affects whether and how citizens vote (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2010; Chong et al.,
2011; Banerjee et al., 2011), reduces corruption in public goods provision (Reinikka and Svensson,
2003), and hurts the re-election probabilities of corrupt incumbents (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Yet,
it is also true that transparency “is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to reduce corruption. In
addition to access to information, [people] need an ability to process the information and the ability
and incentives to act on the processed information” (Kolstad and Wiig, 2008, 524). Critically,
public goods in developing countries are rarely or only minimally financed by taxpayers (Bird and
Oldman, 1990; Bird and Zolt, 2005), but this literature has not yet considered whether the impact
of information on citizens’ political action will be less robust in windfall contexts because of weaker
incentives to use information to hold government accountable. In testing and finding no support
for this possibility, the results dispel this concern and point instead to the potentially substantial
dividends to using expenditure transparency to combat the detrimental effects of revenue windfalls.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents hypotheses for why taxes and windfalls
create different incentives for citizens to hold government accountable, and why different sources
of government revenue might affect how citizens become politically informed. Section 2.3 provides
background information on Indonesia as the setting for the experiment. The research design,
including the experiments and data collection are described in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the
main results for the effect of windfalls and taxes on political action while Section 2.6 evaluates the
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evidence that revenue conditions the effect of information on political behavior. In Section 2.7 I
use features of the experimental design and survey data to dig deeper into why taxation motivates
political action. Section 2.8 concludes by revisiting the implications of this study for both academic
literature and policy.
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses
2.2.1 Windfalls, taxes, and political action
Corruption and rent-seeking imply a failure or inability on the part of citizens to restrain opportunis-
tic politicians by credibly threatening to remove them from power. A substantial political economy
literature has focused on how taxation catalyzes citizens to discipline government—discipline pre-
sumed to be weak or absent where windfalls have diminished fiscal reliance on tax revenue. Brennan
and Buchanan (1980) show formally that a revenue-maximizing Leviathan can be induced to pro-
vide public goods when there is strong complementarity between the tax base and the good itself.
Bates and Lien (1985) develop a model in which government has an incentive to accede to the
policy preferences of the tax base, especially the owners of mobile assets, for the purpose of raising
tax revenues. The notion of taxation as a ‘revolutionary constraint,’ in which taxes determine in
part whether citizens overthrow government to obtain more favorable redistribution, is central to
theories of democratization in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Boix (2003), and Bueno de Mesquita
et al (2003). While much of the literature has developed with non-democratic government as the
starting point, the logic has readily extended to explain the quality of governance in democracies
as well (Moore and Rakner, 2002; Gibson and Hoffman, 2007).
Of central interest in this paper are three aspects of political action that citizens can use
to discipline government. First, taxation could motivate individuals to monitor and scrutinize
government (Devarajan et al., 2011).6 Monitoring politicians’ behavior is essential to political
6Testimony to how widely this is asserted comes from Collier and Hoeffler (2005a) who write “Public scrutiny is
generally weaker in countries with high natural resource rents because of lower taxation, as such patronage politics
are more likely” and make monitoring endogenous in a formal model by introducing “a standard political science
relationship in which citizens are provoked into scrutiny by taxation.”
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oversight and to the existence of an informed public (Miller, 2005; Banks, 1989; Olken, 2007; Davis
and Hayes, 1993; Bjorkman and Svensson, 2010; Grossman and Hanlon, 2011). Second, taxation
could make citizens more willing to take overt political action, from low-cost action like signing
a petition or voting in elections to more high-cost action like joining a protest. Yet, citizens can
use such participation either to signal support for or dissatisfaction with the incumbent. The
third aspect of restraint stems from the observation that higher taxes (holding spending constant)
are widely thought to hurt support for the incumbent and to induce political action against the
government (Niemi, Stanley and Vogel, 1995; Morrison, forthcoming).7
Following the literature, the main predictions are that taxes, compared to windfalls (and holding
spending constant) motivate citizens to:
H1 Monitor government.
H2 Participate in politics.
H3 Withdraw support for the incumbent (sanctioning).
2.2.2 Why do taxes motivate political action?
While the predominant view in political science is that taxation gives citizens stronger incentives
to monitor, participate, and sanction, we still know little about why this would be the case. The
literature suggests three distinct aspects of taxation that might drive incentives: The tax burden,
the share of taxes in total revenue, and the relationship between taxing and spending. Each in turn
are thought to motivate political action by altering individuals’ attitudes towards government.
One explanation for why taxes produce greater demand for good governance than windfalls cen-
ters on the tax burden, or the share of income paid in taxes. The literature has long acknowledged
that taxes tend to mobilize when they ‘bite directly’ (Brautigam, 2002, 11). Thus, income, property
or other direct taxes that create clear, and especially excessive, burdens are most closely linked
7An alternate hypothesis that has received less attention in political science is that the effect of taxation on incumbent
sanctioning could be conditional on satisfaction with government performance; if a person is satisfied with the govern-
ment, then making a contribution could elicit a ‘warm glow’, as suggested by recent neural studies (Harbaugh, Mayr
and Burghart, 2007). I test this alternate prediction in the online appendix and find instead that taxation actually
caused a sharper increase in incumbent sanctioning among those who were initially satisfied with the government.
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to political action (Scott, 1976; Moore, 1998).8 Research on the endowment effect in behavioral
economics and psychology provides insight into why a higher tax burden mobilizes action. Accord-
ing to prospect theory, people are more averse to out-of-pocket losses than to foregone gains of an
equivalent value (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991; Morewedge
et al., 2009). Sandbu (2006) summarizes why the endowment effect would make citizens care more
about $1 of misspent tax revenue than $1 of misspent windfall revenue:
[The] endowment effect is likely to occur with earned income. Tax payments are generally
perceived as a cost that people have to pay out of their earnings, and so people have an
incentive to hold the government accountable for how it spends their money. Natural
resource wealth that is wasted or stolen, in contrast, is more likely to be perceived as a
foregone gain, since it has never passed through the hands of the population and therefore
has never been ‘earned’ or ‘possessed.’ The endowment effect implies that the motivation
to hold the government accountable is less strong in the case of natural resource revenue
than in the case of taxes.
Another possibility is that citizens are motivated to take political action by the share of total
government revenue that comes from taxes. The ratio of taxes to total revenue has traditionally been
regarded as “the degree to which governments are dependent upon taxpayers for their revenues.
The higher that dependency, the more likely it is that governments will have to listen to their
citizens” (Waterbury, 1997, 157). Government’s fiscal dependence on taxation is associated with
the probability that it will offer policy or governance concessions. Thus, the higher the proportion
of taxes in total revenue, the more citizens might feel they have leverage over politicians and that
pressure on government will likely succeed in eliciting concessions.
Finally, citizens could be motivated to take action not by higher taxes alone but rather by the
level of taxes relative to spending. Ross (2004) defines this as the ‘price’ of public goods: “High
taxes would not produce greater demand for representative government, if the taxes were offset by
8As Mahon (2005) articulates: “The main advantage of a direct tax was the clarity of its incidence...it was...thought
that knowing for certain the scale of his contribution would make the citizen into a more responsible guardian of the
public purse.”
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greater benefits. Nor would a small tax bill necessarily lead to political quiescence. Both the size
of the tax burden, and the quality and quantity of government spending matter; citizens ultimately
care about the ‘price’ they pay for the government services they receive.” In a cross national test,
Ross (2004) indeed finds that it is the ratio of taxes to spending that brings about democratization.
The price of public goods captures the importance of expectations of fairness and reciprocity in
the ‘fiscal contract’ between state and society over the terms of taxation. As the price of public
goods rises—and particularly when taxes exceed the benefits provided in return—reciprocity in
the fiscal contract is breached, and deviations from norms of fairness and reciprocity are known
to be important psychological motivators (Bolton, Katok and Zwick, 1998; Camerer, 2003). Since
windfalls enable the provision of goods and services at little or no cost to the public, citizens are
more willing to acquiesce to poor performance.
2.2.3 Revenue and the relationship between information and political action
Predictions on why taxation motivates political action also have important implications for under-
standing the relationship between revenue, information, and accountability. As discussed in the
Section 2.1, both weak taxation and information asymmetries have been proposed as leading—but
so far distinct—mechanisms linking windfalls to bad governance. Perhaps because a more informed
public is the result of taxation, the taxation literature often presumes that citizens have perfect
information on the goods and services provided by government (Bates and Lien, 1985; Brennan
and Buchanan, 1980). Similarly, theories of how windfalls exacerbate information asymmetries
often overlook the effect on taxation. A central challenge for research going forward is identifying
empirically which mechanisms have explanatory power, under what conditions, and how different
mechanisms relate to one another. This paper, therefore, not only tests the motivational effect of
taxation but also considers the implications of this mechanism for the information story.
One possibility, already captured in H1, is that taxation motivates citizens to become more
informed or to demand transparency concessions from government. For many—especially in devel-
oping countries where education levels and access to information are low—the costs of information
exceed the perceived benefits and lead to political ignorance (Downs, 1957; Bimber, 2001; Jerit,
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Barabas and Bolsen, 2006). If paying taxes increases the perceived benefits to seeking out informa-
tion, then a government’s source of revenue could help explain how a good information environment
emerges endogenously. This is important because, while access to information is essential to ac-
countability, we still know little about the causes of fiscal transparency.
Another possibility is that taxation conditions how individuals evaluate the information on
government performance that they hold. The micro-foundations just discussed reveal why this
might be the case. If taxation induces an endowment effect and makes citizens care more waste, then
learning about misspent revenue should provoke a stronger political reaction in a tax environment
(Sandbu, 2006). Or, if citizens are sensitive to the ‘price’ of public goods, then information that
reveals that citizens are getting less for their taxes should motivate political action (Ross, 2004). In
sum, information that reveals wasted or misused funds and shifts beliefs about government spending
downward should be more likely to provoke political action in a tax than a windfall environment.
As mentioned in Section 2.1, this prediction has important implications for understanding not only
how information is processed but also whether improving access to information can mitigate the
detrimental effects of revenue windfalls. I test this prediction by adding the final hypothesis:
H4 Beliefs that government funds are wasted or misused will provoke higher levels
of monitoring, participation, and sanctioning for citizens in tax than in windfall
contexts.
The main hypotheses are summarized in Figure 2.1 following the experimental design and the
format in which results will be presented. The 2x2 table shows overlapping windfall and tax, and
low and high information, environments, which create four experimental conditions also depicted
in the figure below using. The first three hypotheses—that taxation leads to higher levels of mon-
itoring, participation, and sanctioning—are captured by a shift upwards of the tax line vis-a-vis
the windfall line (also denoted by the + in the far column of the table). The fourth hypothesis is
an interaction hypothesis in that the effect of information on all three types of political action is
predicted to be greater in a tax than a windfall environment. This prediction is captured by the
fact that the slope of the tax line increases more sharply than the slope of the windfall line (also
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indicated by the positive interaction term in the bottom right cell of the table).9
Windfall Context Tax Context Difference
(C1) (T1) (T1-C1)
Low info (C2) Group 1 Group 2 +
High info (T2) Group 3 Group 4 +






































Figure 2.1: Hypotheses. The table and figure depict the four main hypotheses. Taxes are predicted
to lead to more monitoring, participating, and sanctioning than windfalls, as denoted by the far
column of the table and the shift upwards of the tax line vis-a-vis the windfall line in the figure.
Evidence that the effect of information on political action will be greater in a tax than a windfall
environment is captured by the positive interaction effect in the bottom-right cell of the table and
by the fact that the slope of the tax line rises more steeply than the slope of the windfall line.
2.3 The Indonesia Context
As one of the world’s most populous and newly decentralized democracies, Indonesia presents a
highly relevant context for testing these hypotheses. Indonesia’s ‘big bang’ decentralization in 2001
9I focus in the paper on testing the effect of negative information because this fits the empirical setting—very few
participants found the information positive—and simplifies the predictions. It is still difficult to predict ex ante the
impact of negative information on all of the outcomes of interest. While learning that government is doing a bad job
should produce more incumbent sanctioning, it could lead to higher or lower levels of monitoring and participation
(Banerjee et al., 2011; Chong et al., 2011). Hence the +/− in the bottom row.
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devolved the authority to manage local development in key areas—including health, education,
water sanitation and infrastructure—to the district-level. This made districts the second most
important level of government in Indonesia after the national level. District governments now
receive more than 40 percent of total public funds to manage development locally. The promise
of decentralization lies in its ability to improve service delivery and strengthen accountability by
bringing state and society into closer proximity (Tiebout, 1956). A recent World Bank (2007) report
notes, however, that “local governments now have significant authority over planning and budgets,
but they do not yet have clear incentives to use these funds to maximize economic development
and service delivery outputs for local citizens.”
Democracy and accountability, while vibrant in post-Suharto Indonesia, are imperfect. Indone-
sians now directly elect both the executive branch and legislative branch at both national and local
levels. Electoral participation is still relatively high; voter turnout in the 2009 parliamentary elec-
tions was estimated at 71 percent and average turnout in local elections was estimated at 69 percent
(Meitzner, 2009). There also appears to be evidence of an anti-incumbency bias and turnover is
frequent. Yet, Indonesians often seem to express quiescence in the face of corruption and poor
governance. One possible explanation for this is (on Java at least) might be a deep-seated culture
of nrimo, a concept which loosely translates into “acceptance of everything without protest” and
which is closely associated with accepting one’s destiny (Irawaty, 2008). Javanese often attribute
bad outcomes, such as floods due to a dam breaking, to fate rather than to government misman-
agement. Such cultural contexts raise important questions about what mobilizes citizens to hold
their politicians accountable for poor performance.
One potentially important obstacle to political engagement in Indonesia stems from the fact that
these elected district governments are still fiscally dependent on revenue windfalls. The main source
of funding for districts are central government transfers through general allocation funds (Dana
Alokasi Umum, DAU), which on average finances more than 80 percent of district government
expenditures (World Bank, 2007, 23). Additionally, about ten percent of regional governments
receive income from natural resources, with producing districts receiving six percent of the oil
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revenues and 12 percent of the gas revenues that accrue to the center (World Bank, 2007).10 For
some well-endowed districts, this has resulted in substantial windfalls and, anecdotally, high levels
of corruption and mismanagement.11
Moreover, Indonesia’s tax system is both highly centralized and relatively weak overall. The
central government is responsible for setting tax rates and collecting revenue. District governments
receive shares of their natural resource, income and property taxes but have limited authority to
raise additional revenue through formal taxation (Brodjonegoro and Martinez-Vazquez, 2002; Fane,
2003; Lewis, 2003).12 The most recent legislation in August 2009 rationalized the fiscal system,
limiting local governments to a prescribed set of taxes and fees to minimize the growing proliferation
of illicit fees and taxes. Overall, tax effort (especially income tax effort) has been weak in Indonesia,
which could be due in part to the substitution of domestic taxes with taxes on natural resources
(Bahl and Tumennasan, 2004). While recently the government has endeavored to strengthen its
tax capacity, the vast majority of citizens have low or nonexistent formal tax burdens.
On the expenditure performance side, many districts in Indonesia are plagued by corruption
and poor budgeting. Common problems include weak capacity, rent-seeking, large allocations for
routine expenditures, poor reflection of policy priorities, and weak legislative oversight. There
are a number of obstacles to improving the budgetary process in Indonesia. While the system
contains a vehicle for participatory budgeting called the musrenbang, many are skeptical about
the effectiveness of this mechanism.13 Several NGOs in Indonesia, including PATTIRO, conduct
independent budget monitoring to increase public awareness of poor budgeting practices (Par, 2008;
KOP, 2008).
These features of fiscal and political life in Indonesia are all evident in Blora district. While
Blora is a relatively poor agricultural district, it anticipates substantial windfalls from the Cepu oil
10Aceh and Papua New Guinea have different deals negotiated as part of their special autonomy.
11One commonly cited example is Kutai Kartanegara (East Kalimantan), where natural resource windfalls are thought
to have led to a profusion of corruption and patronage (Evaquarta, 2010).
12Local governments do have authority to raise additional ‘local-own’ revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah, or PAD), but
PAD remains a small share of revenue at only 8.5 percent of total revenue (World Bank, 2007, 151).
13Musrenbang stands for musyawarah rencana pembangunan and refers to a series of consultative meetings on budget
priorities that start at the village level and go up to the district level.
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and gas block in addition to the transfers it already receives from the government (which comprise
the vast majority of its revenue). Concerns about the conditions for a local resource curse are
compounded by a history of budget management and inefficiency. Allegations of corruption were
particularly rife during the tenure from 1999-2009 of the former legislative chairman, Pak Warsit,
who actually ran for district head in the 2010 elections.14 For organizations like PATTIRO and
LPAW seeking to promote responsible government management of revenue windfalls, districts like
Blora present important opportunities for—and potentially significant obstacles to—strengthening
citizen demand for good government performance. It was in this context that the public awareness
campaign took place.
2.4 Research Design
To test the hypotheses described in Section 2.2 experiments were embedded in a public awareness
campaign conducted one-on-one by canvassers in participants’ homes. The experiments employed
novel exercises to create distinct tax and windfall environments and to vary citizens’ information on
government spending. The experiments were over-lapped to create four groups: (1) a less informed
windfall group, (2) a less informed tax group, (3) a better informed windfall group, and (4) a better
informed tax group. A total of 1,863 participants from 93 villages around Blora were randomly
sampled from the adult population and assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. I
use an original survey and postcard campaign to measure differences in government monitoring,
political participation, and incumbent support across the experimental groups.
14Warsit was arrested and tried in 2008 for corruption amounting to 5.6 milier rupiah (USD $721,000 in 2011 dollars)
in the 2004 district budget. He was originally convicted (along with three deputy parliamentarians) by a provincial
court but Warsit’s conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court just prior to the official candidate registration date
for district head elections. The ruling was reversed for Warsit and not for his three deputies. The decision, and its
timing, was widely regarded as suspect by the media and civil society in Blora. According to Indonesian law (Law
32/2004 on Regional Governance, sub-article 58f), anyone found guilty and sentenced to five or more years in prison
cannot run for office.
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2.4.1 The experiments
The public awareness campaign was designed to familiarize citizens in Blora with the concept of the
district budget and the role of elected officials in managing it. The campaign began with a three
illustration introduction (see Figure 2.2). The opening illustrations reminded participants that
they vote for their representatives; that their representatives make decisions about public services;
and that they should think about the future of the district when making political decisions.
All participants then took part in a household budgeting exercise (Figure 2.2). When they
initially consented to participate, individuals earned a small income in exchange for their time,
equivalent to about a half a day’s wage for an agricultural laborer. Specifically, the windfall group
earned 10,000 rupiah (about $1) and the tax group earned 14,000 rupiah (about $1.40). For the
budget exercise, the canvasser asked the participant to use this income to illustrate how they
allocate in their income in their own household budget. Participants were asked to select six cards
representing their household expenditures (e.g. clothes, education) and to divide their income
across these expenditures in accordance with how they planned to spend it. This exercise helped
to familiarize participants with the concept of a budget. It also aimed to deepen participants’
perceived ownership over their earned income, thus setting the stage for the revenue experiment.
2.4.1.1 Revenue experiment
In this experiment, the tax treatment required participants to make a simulated tax payment to
the district government and primed the share of taxes in total revenue; the windfall treatment
required no personal contribution and primed the salience of central transfers and natural resource
revenue in the district budget. Following the household budget exercise, the canvasser introduced
the district government budget, explaining that just as households get income that they allocate
across expenditures, so does the government. In the windfall treatment, participants were asked to
return their 10,000 rupiah in income to their pockets and the canvasser then took out a separate
10,000 rupiah representing district government income per capita. Using the windfall board (Figure
2.3, top), the canvasser divided the amount into 8,000 rupiah representing the share of revenue
from central government transfers, natural resources and other windfall revenues, and 2,000 rupiah
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Figure 2.2: Campaign Setup. You elect your leaders, and then what do they do (top left)? They
make decisions about public services, like education, health, infrastructure, and farming (top right).
Think about what you want Blora to look like in the future (bottom left). The ‘My Budget’ household
budget exercise game board (bottom right).
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representing revenue from other, unspecified sources.
In the tax treatment, things proceeded slightly differently after individuals allocated their in-
come in the household budget exercise. Rather than having participants return their income to
their pockets, the canvasser reminded participants that they (or citizens like them) often have to
pay taxes to the district government. To represent these tax obligations, the canvasser transferred
4,000 of the participants’ 14,000 rupiah income from the household budget board to the tax board
(Figure 2.3, middle). The canvasser then added 6,000 rupiah to the tax board from a separate pot,
representing income from other, non-tax sources. Both windfall and tax groups ended with the
equivalent of 10,000 rupiah on the board representing government income per capita, where the
only variation between the groups was the tax payment itself and the emphasized share of total
revenue from taxes or windfalls in the budget.15 Canvassers used this 10,000 rupiah to illustrate
real government spending in the subsequent information experiment.
2.4.1.2 Information experiment
The main goal of this experiment was to use new information to alter participants’s beliefs about
government spending performance. This experiment utilized the fact that many citizens in Blora
did not have accurate information on government spending beforehand. The treatment group
obtained information on the share of the budget spent on programs and services for citizens from
an analysis of the 2008 realized budget performed by the author and partner organizations.16 The
control group received placebo information in the form of a list of facts and figures taken from the
2008 Blora statistical yearbook (Blora dalam Angka).
Specifically, the information treatment used the 10,000 rupiah composed during the revenue
experiment, representing government income per capita, and the district budget game-board (Figure
2.3, bottom). The district budget game-board depicts how district elected leaders allocate revenue
15Individuals in both the windfall and tax treatments ultimately kept 10,000 rupiah in income to control for income
effects.
16The 2008 budget was selected because it was the most recent year for which realized spending data was available
and for which the incumbent district head and former legislative chairman (both candidates in the 2010 district head
elections) were responsible. Details on how the budget analysis were conducted are in the field manual, available on
the author’s website.
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Figure 2.3: Experiment ‘game-boards.’ The windfall game board (top); the tax game board (center);
and the information experiment spending game board (bottom).
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across five categories (plus an ‘other’ category): education, infrastructure, health, farming, and
politicians. The information was presented in four parts. First, the canvasser divided the 10,000
rupiah to illustrate the share of the total budget spent on each of the six sectors. Second, the
canvasser showed, within sectors, the share of the total budget spent on programs for citizens
versus routine administration. Third, to illustrate the fact that corruption further erodes spending
on programs for citizens, the campaign cited two recent cases of alleged corruption and removed
two cents from the board.17 Finally, the canvasser disaggregated spending in the ‘politicians’
category, breaking out the share that went to running the executive and legislative offices from
the share that Blora’s 46 elected representatives allocated to themselves for salaries, healthcare,
travel, and other private benefits. Overall, participants learned that about 30 percent of the total
budget was spent on direct programs and services for citizens. Since participants initially believed
that government was spending substantially more on citizens; this treatment identifies whether
poor spending performance (negative information) elicits a stronger reaction from the tax than the
windfall group.
2.4.1.3 A note on design
The design merits some explanation as one of the first attempts to use an experiment to simulate
windfall and tax contexts.18 One main advantage of the design is that it isolates the hypothesized
incentive effect of taxation from the information channel, which it does by giving both the wind-
fall and tax groups the kind of information that taxation is thought to be intrinsically better at
providing. One possible benefit of taxation is that it presents public finances in per capita terms
(Sandbu, 2006)—here information for both windfall and tax groups was presented as such. Simi-
larly, both groups learned about revenue and spending in terms of proportions of the total budget,
17Participants were told that the actual scale of corruption in the budget was not known and that the two cents removed
was meant to represent the fact that corruption exists.
18This is (to my knowledge) the first experimental test of the causal impact of taxes (versus windfalls) on political
preferences and behavior. Other studies have experimentally manipulated a tax to identify impacts on economic
behavior (Chetty, Looney and Kroft, N.d.; Sausgruber and Tyran, 2008; Finkelstein, forthcoming; Blumkin, Ruffle
and Ganun, N.d.). There are also been several experimental studies of the determinants of tax compliance (Alm,
Jackson and McKee, 1992; Alm and McKee, 2003; Cummings et al., 2006; Torgler, 2007).
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not in terms of magnitudes, which are difficult to comprehend. The experiment also minimized
fiscal illusion for both groups by establishing clear linkages between revenue, spending, and the
district government.19 These design features should increase confidence that any effect of taxation
is due to stronger incentives, not better information.
A second advantage is that the design helps to clarify why taxation creates stronger incentives
to take political action. The tax treatment exogenously varies three distinct and theoretically-
motivated aspects of taxation: The tax burden, the perceived share of taxes in total revenue, and
the perceived ratio of taxes to spending. How the experiment does this, and the advantages of this
approach, are elaborated in the Appendix. While it was not possible to vary each aspect of taxation
independently, I present survey evidence in Section 2.7 to uncover which aspects of taxation drive
the main results.
2.4.2 Sampling and randomization
Participants in the campaign were randomly sampled using multi-stage cluster sampling from the
adult population in Blora. The target population was all individuals between the ages of 17 (the
voter eligibility age) and 65 who had resided in Blora for at least six months. First, 93 of 295 villages
were randomly sampled within strata formed by subdistrict and urban-rural status. Within each
village, one sub-village unit (dusun) was randomly sampled, followed by the random selection of
20 households from an updated list of all households in the dusun. Canvassers then sampled one
participant in each household on arrival using simple random sampling from a full list of eligible
household members made in consultation with a household member. The random assignment of
participants to treatment was done in advance by the author. Random assignment was blocked at
the village-level so that, of the 20 participants per village, five were randomly assigned to each of
the four experimental conditions.
A number of steps were also taken to minimize design and timing effects. To reduce effects
19Fiscal illusion is often a raised as concern with respect to the link between taxation and accountability; complex
systems of fiscal federalism weaken the mapping from taxes to spending and thus making it harder for citizens to
know where to place blame (McCulloch, 1975 (original edition 1845; Buchanan, 1967; Buchanan and Wagner, 1977;
Dollery and Worthington, 1996; Herb, 2003).
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associated with variation in canvasser abilities, assignment to treatment in each village was blocked
on individual canvassers so that each canvasser conducted two treatment and two control campaign
versions per village. Quotas were also set so that gender balance across experimental conditions and
canvassers was achieved. Finally, to minimize timing effects, villages were divided geographically
into three groups and the order in which implementation teams visited villages was randomized.
Random assignment was implemented by providing canvassers with a schedule for each village that
matched a randomly selected household to an experimental condition and informed canvassers of
whether they should sample a male or female participant in that household.20
2.4.3 Data
Data comes from two sources: Participation in a postcard campaign and an original survey. Survey
data was collected by canvassers during the same visit. Upon consent, canvassers implemented a
pre-treatment module that inquired into individual and household characteristics, such as demo-
graphics, public goods usage, political participation, and experience with taxation. Additionally,
post-treatment modules were implemented immediately following both the revenue and information
experiments to provide measures of the main outcomes as well as of underlying attitudinal change.
The survey was identical for all participants, regardless of their treatment assignment.
The well-known concern with surveys is that they do not provide reliable measures of real
political behavior because responses are costless and subject to social desirability bias. I therefore
use participation in a postcard campaign as a revealed preference measure of political behavior. At
the end of the campaign, canvassers gave all participants the opportunity to return postcards. The
postcard asked participants to indicate whether they were “satisfied with the district government
in Blora and don’t want to change anything about how it works” (a reward for good performance)
or whether they “want the district government in Blora to do a better job” (a sanction for bad
performance).21 To crystallize the perceived benefits of taking action, participants were informed
20A more detailed description of the sampling and randomization procedure is available in the design memo, available
on the author’s website. The final sample consists of 1,863 individuals, including the original goal 1,860 plus three
additional participants randomly sampled in a small number of villages with non-compliance.
21If they selected the latter, they were also asked to indicate their level of support for five different governance reforms
CHAPTER 2. KEEPING THE PUBLIC PURSE 34
that the results of the postcard campaign would be shared with candidates in the lead up to the
district head elections to encourage them to respond to public opinion.22
Returning the postcard intentionally entailed a small cost. Participants had up to 24 hours to
deposit their postcards in specially designated mailboxes located in their community. On average,
participants lived about a 10 minute walk from the mailbox location. This small cost in terms
of time and energy is akin to various types of low cost political action, like signing a petition or
contacting an official. The postcard campaign also resembles the voting decision in that participants
had to decide both whether to turnout and whether to use their postcards to reward or punish
the incumbent government. Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics on the main outcome measures
from both the survey and postcard campaign.
2.4.4 Randomization check
Evidence from a one-way anova of baseline survey data shows that, as expected, randomization
produced a balance in pre-treatment covariates across the four experimental conditions (Table 2.2,
Panel A). The data in Panel B also provides a picture of participants’ previous experience with
taxation in the district. Overall, 93 percent of all participants reported that their household had
paid at least one tax in the previous 12 months.23 Of those, 62 percent reported that they had
personal experience with paying a tax. Participants were also familiar with the idea of taxes going
to the local government; about 67 percent said they thought tax payments primarily go to the
district. The fact that citizens in Blora have some experience with taxation plausibly facilitated
the priming effect of the tax treatment.24 As can be seen in Panel C, participants also generally
had a low level of political knowledge; only nine percent had heard something about the work of the
promoted by PATTIRO and LPAW, and to indicate their priority reform. I do not analyze the outcomes for each
reform here since those were primarily intended for the partner organizations.
22This was accomplished in a subsequent voter education experiment, results forthcoming.
23Over 90 percent of all households report paying streetlight tax (Rp. 46,000 annually) and property tax (pajak bumi
dan bangunan, or PBB, Rp. 34,000 annually). The biggest single tax, paid by 57 percent of the population, is the
vehicle tax at almost Rp. 260,000 annually. Only three percent of households pay income tax, with an average annual
payment of Rp. 1.2 million.
24Tellingly, when asked during the pilot how they felt about paying the tax in the campaign, many participants
responded ‘same as always’ (biasa saja).
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Range Confidence Interval
min max mean SD Lower Upper n
Panel A: Monitoring
Willing to learn more about budgeta (%) 0 1 .79 .01 .77 .80 1,863
Willing to learn more about govt.b (%) 0 1 .78 .01 .76 .80 1,862
Scrutinize budgetc (%) .91 .01 .89 .92 1,858
Panel B: Participation
Political actiond (mean of 5) 0 5 1.32 .02 1.27 1.36 1,863
Participation (postcard campaign)e (%) 0 1 .78 .01 .77 .80 1,863
Panel C: Incumbent Sanctioning
Plan to vote for incumbentf (%) 0 1 .53 .02 .48 .57 458
Plan to vote for former leg. Chairmang (%) 0 1 .09 .01 .07 .12 458
Net sanctioning (postcard campaign)h (%) -1 1 .75 .01 .73 .77 1,857
Panel D: Perceptions of Government
Performance worse than expectedi (%) 0 1 .49 .01 .46 .52 1,851
Panel E: Aspects of Taxation
Gamble to win morej (%) 0 1 .49 .01 .48 .51 1,853
Gamble to avoid lossk (%) 0 1 .18 .01 .17 .19 1,848
Posteriors on taxes/total revenuel (%) 0 1 .24 .00 .23 .25 1,836
Posteriors on windfalls/total revenuel (%) 0 1 .63 .01 .62 .64 1,842
Changed opinion about district gov’t.m(%) -1 1 .67 .01 .65 .69 1,850
Dissatisfaction with governmentn (%) 0 1 .67 .01 .65 .69 1,845
Distrust district heado (%) 0 1 .55 .01 .53 .57 1,853
Citizen ownership over budgetp (%) 0 1 .78 .01 .77 .80 1,830
Relevance of budget to daily lifeq (%) 0 1 .86 .01 .85 .88 1,850
Citizens have powerr (%) 0 1 .77 .01 .75 .79 1,853
Appropriate to criticizes (%) 0 1 .87 .01 .85 .88 1,858
Note: Table reports the summary statistics for the main dependent variables from both the survey and the
postcard campaign.
aHow interested are you in learning more about how the district government spends money in the budget?
(interested=1)
bHow interested are you in learning more about what the government of Blora is doing? (interested=1)
cYou should pay more attention to what the district government does. (agree=1)
dRegarding a problem or an issue that was affecting your daily life of your community, would you in the future
[contact a village/subdistrict official, contact the district head, contact a local legislator, contact the media or an
NGO, take part in a demonstration]? (average response of 5)
eReturned postcard=1
fSupport for the [incumbent district head=1/former legislative chairman=1].
gTurned out and sanction=1, turnout and reward=-1, abstain=0
hElected leaders in the district government are doing a [worse job (=1)/better job (=-1)/the same job (=0)] than
you thought they were?
iImagine there are two envelopes—inside one envelope there is 0 rupiah and inside the other envelope there is
4,000 rupiah...Would you rather receive [...] for certain or would you rather take the risk between obtaining 0 or
4,000 rupiah? (recorded amount for certain as a percentage of Rp. 4,000).
jLet’s say there’s a chance that you will have to spend 4,000 rupiah from your income...You could, however, pay
some amount for sure to avoid the possibility it will break. Would you rather pay [...] for sure or take the risk?
(recorded amount they would rather take the risk as a percentage of Rp. 4,000).
k For every 10,000 rupiah the district government gets in income, how much do you think comes from taxpayers
in Blora?
l...comes from the central government and oil and gas?
mWould you say the information you just heard changed your opinions about district government? (yes=1)
nHow satisfied are you with how the district government manages the budget? (dissatisfied=1)
oHow much do you trust the district head to do the right thing for people in Blora? (distrust=1)
pArg A: The money in the budget belongs to citizens in Blora vs Arg B: The money in the budget belongs to the
district government (agree with A=1).
qThe budget is relevant to your daily life (agree=1).
rPeople have power to get the district government to do what they want (agree=1).
sIt is appropriate for you to criticize government (agree=1).
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
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Treatment Groups
1 2 3 4 P-value
Range Sample Windfall, Tax, Windfall, Tax, oneway
min max Mean no info no info info info Fk-1, n-1 ANOVA n
Panel A: Demographics
Age 17 65 41.7 41.7 41.7 41.8 41.5 0.06 .980 1,818
Female (%) 0 1 50 51 50 50 50 0.04 .989 1,863
Muslim (%) 0 1 99 99 99 100 99 0.86 .460 1,863
Javanese (%) 0 1 100 100 100 100 100 0.33 .802 1,862
Married (%) 0 1 90 89 90 92 91 0.86 .461 1,862
Completed at least primary school 0 1 72 71 74 73 70 0.78 .506 1,862
Can read a newspaper (%) 0 1 81 80 84 82 79 1.18 .315 1,861
Numeracy quiz scorea 0 5 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.03 .993 1,863
Employed Full-time (%) 0 1 64 66 62 64 63 0.62 .604 1,863
Working in agriculture (%) 0 1 70 71 68 69 71 0.45 .716 1,477
Panel B: Tax Experience
Paid a tax in previous 12 months (%) 0 1 93 93 92 95 94 1.13 .335 1,863
Personal experience paying a tax (%) 0 1 62 64 61 63 60 0.76 .514 1,824
Believe taxes go to district government (%) 0 1 67 65 70 66 67 0.86 .459 1,608
Panel C: Political Knowledge
Political awareness quiz scoreb 0 5 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.11 .956 1,863
Know about district headc (%) 0 1 9 9 9 10 9 0.17 .918 1,847
Notes: Table reports results from a randomization check using a oneway ANOVA across the four experimental conditions.
aMean number of answers correct (out of 5) from a math quiz in the survey.
bMean number of answers correct (out of 5) from a political awareness quiz in the survey.
cHow much would you say you’ve heard about the work of the district head over the last 12 months? (not much/nothing=1, some/a
lot=0).
Table 2.2: Randomization Check and Baseline Data
district head in the previous 12 months. This supports the notion that the information provided
in the second experiment would be new to many participants.
2.5 Main Results
2.5.1 Estimation and hypothesis testing
Treatment effects and hypotheses tests presented here employ design-based inference. Let Zrt
denote treatment assignment, where the superscript r ∈ {0, 1} indicates assignment to the tax
treatment when r = 1 or the windfall treatment when r = 0. Similarly, t ∈ {0, 1} indicates assign-
ment to the information treatment when t = 1 or to the control when t = 0. Since the experiments
were cross-cutting, there were four possible treatment assignments: Zrt ∈ {Z00, Z10, Z01, Z11}. We
are interested in estimating treatment effects across several pairings of these groups so to generalize
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the superscripts can be dropped. Let Z ∈ {0, 1} where Z = 1 refers to a group designated to be
the treatment group in a particular pairing and Z = 0 the control. There are N individuals and
0 < M < N are randomly assigned to treatment. Using potential outcomes notation, Y 1i then
denotes the outcome for individual i assigned to treatment and Y 0i the outcome an individual in
the control. In an experiment an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect (τ) can be
obtained simply by taking the difference in means outcomes for the treatment and control groups
(Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974):










Note, the estimate of the average treatment effect used here is based on assignment to treatment
(not actual treatment status). There were only seven participants who did not receive the treatment
version to which they were initially assigned (which is often called ‘non-compliance’), in all cases
due to canvasser error. Using treatment assignment is conservative in the presence of such non-
compliance since it makes it more difficult to identify treatment effects by mixing the treatment
and control groups.25
For the variance of the estimate of this average treatment effect, I use standard errors first
developed by Neyman (1923). This approach is conservative (produces bigger standard errors)
because it assumes that the covariance between potential outcomes at the individual level (which
cannot be measured directly) is zero. I also provide ‘randomization inference’ p-values from a Fisher
exact test (Fisher, 1935; Rosenbaum, 2002). I implement the test by comparing the probability of
observing a treatment effect as big as the true effect (produced by the actual treatment assignment)
to the randomization distribution of treatment effects under the null, generated by reproducing the
random assignment in 10,000 simulations.26
25Average treatment effects for only those who complied with their initial treatment assignment, obtained by using
the treatment assignment indicator as an instrument for actual treatment status, are available from the author upon
request.
26In a regression approach, when random assignment is blocked it is common to cluster standard errors at the level
at which blocking occurred. Clustering at the village-level in this case produced standard errors that are smaller,
which is an indication of negative intra-cluster correlation in the treatment groups. An advantage of randomization
inference p-values is that they are non-parametric and do not depend on the clustered nature of the data. No
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2.5.2 Monitoring
I first investigate the effects of revenue on participants’ willingness to monitor government and
become politically informed (H1), proxied by three survey questions reported in Table 2.3. The
table layout mirrors the predictions found in Table 2.1. Each panel reports the means of the
windfall and tax groups overall (row one), in the low information environment (row two), and the
high information environment (row three). In this section, I focus on identifying whether taxes
produce more political action than windfalls, captured by the predicted positive difference between
the tax and windfall groups reported in the final column of each panel. The subsequent section
revisits these tables to evaluate support for the fourth hypothesis by comparing the differences in
the impact of information on political action in the windfall and tax groups as revealed in the final
row of each panel.
The first two questions in Table 2.3 inquire directly into how willing participants are to learn
more about how the district government manages the budget (Panel A) as well as what the district
government is doing in general (Panel B). Taxes have a positive effect on willingness to monitor
both the budget and government more broadly, and the effect pertaining to budget scrutiny is
clearly significant. Overall, the tax group was five percentage points more willing to monitor the
budget than the windfall group. The four percentage point difference is almost significant at the
95 percent confidence level for the low information group (p-value=.065) and is a significant six
percentage points higher in the high information group (p=.017) (see also Panel A of Figure 2.5).27
Substantively, the magnitude of the treatment effect is about half the size of the effect of having
at least some primary school education; those who had completed at least primary school were
11 percentage points more willing to monitor the budget. While the response to a more abstract
question asking participants whether they should “pay more attention” to the district government
provides no evidence of treatment effects (Panel C), the first two measures support the prediction
modelling assumptions are needed to calculate the randomization distribution of the test statistic; the validity of the
test depends on the randomization alone (Imbens and Rubin, 2009).
27I also confirm that this result is driven by a shift upwards in the tax group vis-a-vis the windfall group rather than
a shift downwards of the windfall group. In the pre-treatment survey, 71 percent of all participants wanted to learn
more about the budget; the treatment increased willingness to monitor in both the windfall and tax groups but more
so in the latter.
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Windfall (C1) Tax (T1) Diff (T1-C1)
Panel A: Willingness to monitor the budgeta
All (Tax) .76 .81 .05***
(n)/(s.e.) (932) (931) (.02)
RI p-value .003
Low Info (C2) .73 .77 .04*
(n)/(s.e.) (466) (465) (.03)
RI p-value .065
High Info (T2) .79 .85 .06**
(n)/(s.e.) (466) (466) (.02)
RI p-value .017
Diff (T2-C2) .07** .08*** .01
(s.e.) (.03) (.03) (.04)
RI p-value .006 .001 .710
Panel B: Willingness to monitor governmentb
All (Tax) .76 .79 .03*
(n)/(s.e.) (931) (931) (.02)
RI p-value .086
Low Info (C2) .73 .75 .02
(n)/(s.e.) (466) (465) (.03)
RI p-value .363
High Info (T2) .80 .84 .04
(n)/(s.e.) (465) (466) (.03)
RI p-value .136
Diff (T2-C2) .07*** .09*** .01
(s.e.) (.03) (.03) (.04)
RI p-value .003 .001 .713
Panel C: Pay more attention to governmentc
All (Tax) .91 .90 -.01
(n)/(s.e.) (928) (930) (.01)
RI p-value .707
Low Info (C2) .91 .91 .00
(n)/(s.e.) (465) (464) (.02)
RI p-value .970
High Info (T2) .91 .90 -.01
(n)/(s.e.) (463) (466) (.02)
RI p-value .581
Diff (T2-C2) .01 .00 -.01
(s.e.) (.02) (.02) (.03)
RI p-value .670 .938 .711
Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or standard
errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values from a Fisher exact test
reported below and *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01 based on the RI p-values.
The intersection of the ‘Diff’ columns is the difference-in-difference (interaction)
effect of the treatments.
aHow interested are you in learning more about how the district government
spends money in the budget? (interested=1)
bHow interested are you in learning more about what the government of Blora
is doing? (interested=1)
cYou should pay more attention to what the district government does.
(agree=1)
Table 2.3: Willingness to Monitor
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that taxation creates a greater demand for information on government.
2.5.3 Participation
I next investigate the impact of windfalls and taxes on participants’ willingness to take overt political
action (H2) using data from both the survey and postcard campaign, with results presented in Table
2.4. To assess whether the treatments made participants more willing to take action to address
issues affecting their lives or their communities, the survey asked about five types of non-electoral
political behavior. These included contacting a village or subdistrict official, the district head, a
local legislator or the media, or taking part in a demonstration. The results reported in Panel A of
Table 2.4 show no evidence that taxation had an impact on plans to take more overt political action,
either directly or in response to updated beliefs about government spending. This pattern also holds
when analyzing the types of action individually. The survey also asked about plans to vote in the
upcoming district head elections but the measure is problematic in that an unrealistically high 99
percent in each group said they planned to vote in the elections (not shown). This reflects the
difficulty of relying on costless self-reported measures of political behavior when social desirability
bias is likely high.
Participation in the postcard campaign, as a revealed preference, provides a better measure
of willingness to take political action. As can be seen in Panel B of Table 2.4, however, taxation
did not cause more participants to exert effort to return their postcards; while 78 percent of
all participants returned their postcards, there is no detectable variation in return rates across
experimental conditions (see also Panel B of Figure 2.5. As an actual behavioral measure, returning
the postcard entailed a small cost. Such costs have been identified as an obstacle to participation
(Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). While these costs are balanced across groups pre-treatment (and
thus could not explain differences in outcomes across groups) it is possible to analyze whether there
was variation across groups in willingness to accept these costs.
In both the overall data and in the low information environment, the effect of the tax treatment
on willingness to return the postcard did not depend on participants’ distance from the mailbox,
as shown in Panels A-B of Figure 2.4. Yet, as can be seen in Panel C, in the high information
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Windfall (C1) Tax (T1) Diff (T1-C1)
Panel A: Willingness to take political actiona
All (Tax) 1.29 1.34 .05
(n)/(s.e.) (932) (931) (.05)
RI p-value .164
Low Info (C2) 1.26 1.33 .07
(n)/(s.e.) (466) (465) (.06)
RI p-value .190
High Info (T2) 1.32 1.35 .03
(n)/(s.e.) (466) (466) (.07)
RI p-value .529
Diff (T2-C2) .06 .03 -.03
(s.e.) (.06) (.07) (.09)
RI p-value .249 .624 .631
Panel B: Participated in postcard campaignb
All (Tax) .79 .78 .00
(n)/(s.e.) (932) (931) (.02)
RI p-value .883
Low Info (C2) .77 .78 .01
(n)/(s.e.) (466) (465) (.03)
RI p-value .633
High Info (T2) .80 .79 -.02
(n)/(s.e.) (466) (466) (.03)
RI p-value .528
Diff (T2-C2) .03 .00 -.03
(s.e.) (.03) (.03) (.04)
RI p-value .192 .830 .414
Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or standard
errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values from a Fisher exact test
reported below and *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01 based on the RI p-values.
The intersection of the ‘Diff’ columns is the difference-in-difference (interaction)
effect of the treatments.
aRegarding a problem or an issue that was affecting your daily life of your
community, would you in the future [contact a village/subdistrict official, contact
the district head, contact a local legislator, contact the media or an NGO, take
part in a demonstration] (average response of 5)
bReturned postcard=1
Table 2.4: Political Participation
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Figure 2.4: Costs of Participation. The figures show the impact of the tax treatment on participating
in the postcard campaign for the full sample (top), the low information group (middle), and the high
information group (bottom). The interaction is positive and significant at p=.052 in the latter.
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environment—where participants were more dissatisfied with government performance and the
benefits to participation were plausibly higher—there was a positive and significant interaction
between the tax treatment and mailbox distance (p=.052). In other words, when participation
costs were high, the tax group was more likely than the windfall group to return the postcard,
which suggests some support for H2.
2.5.4 Incumbent sanctioning
I turn finally to examining the effect of windfalls and taxes on support for the incumbent government
(H3). I use survey data on self-reported vote choice as well as the overall sanctioning effect of the
postcard campaign, presented in Table 2.5. The public awareness campaign took place in the three
months leading up to district head elections, which provided an opportunity to investigate the
impact of of the treatments on anticipated vote choice. The three candidates for district head
included the incumbent, the former chairman of the district legislature, and a third challenger
with ties to the bureaucracy and a popular muslim organization. Notably, the former legislative
chairman was widely suspected of corruption at the time of the election, as described in Section
2.3. Participants were asked in the survey which candidate they most supported at that time, with
the prediction that taxation makes citizens more likely to withdraw support from the incumbent
(sanctioning).
While low statistical power makes it difficult to detect significant differences across groups,
the signs on the treatment effects in Table 2.5 provide suggestive evidence that the tax treatment
produced higher support for the incumbent district head (Panel A) and lower support for the former
legislative chairman (Panel B).28 One plausible explanation for this outcome is that participants
attributed bad spending performance to both the incumbent district head and the former legislative
chairman. In that case, the election would be a choice between two poorly performing incumbents
and, given the suspicions of corruption surrounding the former legislative chair, participants opted
28Low power is due to two reasons. First, candidates officially registered during the fourth week of implementation,
so the questions on vote preferences were added to the survey only after the campaign had already been conducted
with 400 participants (the highest possible n is 1485). (The order in which villages were visited was randomized,
however, so the remaining sample still reflects a random sample of the population.) Second, the non-response rate
on this question was high because it is a politically sensitive question.
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Windfall (C1) Tax (C1) Diff (T1-C1)
Panel A: Support for the Incumbent
All (Tax) .51 .55 .04
(n)/(s.e.) (231) (227) (.05)
RI p-value .466
Low Info (C2) .48 .51 .04
(n)/(s.e.) (115) (109) (.07)
RI p-value .590
High Info (T2) .54 .58 .03
(n)/(s.e.) (116) (118) (.07)
RI p-value .667
Diff (T2-C2) .06 .06 .00
(s.e.) (.07) (.07) (.09)
RI p-value .339 .394 .980
Panel B: Support for Challenger
All (Tax) .11 .08 -.03
(n)/(s.e.) (231) (227) (.03)
RI p-value .342
Low Info (C2) .11 .10 -.01
(n)/(s.e.) (115) (109) (.04)
RI p-value .758
High Info (T2) .10 .06 -.04
(n)/(s.e.) (116) (118) (.04)
RI p-value .323
Diff (T2-C2) -.01 -.04 -.03
(s.e.) (.04) (.04) (.05)
RI p-value .812 .326 .576
Panel C: Net sanctioning–Postcard Campaign
All (Tax) .74 .76 .01
(n)/(s.e.) (928) (929) (.02)
RI p-value .529
Low Info (C2) .71 .77 .06**
(n)/(s.e.) (465) (464) (.03)
RI p-value .041
High Info (T2) .78 .75 -.03
(n)/(s.e.) (463) (465) (.03)
RI p-value .253
Diff (T2-C2) .07** -.02 -.09**
(s.e.) (.03) (.03) (.04)
RI p-value .014 .480 .023
Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or standard
errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values from a Fisher exact test
reported below and *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01 based on the RI p-values.
The intersection of the ‘Diff’ columns is the difference-in-difference (interaction)
effect of the treatments.
aSupport for the incumbent district head (support=1)
bSupport for the challenger (the former legislative chairman) (support=1)
cTurned out and sanction=1, turnout and reward=-1, abstain=0
Table 2.5: Incumbent Support
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for the “lesser of two evils.” There is no evidence that the treatments affected support for the other
challenger (not shown), which could be because less was known about him at the time as the public
awareness campaign was implemented before the start of the official political campaign period.
I corroborate these results by analyzing the postcard campaign as the main revealed preference
measure of willingness to take action to demand better performance from government. To provide
a composite ‘net sanctioning effect’ measure, I code all those who returned their postcard and
signaled that the want government to do better as 1, those who returned their postcard and said
they were satisfied with the status quo as -1, and those who abstained from participating as 0. As
can be seen in Panel C of Table 2.5 and Figure 2.5, there is little evidence that taxation on average
produced a greater impetus to sanction the incumbent than windfalls. Yet, the average effect
obscures interesting variation across low and high information groups. While the tax treatment
had no effect in the high information environment, taxpayers were six percentage points more likely
than the windfall group to use their postcards to sanction the incumbent in the low information
environment (p-value=.041). These results indicate support for H3, at least in the low information
environment. They also point to an unexpected relationship between revenue and information,
which I discuss more in the next section.
2.5.5 Summary of main results
The main results support H1, that windfalls and taxes create different incentives to become politi-
cally informed about government in general and the budget in particular. Evidence for H3 is also
provided in showing (suggestively) that taxes and windfalls affected support for candidates in the
district head elections and that taxes motivated participants in the low information environment
to use their postcards to sanction the incumbent. There is less support for the hypothesis that
different sources of government revenue create a differential willingness to participate in politics, as
predicted by H2. One possible explanation for this pattern of results is that taxation increased the
perceived benefits of restraining government for participants. Yet, the benefits of taking political
action still have to exceed the costs and behavior like monitoring is less costly than more overt
forms of political participation. The findings support this interpretation when the costs of partic-
























































Panel C: Net Sanctioning (Postcard)
Figure 2.5: Main Results. Figures show results for the effect of the tax and information treatments
on willingness to monitor the budget (Panel A), participation in the postcard campaign (Panel B),
and the net sanctioning effect of the postcard campaign (Panel C).
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ipation in the postcard campaign are taken into account: Participation in the tax group dropped
off significantly less steeply than participation in the windfall group as participants’ distance from
the mailbox increased but only in an environment where participants were more disgruntled about
government spending.
The findings also shed light on the relationship between taxation and information. In showing
that taxation made participants willing to learn more about government, it supports the notion
that taxation enhances demand for information. In the next section I investigate whether windfalls
and taxes also condition how individuals process information on government spending.
2.6 Does Revenue Condition the Impact of Information on Polit-
ical Action?
The fourth hypothesis predicts that the impact of information on political action depends on
whether taxpayers finance public goods. To evaluate this hypothesis, we revisit the results pre-
sented above, but this time with a focus on the interaction between revenue and information.
Specifically, I regard as support for this hypothesis evidence that information causes more mon-
itoring, participation, and incumbent sanctioning in a tax than a windfall environment. This is
denoted by a positive and significant interaction in the bottom right cells of each panel or a steeper
increase in the slope of the tax line, as shown in Figure 2.5 for the main measures.
With respect to monitoring, Panels A and B of Table 2.3 show that, contrary to the prediction,
the effect of information was approximately equivalent in both the windfall and tax groups. For
instance, the bottom row in Panel A shows that better information caused a seven percentage
point increase in willingness to monitor government in the windfall group and an eight percentage
point increase in the tax group. The fact that these magnitudes are about the same is captured by
the lack of a positive and significant interaction term. These results suggest that the relationship
between information and taxation might be additive rather than interactive.
In contrast, the information had no effect on participation in the postcard campaign in either the
windfall or tax groups, as reported in Panel B of Table 2.4. The fact that, in the high information












Figure 2.6: Spending Priors. Figure compares actual spending (as revealed by the treatment) to prior
ideals and beliefs about government spending across the six categories highlighted in the information
campaign.
environment, the tax group was more likely to return postcards than the windfall group at high
costs of participation weakly suggests some support for H4. The results for the net sanctioning effect
of the postcard campaign presented in Panel C of Table 2.5 show yet another pattern, however:
A significant negative interaction between revenue and information. This occurs because, while
information increased the net sanctioning effect of the postcard campaign by a significant seven
percentage points in the windfall group, it had no detectable effect on the tax group. This indicates
either a ceiling or a substitution effect in that participants were provoked to punish the incumbent
either by taxation or by the information but there was little added value to having both. All in all,
while the data shows three different patterns in how revenue and information relate, there is little
evidence to support the main pattern of interest: That information provokes more political action
when people pay taxes.29
Before dismissing H4, however, it is important to check that the information treatment ‘worked’
29It is difficult to shed additional light on which pattern is ‘true’ in the context of this experiment. On one hand, it
is possible to theorize why taxation and information might be substitutes; this would be the case, for instance, if
taxation primarily motivated people to become politically informed. In the experiment, participants were not given
the opportunity to acquire their own information, however, making the results all the more puzzling. Future studies
interested in shedding more light on the relationship between revenue and information should allow for downstream
information acquisition.
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Windfall (C1) Tax (C1) Diff (T1-C1)
Panel A: District leaders doing a worse job than expected
All (Tax) .56 .57 .01
(n)/(s.e.) (927) (924) (.02)
RI p-value .508
Low Info (C2) .34 .34 .01
(n)/(s.e.) (463) (458) (.03)
RI p-value .849
High Info (T2) .77 .79 .02
(n)/(s.e.) (464) (466) (.03)
RI p-value .530
Diff (T2-C2) .43*** .45*** .01
(s.e.) (.03) (.03) (.04)
RI p-value .000 .000 .746
Panel B: Dissatisfaction with budget management
All (Tax) .68 .70 .01
(n)/(s.e.) (915) (917) (.02)
RI p-value .585
Low Info (C2) .51 .53 .02
(n)/(s.e.) (452) (453) (.03)
RI p-value .529
High Info (T2) .86 .86 .00
(n)/(s.e.) (463) (464) (.02)
RI p-value .873
Diff (T2-C2) .35*** .33*** -.01
(s.e.) (.03) (.03) (.04)
RI p-value .000 .000 .736
Panel C: Distrust the district head
All (Tax) .56 .55 -.01
(n)/(s.e.) (926) (927) (.02)
RI p-value .716
Low Info (C2) .42 .39 -.03
(n)/(s.e.) (464) (464) (.03)
RI p-value .338
High Info (T2) .69 .71 .01
(n)/(s.e.) (462) (463) (.03)
RI p-value .653
Diff (T2-C2) .27*** .32*** .04
(s.e.) (.03) (.03) (.04)
RI p-value .000 .000 .319
Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or standard
errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values from a Fisher exact test
reported below and *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01 based on the RI p-values.
The intersection of the ‘Diff’ columns is the difference-in-difference (interaction)
effect of the treatments.
aElected leaders in the district government are doing a worse job (=1)/better
job or about the same job (=0) than you thought they were?
bHow satisfied are you with the way the district government manages the budget?
(dissatisfied=1)
cHow much do you trust the district head to do the right thing for people in
Blora? (distrust=1)
Table 2.6: The Effect of Information on Attitudes, Conditional
on Revenue
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in that it indeed shifted participants beliefs about government spending. I use data from a district
budget exercise conducted with participants just prior to the information experiment to measure
participants’ initial ideals and beliefs about public spending. All participants were asked to the use
the 10,000 rupiah from the revenue experiment (and the district budget game-board) to illustrate
how they would spend the funds if they were the decision-maker (ideals) and how they think
government actually spends the funds (beliefs). Participants were also asked to estimate the share
they thought government actually spent both on: (a) all programs for citizens, and (b) on the
programs of greatest priority to the respondent. As can be seen in Figure 2.7, while actual spending
on education was far greater than what participants wanted or expected, spending was lower than
desired or expected for health, infrastructure and farming. In general, participants estimated that
government spent about 55 percent of its revenue on public services and direct programs for them;
the campaign revealed the true amount in 2008 to be 30 percent.
Table 2.6 confirms that what participants learned caused them to view the district government’s
performance in a substantially worse light. The information caused a 43 percentage point increase
in the share of participants who felt government was doing worse than expected and a 45 percentage
point increase in the tax group. Better information increased dissatisfaction with management of
the budget by 34 percentage points (Panel B) and distrust in the district head by 30 percentage
points (Panel C). Results of a similar pattern and magnitude apply for questions on dissatisfaction
with the district government overall and distrust in local legislators.
All in all, the results in this section show that the new information indeed caused learning;
namely, participants learned that government was performing worse than initially believed. Con-
trary to H4, however, both the windfall and tax groups were equally displeased. This strongly sug-
gests that the incentive effect of taxation was not conditonal on beliefs about government spending.
If anything, the results point to the effects of information being as great, if not greater, in windfall
contexts.30 One important implication of these findings is that, while taxation motivates citizens
to restrain government, there are also substantial dividends to improving access to information in
30A caveat to this statement is that we might expect the effect of providing information in a tax environment to be
different (higher or lower) if people also have the opportunity to become better informed on their own, which I did
not allow for with this design.
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windfall environments directly.
2.7 Why Does Taxation Motivate Action?
While the findings provide little support for H2 and H4, taxes increased both the willingness to
monitor government (H1) and to use the postcard to sanction the incumbent government (H3).
This section provides deeper insight into these results by using the survey data and features of the
experimental design to shed light on why taxes motivated monitoring and sanctioning. As discussed
in Section 2.4.1.3 and the appendix, the revenue and information experiments exogenously varied
three theoretically-motivated aspects of taxation: The tax burden, the share of taxes in total
revenue, and the ratio of taxes to spending (the ‘price’ of public goods). Of note, in finding no
support for H4, I can also rule out the possibility that participants were driven to action by increases
in the price of public goods induced by the experiment.31 I therefore focus instead on investigating
how the tax treatment affected the first two aspects of taxation.
Panel A in Table 2.7 present measures designed to capture whether participants felt tax burden,
or the ‘loss’ of their earned income associated with the tax payment itself. Out-of-pocket loss is
difficult to measure directly so the survey employed two questions adapted from the procedure
developed by Becker, DeGroot, and Marshcak to elicit risk tolerance for monetary gambles (Becker,
DeGroot and Marschak, 1964). The main measure is willingness to gamble for a gain, where the tax
group is expected to be more risk-seeking than the windfall group. This comes from the notion that
a member of the tax group—who suffered the pain of an out-of-pocket loss of 4,000 rupiah from their
endowment—should be more eager to take a risk to win that 4,000 rupiah back than a member of
the windfall group would be to win an ‘additional’ 4,000 rupiah (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).32
The results presented in the first row of Table 2.7 show, however, that the windfall and tax groups
31This is because, by experimental design, sensitivity to the price of public goods would also have manifested itself as
a positive interaction between the revenue and information experiments.
32The measures used here derive from the S-shaped value function in prospect theory, which kinked at the reference
point (the origin) and more steeply sloped in the domain of loses than of gains. The assumption is that the tax shifted
those in the tax group down the slope into the domain of losses while the windfall group remained at its reference
point. This is consistent with the observation by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 286) that: “An unexpected tax
withdrawal from a monthly pay check is experienced as a loss, not as a reduced gain.”
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display no difference in risk tolerance for a gamble to win additional funds.
I also employ a measure of willingness to gamble to avoid a loss. Prospect theory suggests a
greater sensitivity to an initial loss of an endowment than to an additional deduction, which implies
that the windfall group would be more risk-seeking than the tax group in a gamble to avoid a loss
of 4,000 rupiah. The results in the second row are in the opposite direction than predicted and also
substantively small.33 Overall, while it is difficult to rule out that participants registered the tax
burden induced by the experiment, the data provides little confirmatory support.
There is strong evidence, however, that the revenue experiment shifted the perceived share of
tax revenue to total revenue in the district budget (Panel B). Row three shows that participants in
the baseline on average estimated that 30 percent of total revenue comes from taxes, and that—
as expected—there was no difference across groups. Following the tax treatment, the tax group
updated its beliefs to estimate that about 38 percent came from taxes while the windfall group
decreased its estimate to 10 percent, a significant 26 percentage point difference (row six). Similarly,
the windfall group increased its perceived share of windfall revenue to about 80 percent, compared
to nearly 46 percent in the tax group, a significant 34 percentage point difference (row seven).34
This evidence of the tax treatment’s impact is reflected in turn in a clear change in attitudes
towards the budget, as proxied by three survey questions presented in Panel C of Table 2.7. In
general, the tax treatment caused a six percentage point increase in the share of respondents who
claimed that taxation changed their opinion about the district government (row six). To measure
specifically feelings of ownership over the district budget, one question asked participants whether
they thought the money in the budget “belongs to citizens in Blora” or “belongs to the district
government” (row seven). The tax group was four percentage points more likely to claim ownership
33The fact that the sign is positive is consistent with a discussion in the literature that people have trouble integrating
losses and that losses tend to accumulate; if so, the result could provide some support that participants actually
registered the tax payment (Coombs and Avrunin, 1977; Thaler and Johnson, 1990).
34While the campaign script highlighted that the ratio in the tax treatment was hypothetical to avoid deception, these
results indicate that participants interpreted them as fact. The second step taken during the design stage to avoid
deception was to use the real ratio for the windfall group and to fix the ratio for the tax group based on our best
estimate on individuals’ prior beliefs. We estimated this to be 40 percent from focus group discussions, although, as
can be seen here, the real priors were 30 percent on average. We were close but not exact and consequently there
was some unintentional deception.
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for citizens. Similarly, to measure affinity to the district budget, another question asked participants
whether they agreed with the statement that “the budget is relevant to your daily life” (row eight).
The difference between the tax and windfall groups is a positive and significant five percentage
points for this measure.
There is no evidence, however, for other types of attitudinal change suggested in Section 2.2.
One possibility is that people simply dislike paying taxes and taxation elicits anger and frustration
towards the government. Rows nine and ten present measures of dissatisfaction and distrust in the
district government, but there is no evidence of a significant difference between the windfall and tax
groups. Given the strong indication that participants shifted the perceived share of taxes in total
revenue, I also investigate whether the tax treatment made citizens feel more empowered vis-a-vis
local government, associated with perceptions of the government’s fiscal dependence on society.35
To assess this possibility, the survey asked participants whether they think citizens “have power to
get the district government to do what they want” and whether they agree that “it is appropriate
for citizens to criticize government.” Rows 11 and 12 of Panel B show no evidence of any difference
in feelings of empowerment between the windfall and tax groups.
In sum, the data suggests that the incentive effect of taxation observed in the main results is
most likely due not to the tax payment itself but rather to a shift in beliefs about the share of
government revenue from taxation. This in turn resulted in a greater sense of perceived ownership
over district government funds and an appreciation of the relevance of the budget to daily life.
There is no support for the possibility that taxation evokes more negative feelings towards the
government or that citizens felt more empowered vis-a-vis government as a result of the perceived
increase in its fiscal dependence on society.
35While the tax treatment did not bring about an objective change in citizens’ leverage over government, it nonetheless
might have primed a stronger sense of efficacy or higher expectations of government responsiveness, associated with
government’s fiscal dependence on citizens. The notion that a change in perceptions could matter comes from the
role of opportunity structure in the literature on collective action and contentious politics. According to this view,
collective action emerges as a response to changes in political constraints confronting groups (Tilly, 1978; McAdam
and Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 1998). Kurzman (1996) has argued that what mattered to successful mobilization in the
Iranian revolution was not an objective change in the opportunity structure but rather a perceived change.
CHAPTER 2. KEEPING THE PUBLIC PURSE 54
Sample Windfall Tax Diff (T1-C1)
Mean (C1) (T1) Diff (se) p-value n
Panel A: Tax Burden
1 Gamble for gaina (%) .49 .49 .49 .00 (.02) .939 1,853
2 Gamble to avoid lossb (%) .18 .17 .19 .02* (.01) .061 1,848
Panel B: Taxes/Total Revenue
3 Priors on taxes/total revenuec .30 .31 .30 -.01 (.10) .501 1,179
4 Posteriors on taxes/total revenuec .24 .10 .38 .29*** (.57) .000 1,836
5 Posteriors on windfalls/total revenued .63 .80 .46 -.34*** (.80) .000 1,842
Panel C: Attitude change
6 Changed opinion about district gov’t.e .71 .68 .75 .06*** (.02) .000 1,857
7 Citizen ownership over budgetf .78 .77 .80 .04** (.02) .029 1,830
8 Relevance of budget to daily lifeg .86 .84 .89 .05*** (.02) .000 1,850
9 Dissatisfaction with governmenth .69 .68 .70 .01 (.02) .585 1,832
10 Distrust district headi .55 .56 .55 -.01 (.02) .716 1,853
11 Citizens have powerj .77 .78 .76 -.02 (.02) .248 1,853
12 Appropriate to criticizek .87 .86 .87 .02 (.02) .304 1,858
The first three columns report the means for the full sample, the windfall group, and the tax group respectively. Columns 4-6
report the difference in means, standard errors, and randomization inference p-values, where *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01.
All data comes from survey measures taken immediately following the revenue experiment, except for rows 7 and 8, which were
taken following the information experiment.
aImagine there are two envelopes—inside one envelope there is 0 rupiah and inside the other envelope there is 4,000 rupiah...Would
you rather receive [...] for certain or would you rather take the risk between obtaining 0 or 4,000 rupiah? (recorded amount for
certain as a percentage of Rp. 4,000).
bLet’s say there’s a chance that you will have to spend 4,000 rupiah from your income...You could, however, pay some amount
for sure to avoid the possibility it will break. Would you rather pay [...] for sure or take the risk? (recorded amount they would
rather take the risk as a percentage of Rp. 4,000).
c For every 10,000 rupiah the district government gets in income, how much do you think comes from taxpayers in Blora?
d...comes from the central government and oil and gas?
eWould you say the information you just heard changed your opinions about district government? (yes=1)
fArg A: The money in the budget belongs to citizens in Blora vs Arg B: The money in the budget belongs to the district
government (agree with A=1).
gThe budget is relevant to your daily life (agree=1).
hHow satisfied are you with how the district government manages the budget? (dissatisfied=1)
iHow much do you trust the district head to do the right thing for people in Blora? (distrust=1)
jPeople have power to get the district government to do what they want (agree=1).
kIt is appropriate for you to criticize government (agree=1).
Table 2.7: Why Taxation Motivates Political Action
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Changed Opinion
Satisfaction with gov't.
Trust in district head
Ownership over Budget
Budget relevant to daily life
Power over government
Appropriate to criticize
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
Figure 2.7: Why taxes motivate political action. The figure presents results from Panel C of Table
2.7 graphically. The bars indicate the differences between the tax and windfall groups for survey
measures of attitudes towards government (first two rows), attitudes towards the budget (second two
rows), and perceived leverage over government (bottom two rows).
2.8 Conclusion
Understanding when and why windfall revenue undermines development remains a central focus of
political economy research. While a number of compelling explanations for the resource curse ex-
ist, knowledge of which mechanisms have explanatory power, under what conditions, and how they
relate to one another remains elusive. This paper sought to address this challenge by conducting a
test of the validity of a specific but prominent mechanism: That windfalls and taxes have a differ-
ential impact on citizens’ motivation to take political action and hold politicians accountable. This
paper provides possibly the first micro-level, causal evidence that taxes indeed motivate citizens
to monitor government and sanction the incumbent more than windfalls. In finding less support
for the prediction that taxation mobilizes political participation, the findings highlight the need to
consider how taxation affects the perceived benefits of taking action vis-a-vis the costs.
The paper also provides insights into why taxes motivate political action. The literature has
variously suggested—but offered little evidence to substantiate—whether citizens are motivated to
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take action by their tax burdens, by the share of taxes in total revenue, or by the ratio of taxes to
spending. The results indicate that higher levels of monitoring and sanctioning can be attributed
to the fact that the revenue experiment caused participants to perceive a greater share of the total
budget came from taxes. This was associated with a greater sense of ownership over district public
funds and an appreciation of the relevance of the budget to their daily lives.
A further contribution of this paper is to shed light on the role played by revenue in the rela-
tionship between information and accountability. The evidence indicates that taxation increased
demand for information on government, implying that taxation could help to explain how a more
informed society comes about. There is no support for the prediction the hypothesis that revenue
conditions how people evaluate information on government spending, however; revelations of mis-
used funds did not elicit a greater response from taxpayers than from individuals in a windfall
environment.
The findings presented here have important implications for understanding not only the causes
of the resource curse but also policy options to mitigate it. For one, the paper lends support
to policy approaches that favor requiring citizens to pay taxes or otherwise contribute directly
to the provision of public goods. The heavy reliance on different types of windfall revenue in
developing countries raises concerns about a resource curse emerging in a wide variety of contexts,
from transfer-dependent local governments in newly decentralized democracies to villages receiving
windfall aid through community-driven development initiatives (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). The
findings here provide some support for policies that seek to strengthen citizen contributions to
funding public goods to improve both monitoring and accountability.
The results also suggest that there are direct gains to improving expenditure transparency and
helping citizens become better informed about how politicians are using public funds, especially
in windfall environments. This paper was motivated in part by the concern that citizens are
more permissive of poor spending performance when government is financed by windfalls instead
of taxes. Yet, this does not appear to be the case: The impact of providing participants with
negative information on government spending was as great, if not greater, in windfall than in tax
contexts. While much of the focus on transparency in natural resource rich places has centered on
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improving revenue transparency through initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI), the results here help to demonstrate the importance of elevating the emphasis on
expenditure transparency (Kolstad and Wiig, 2008).
The findings also point to avenues for future research. Additional research is needed to investi-
gate more closely the effects on political behavior of changes to the tax burden, the share of taxes
in total revenue, and the price of public goods. While it was beyond the scope of this experiment
to exogenously change each of these quantities individually and with sufficient variation, the ap-
proach taken here points to the benefits of clarifying further the micro-foundations under-pinning
the incentive effect of taxation. Further, while this paper simulated a lump-sum personal income
tax, additional research should focus on identifying causally the impact of other types of direct
and indirect taxes—including value-added taxation, a leading source of tax revenue in developing
countries—on political behavior.
Finally, this paper highlights the need for additional research identifying the causal effect of
taxes and windfalls on the political behavior of politicians and the quality of government. While
this paper shows that taxation gives citizens stronger incentives to restrain government, evidence
that it likewise gives politicians the incentives to make government more transparent, responsive
and efficient is still needed. Only through such future research will the full effects of windfalls
and taxes on motivating citizens to become more vocal and active keepers of the public purse be
understood.
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2.9 Appendix to Paper: Experimental Design
To shed light on why taxation produces incentives to take political action, the tax treatment
exogenously varied three distinct and theoretically-motivated aspects of taxation. The first aspect
was the tax payment itself: Members of the tax group faced a 29 percent tax rate on their earned
income from the campaign, which implies that they also had a higher tax burden than members of
the windfall group (defined as the ratio of taxes paid to income, see Panel A).
The experimental design strove for realism in simulating this tax payment. In particular, the tax
treatment imitated the core components of an actual payment, defined as a mandated transfer from
an individuals’ income to the government at at an exogenous rate. To elicit the sense of an income
tax payment, participants had to feel that they were paying income they had earned.36 Canvassers
emphasized at the outset that the payment was in exchange for the two hours of the participants’
time that the campaign would take; the household budget exercise was intended to deepen further
participants’ sense of ownership over the payment. In this context, the role of the canvassers in
transferring the income was akin to employer income tax withholding. An additional advantage
was that tax compliance was held constant at 100 percent. A final benefit was that, by simulating
a tax payment rather than simply priming previous tax experience, the treatment was designed
to resonate with participants regardless of whether they had previous real-world experience with
taxation. This was important because it was believed at the outset that few citizens in Blora had
substantial exposure to taxation.
The second difference was that the tax and windfall treatments altered the relative perceived
share of total revenue from taxes in the budget (Panel B). In particular, the tax group learned that
40 percent of total revenue came from taxes. In contrast, the windfall group was informed that 80
percent of the budget comes from windfalls, which implies that up to 20 percent could come from
taxes, depending on participants’ beliefs about other sources of revenue. To avoid deception, the
share of taxes to total revenue in the windfall treatment approximated reality; the share in the tax
treatment was calibrated to reflect participant priors based on estimates obtained during piloting
36According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 286): “An unexpected tax withdrawal from a monthly pay check is
experienced as a loss, not as a reduced gain.”
59 CHAPTER 2. KEEPING THE PUBLIC PURSE
and focus groups. Participants in both groups were also informed that the revenue composition of
the budget was hypothetical and illustrative only.
Finally, the experiments jointly affected the ‘price’ of public goods, defined here as the ratio of
tax revenue to spending on direct programs and services for citizens in the budget. As Ross (2004,
247) notes, “A rise in the price of government services can either take the form of a rise in taxes
for a constant set of government services, or a constant level of taxes with a cut in government
services.” While the tax experiment altered the numerator of that ratio as just described, the
information experiment altered the denominator. Specifically, the spending experiment informed
participants that 30 percent of the budget was spent on citizens, whereas beliefs in the low infor-
mation group are participants’ priors (Panel C). Panel D shows how the ‘price’ of public goods
changes across the experimental conditions. When true spending is less than prior beliefs on aver-
age, it is straightforward to see how the price of public goods rose across experimental conditions.
Moreover, the ratio of taxing to spending only exceeded parity for informed taxpayers.37 If citizens
are indeed mobilized to hold government accountable not just as prices rise but only when taxes
exceed spending, informed taxpayers should exhibit the highest responses. The experimental design
is therefore consistent with the original hypotheses.
37Given that average priors on government spending were 30 percent, the mean price of public goods was $.43 for the
windfall group and $.83 for the tax group in the low information environment. By experimental design, the price
of public goods in the high information environment was set to be $.67 for the windfall group and $1.33 for the tax
group.
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Notes: The panels present details of the three aspects of taxation varied exogenously by the experiments. Panel A shows the
tax burden (the ratio of taxes paid to income earned in the experiment). Panel B depicts the shift in the perceived share of
taxes in total revenue. Panel C shows the effect of the information treatment, where the low information group kept its initial
beliefs about government spending while the high information group learned that government spent 30 percent of total revenue
on citizens. Panel D is the price of public goods, obtained by putting the numerator in Panel B over the numerator in Panel C.
Table 2.8: Detailed Summary of the Treatments
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2.10 Online Appendix
This online appendix contains supplementary results, discussion, and robustness checks for the
main paper. The appendix is organized roughly in the order in which additional analysis is referred
to in the paper.
2.10.1 Does the effect of taxation depend on satisfaction?
Section 2.2 in the main paper discusses the alternate prediction that the effect of taxes on incumbent
support is conditional on satisfaction with government performance. In other words, higher taxes
(holding spending constant) will not necessarily lead to less incumbent support but rather to more
rewarding of incumbents for those who are satisfied with government performance.
To investigate support for this alternate prediction, I examine how the effect of the tax treatment
on four of the main outcomes of interest varies depending on a pre-treatment measure of satisfaction
with government performance. Satisfaction was measured in the survey by the question: “How
satisfied are you with the way the district government in Blora is doing its job overall?” where
dissatisfied was coded 1 and satisfied coded 0.
Table 2.9 shows that the net sanctioning effect of the postcard campaign is the only outcome
that varies based on satisfaction. Yet, the significant negative interaction in the full sample and in
the low information environment indicate that the tax treatment caused more sanctioning among
those who were initially satisfied with district government performance. This result is also shown
in Figure 2.8, which shows that on average, and particularly in the low information group, the tax
treatment caused a steeper increase in net sanctioning among those who were originally satisfied.
In sum, there is little support for the alternate prediction that paying taxes makes people reward






























Performance Worsea Monitor Budgetb Participation (Postcard)c Sanctioning (Postcard)d
Panel A: Tax Treatment (Overall)
Tax .04 .05* .03 .07**
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Dissatisfaction .29*** .03 .02 .08**
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Tax*dissatisfaction -.05 -.01 -.07* -.11**
(.05) (.04) (.04) (.05)
Panel B: Tax Treatment (Low Info)
Tax .05 .03 .05 .15***
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.05)
Dissatisfaction .41*** -.01 .04 .14***
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.05)
Tax*dissatisfaction -.08 .03 -.08 -.17**
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.07)
Panel C: Tax Treatment (High Info)
Tax .02 .08** .01 -.01
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Dissatisfaction .19*** .07* .01 .02
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Tax*dissatisfaction .00 -.03 -.05 -.05
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.06)
Constant .41 .13 .67 .75 .74 .76 .77 .74 .79 .70 .63 .77
n 1,758 874 884 1,768 883 885 1,768 883 885 1,762 881 881
Notes: Table reports results from separate regressions of the form Yij = α + β1Tij + β2Xij + β3(Tij ∗Xij) + εij where Tij is the treatment indicator
(tax group=1) and Xij is the pre-treatment covariate of interest. Neyman standard errors are reported in parentheses, where *p<.10, ** p<.05, and
*** p<.01. Dissatisfaction was measured pre-treatment in the survey with the question: “How satisfied are you with the way the district government in
Blora is doing its job overall?” where dissatisfied was coded 1 and satisfied coded 0.
aElected leaders in the district government are doing a worse job (=1)/better job or about the same job (=0) than you thought they were?
bHow interested are you in learning more about how the district government spends money in the budget? (interested=1)
cReturned postcard=1
dTurned out and sanction=1, turnout and reward=-1, abstain=0
Table 2.9: Does the Effect of Taxation Depend on Satisfaction?





































































Panel C: High Information
Figure 2.8: Does the effect of taxation on net sanctioning in the postcard campaign depend on
satisfaction? The figures show the tax treatment effect on net sanctioning in the postcard campaign,
conditional on satisfaction, for the full sample (top), the low information group (middle), and the
high information group (bottom).
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2.10.2 Does the effect of taxation depend on mailbox distance?
Section 2.5.3 in the main paper shows that the tax group is more likely to return postcards than
the windfall group as the cost of participation increases. Table 2.10 presents the regression results
behind Figure 2.5 in the main paper. The results show that there is a positive and significant
interaction between the tax treatment and mailbox distance in the high information environment
(p=.052). The triple interaction between the tax treatment, information treatment, and mailbox
distance is also positive and significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
Participation (Postcard Campaign)a
Full sample Low Info High info Full sample
Tax treatment -.02 .04 -.08* .04
(.03) (.05) (.04) (.05)
Mailbox distance (min) -.00* .00 -.01*** .00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Tax*mailbox distance .00 .00 .01* .00









Constant .82 .76 .87 .76
N 1,849 924 925 1,849
Notes: The first three columns reports results from separate regressions of the form Yij =
α+β1Tij+β2Xij+β3(Tij∗Xij)+εij where Tij is the treatment indicator (tax group=1) and
Xij is the pre-treatment covariate of interest. The fourth column reports all constituent
elements of a triple interaction between the tax treatment, information treatment, and
mailbox distance. Neyman standard errors are reported in parentheses, where *p<.10, **
p<.05, and *** p<.01. Mailbox distance is a continuous measure (in minutes) obtained
from the survey question: “During the rainy season, how many hours or minutes does it
take to walk to the [postcard mailbox location]?”
aReturned postcard and sanctioned=1, returned postcard and rewarded=-1, abstained=0.
Table 2.10: Does the Effect of Taxation on Participation Depend on
Mailbox Distance?
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2.10.3 Were participants sensitive to the price of public goods?
As discussed in Section 2.4.1.3, Section 2.7 and the appendix, the experiment was designed to
shift the perceived price of public goods, defined as the ratio of the share of taxes to the share
of spending on citizens in the budget. By experimental design, a positive interaction between the
tax and information experiments would be regarded as support for the notion that participants
reacted to the rising price of public goods induced by the experiment. The results presented in
the paper show little evidence that this is the case, however. I confirm this lack of support with
an additional survey measure presented in Table 2.11. The survey asked participants whether they
felt their taxes were too high, about equal to, or relatively low compared to “the value to you of
the public services [they] receive from the district government.”
There is some indication that the tax treatment caused participants to feel their taxes were too
high relative to services in the low information environment. Yet, the information treatment caused
on average a 22 percentage point increase in the share of participants who felt the price of public
goods was too high and this effect was about the same size in both the windfall and tax groups.
In other words, while participants indeed registered an increase in the price of public goods, this
was primarily due to a downward shift in the denominator of the ratio (beliefs about government
spending) rather than an upward shift in the numerator (beliefs about the share of taxes in total
revenue).
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All (Info) Windfall (C1) Tax (C1) Diff (T1-C1)
All (Tax) .42 .46 .04
(921) (924) (.03)
.106
Low info (C2) .33 .30 .36 .06*
(922) (461) (461) (.04)
.095
High info (T2) .55 .54 .56 .02
(923) (460) (463) (.04)
.546
Diff (T2-C2) .22*** .24*** .20*** -.04
(.03) (.04) (.04) (.05)
.000 .000 .000 .445
Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or standard errors in
parentheses. Randomization inference p-values from a Fisher exact test reported below and
*p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01 based on the RI p-values. The intersection of the ‘Diff’
columns is the difference-in-difference (interaction) effect of the treatments. The question
wording was: “Your taxes are too high (=1), about equal to (=0), too low compared to (-1)
the value to you of the public services your receive from district government.”
Table 2.11: The Price of Public Goods
2.10.4 Does the effect of taxation depend on previous tax experience or priors?
Section 2.7 in the main paper uses features of the experimental design (discussed in the appendix to
the paper) and the survey data to explore why taxation motivates more political action. Specifically,
it focuses on whether participants reacted to the simulated tax payment or to the shift in the
perceived share of taxes and windfalls in the district budget. The results provide little conclusive
support that participants reacted to the tax burden induced by the treatment and suggest instead
that the results were driven by the perceived changes in the budget share coming from taxes. In
this section I use pre-treatment data on participants previous experience with taxation and their
prior beliefs about the share of revenue from taxes to look for additional support for these findings.
I begin by looking at whether the effect of the tax treatment on three main outcomes of interest
varied depending on previous experience with taxation. One possibility is that the simulated tax
payment primed actual experience with paying taxes. If this were the case, we would expect to see
that the effect of the tax treatment on political action outcomes would be bigger for those with
more previous experience with taxation or bigger real-world burdens. Another possibility is that
the tax treatment effectively simulated a tax payment regardless of previous tax experience. This
would suggest that the effect of the tax treatment would not depend on prior exposure to taxation.
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Table 2.12 presents the effect of the tax treatment on three of the main outcomes of interest,
conditional on four different measures of real world tax experience. The measures include whether:
(1) the household had paid at least one tax in the previous 12 months; (2) the participant had
personally ever paid a tax; (3) annual household taxes in the previous 12 months were high (greater
than the mean); and (4) the household was poor (implying the 4,000 rupiah tax from the 14,000
rupiah income would matter more the participant). There is almost no evidence that any of these
factors conditioned the effect of the tax treatment on monitoring, participation, or sanctioning. This
suggests that participants either did not react to the simulated tax payment in the experiment or—
since this is difficult to rule out for reasons mentioned in the paper—that the tax payment did not
‘work’ by priming real world tax experience.
I next look at whether the effect of the tax treatment on political action varied depending
on prior beliefs about the share of taxes in total revenue. The main results suggest that the tax
treatment had a significant impact on shifting the perceived share of windfalls and taxes in the
budget. The tax treatment primed a (hypothetical) scenario in which 40 percent of the district
government budget came from taxes. I predict that the tax treatment would provoke political action
among those with low priors (priors less than 40 percent) because these participants would have
learned that a greater share of the budget comes from taxes than initially believed. Conversely,
the tax treatment could have reduced political action among those with high priors (priors greater
than or equal to 40 percent), would have learned that government revenue was less dependent on
taxes.
Table 2.13 presents results for the effect of the tax treatment on three of the main outcomes
of interest, conditional on prior beliefs about the share of taxes in total revenue, coded as 1 if
priors were less than 40 percent (meaning more political action predicted) and zero if they were
greater than or equal to 40 percent (the results are robust to coding observations at 40 percent
as 1 instead of 0). The results show that, in the low information environment, the tax treatment
provoked a worse outlook on government performance among those who learned there were more
taxes in the environment. The tax treatment caused significantly more monitoring among those
who learned that there were more taxes in the budget (see also Panel A of Figure 2.10). While
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of prior beliefs on taxation. The figures shows the pre-treatment distribution
of prior beliefs about the share of taxes in total revenue.
these results are consistent with predictions, the effect was surprisingly opposite for participation
and net sanctioning in the postcard campaign: The tax treatment induced more participation and
sanctioning in the postcard campaign among those who learned that taxes were a smaller share of
the budget.
One possible explanation is that the results reflect not the effect of a decrease in the perceived
share of taxes in total revenue but rather an increase in the perceived share of windfalls in total
revenue. Yet, as can be seen in the final two columns, there is no indication that perceptions of the
share of windfalls in total revenue varied depending on tax priors. Another possibility is that this is
an artefact of the fact that 37 percent of the sample is missing data on prior tax beliefs; restricting
analysis to those with tax priors might not capture the effect of the shift in the perceived share of






























Learn more about Budget† Participation (Postcard)‡ Net Sanctioning (Postcard)§
Overall Low Info High Info Overall Low Info High Info Overall Low Info High Info
Panel A: Paid taxesa
Tax treatment -.05 -.13 .06 -.03 -.06 .01 -.09 -.11 -.06
(.08) (.09) (.13) (.08) (.11) (.10) (.09) (.12) (.12)
Paid taxes -.04 -.17*** .12 .01 .04 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.06
(.05) (.06) (.10) (.06) (.08) (.08) (.06) (.08) (.08)
Treatment*paid taxes .10 .18* .00 .03 .08 -.03 .11 .19 .03
(.08) (.10) (.13) (.08) (.11) (.11) (.09) (.12) (.13)
Panel B: Paid taxes personallyb
Tax treatment .02 .00 .04 -.02 -.02 -.02 .00 .02 -.02
(.03) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.05) (.05)
Participant paid -.03 -.04 -.03 -.01 -.06 .03 -.03 -.10** .04
(.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.05) (.04)
Treatment*participant paid .05 .07 .02 .03 .05 .01 .02 .07 -.02
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.06) (.04) (.06) (.06)
Panel C: Annual taxes highc
Tax treatment .04 .03 .05 .00 .02 -.01 .02 .07* -.04
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Annual tax high .03 .07 -.01 -.04 -.01 -.07* -.04 .00 -.07*
(.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.05) (.04)
Treatment*annual tax high .03 .04 .03 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 .01
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.06) (.04) (.06) (.06)
Panel D: Poord
Tax treatment .08*** .06 .09*** -.01 .02 -.03 .00 .06 -.06
(.02) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Poor -.02 -.09** .05 .06** .05 .08** .05 .02 .08**
(.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.05) (.04)
Treatment*Poor -.05 -.03 -.08 .01 -.01 .04 .04 .01 .07
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.06)
Table reports the average effect of the tax treatment over standard errors in parentheses, where *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01.
†How interested are you in learning more about how the district government spends money in the budget? (interested=1)
‡Returned postcard=1
§Turned out and sanction=1, turnout and reward=-1, abstain=0
aHousehold paid at least one tax in the previous 12 months.
b“You just mentioned that you pay taxes. Do you personally pay taxes or is another member of your household usually the one to pay? (personally=1)
cAnnual household taxes are greater than the mean=1.
d“I would like you to think of your village in terms of three levels of poverty/wealth. Imagine that each level has about the same number of households
in it. In your opinion, relative to other households in your village, which level is your household on? (lowest level=1)






























Performance Worse Learn more about Budget Participation (Postcard) Net Sanctioning (Postcard) First Stage
Overall Low Info High Info Overall Low Info High Info Overall Low Info High Info Overall Low Info High Info % Taxes %Windfalls
Tax treatment -.04 -.16** .07 -.03 .01 -.06 .09** .17*** .02 .12*** .25*** .00 .25*** -.30***
(.05) (.07) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.02) (.02)
Low priors -.12*** -.23*** -.02 -.07* -.05 -.08* .05 .07 .02 .09** .14** .03 -.05*** .04**
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.02) (.02)
Treat*low priors .07 .24*** -.06 .11** .04 .19*** -.14*** -.21*** -.06 -.16*** -.29*** -.04 .04** -.03
(.06) (.08) (.06) (.05) (.07) (.06) (.05) (.07) (.07) (.05) (.08) (.08) (.02) (.02)
Constant .67 .52 .82 .81 .77 .85 .75 .71 .78 .70 .63 .76 .14 .76
N 1,176 576 600 1,179 579 600 1,179 579 600 1,177 579 598 1,178 1,178
Table reports the average effect of the tax versus windfall treatments, conditional on the pre-treatment covariate, over standard errors in parentheses, where *p<.10,
** p<.05, and *** p<.01. The variable ‘low priors’ was measured in the survey by: “For every 10,000 rupiah the district government gets in income, how much do
you think comes from taxpayers in Blora?” Responses are coded 1 if priors were less than 4,000 (or 40 percent), implying participants initially perceived that taxes
were a smaller share of the budget than what they learned in the campaign, which is consistent with the prediction that the treatment would produce higher levels of
monitoring, participation, and sanctioning.
Table 2.13: Does the Effect of the Tax Treatment Depend on Prior Beliefs about the Share of Taxes in Total Revenue?
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Figure 2.10: The effects of the tax treatment on political action, conditional on prior beliefs about
the share of taxes in total revenue. The panels show the effect on the tax treatment on willingness
to learn more about the budget (top), participation in the postcard campaign (middle), and net
sanctioning in the postcard campaign (bottom) for the full sample.
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3.1 Introduction
Identifying the determinants of effective accountability is a central concern in political economy
research. In many developing democracies, it has become apparent that elections and democratic
institutions do not necessarily ensure that politicians act in the best interest of citizens. Of those
countries that transitioned to democracy in the previous two decades, many have fallen into a
“gray zone,” characterized by disconnected political elites, feeble policy-making capacity, endemic
political corruption, and low levels of political engagement (Carothers, 2002).
One enduring explanation for why accountability fails centers on the existence of information
asymmetries between politicians and citizens. In the political agency tradition, democracy is con-
ceptualized as an accountability relationship where citizens (the principals) elect politicians (the
agents) to work on their behalf (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Besley, 2006). Yet, politicians often
are self-interested and have an information advantage over citizens. The challenge for voters is thus
either to select good (honest, hard-working) politicians or discipline bad ones using re-election as
an incentive. Doing so requires that citizens have adequate information on incumbent performance
or the quality of candidates contesting the elections. While some have pointed out that better
information could have perverse effects for policy and welfare (Pratt, 2005; Humphreys and Wein-
stein, 2010; Malesky, Schuler and Tran, 2011), a growing empirical literature provides evidence that
information strengthens accountability and improves government performance (Ferraz and Finan,
2008; Reinikka and Svensson, 2003; Besley and Burgess, 2002).
This paper explores how citizens use information to make political decisions. There is substantial
evidence that information affects whether and how citizens vote, both in the United States (Bartels,
1996; Alvarez, 1999; Stromberg, 2004) and in developing countries from Uganda (Humphreys and
Weinstein, 2010), to Mexico (Chong et al., 2011), to India (Banerjee et al., 2011). An important
recent empirical development is the use of experiments—which exogenously improve access to gov-
ernment, media or civil society-provided information—to identify the causal effect of information on
citizen political behavior (Pande, 2011). Experiments bypass the concerns that whether an individ-
ual is politically informed is likely correlated both with the outcomes of interest (such as turnout)
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and a host of other possible explanatory variables. Yet, important questions remain: When does
new information increase or decrease the perceived benefits of taking political action? How does
the effect of information on political behavior vary depending on individuals’ initial expectations
about government performance? And, does the relationship between information and political
behavior depend on characteristics that affect whether an individual comprehends or values new
information?
To address these questions, I embedded an information experiment into a public awareness
campaign conducted at the district-level in Indonesia. The treatment group received information
on how the government spent the budget across and within key categories for development, including
education, infrastructure, health, and agricultural sectors. Overall, the information was designed
to provide the treatment group with a clearer picture on the budget share that local politicians
allocated to programs and services for citizens, to routine administration, and to themselves in the
form of private benefits. The control group received placebo information only.
The campaign was conducted with 1,863 randomly sampled and randomly assigned citizens
from 93 villages around Blora, a predominantly rural district in Central Java. Since Indonesia’s
‘big bang’ decentralization in 2001, districts like Blora have acquired both significant resources and
authority to manage local development. Yet, corruption is rife and the information environment at
the local level remains poor. The campaign was conducted in partnership with Indonesian NGOs
and implemented by trained canvassers in the three months preceding district head elections in
2010.1 The main outcomes of interest—measured through both a survey and participation in a
postcard campaign—are the effects of information on incumbent support, political participation,
and the willingness to remain politically informed.
This paper makes three contributions to the emerging experimental literature. First, the results
provide new empirical evidence of how information affects both incumbent support and participa-
tion. The treatment had a powerful effect on participants’ beliefs about government performance.
Overall, the information caused a 52 percentage point increase in the share of people who thought
1Blora’s selection as a project site was also determined in large part by the NGO partners’ implementation capacity.
The partners had been operating in the district since 2008 advocating for better budget management.
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government was performing worse than previously expected. Yet, there is only weak evidence from
the postcard campaign that this information decreased incumbent support either in the absolute
or vis-a-vis challengers in the local elections. The data suggests the information had a positive
effect on participation in the postcard campaign. Members of the treatment group were four per-
centage points more likely to return postcards than the control group but only when the costs of
participation were low.
Second, the paper investigates how prior beliefs and other individual characteristics condition
the effect of information on political behavior. While the macro context in this study is held
constant (since the project took place in only one district), rich pre-treatment survey data makes
it possible to study how information’s impact varies depending on underlying factors. The results
show that prior beliefs on two dimensions—the share of revenue that politicians spend on goods
and services for citizens and take for themselves—indeed conditioned the effect of information on
perceptions of government as performing worse than previously expected. With respect to political
behavior, information increased participation but only when participants obtained bad news on
at least one dimension. This result highlights the complexity of needing to take into account
how multiple dimensions of information might work in complementary or competing directions to
understand more fully how information affects political decisions at the individual-level.
The third contribution arises from addressing a question that has received little attention to
date: Does one-off information provision also affect whether citizens choose to remain politically
informed in the future? Much of the experimental literature has studied the effects of one-off
information provision on voting behavior but has not yet considered its impact on demand for
more information. Yet, public scrutiny and demand for information can play an important role in
accountability outside of elections (Bauhr, Grimes and Herring, 2010). When citizens exert effort
to monitor government, for instance by simply reading a newspaper, mis-managing or diverting
budgetary funds becomes more costly for agents. Monitoring of agents has been associated with
more efficient and effective outcomes in a wide range of principal-agent relations (Miller, 2005;
Banks, 1989; Olken, 2007; Davis and Hayes, 1993; Bjorkman and Svensson, 2010; Grossman and
Hanlon, 2011).
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The results show that the information treatment caused an eight percentage point increase in
the share of participants willing to remain politically informed on the government and the budget.
Moreover, those gains primarily came from those who were disinterested in such information at
the outset. An important implication of these findings is that one-off exogenous improvements to
access to information—through the efforts of government, the media or civil society—could create
a demand for information that sustains a more politically informed society over time.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on information and political
behavior and describes the hypotheses to be tested in this paper. Section 3.3 describes the sit-
uation in Indonesia and Blora district, where this study takes place. In Section 3.4 I review the
experimental design, data and randomization. The main results for the average treatment effect of
information are presented in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 I investigate how the impact of informa-
tion varies depending on individuals’ prior beliefs about government spending as well as on other
individual-level characteristics.
3.2 Literature and Hypotheses
How information affects citizens’ political decisions—and, by extension, accountability and govern-
ment performance—is the subject of an already substantial literature. While it is widely accepted
that political knowledge is essential to accountability, it is similarly accepted that the public often
is not well informed. For many, the total costs exceed the perceived benefits of being politically
informed, which rationally leads to ignorance (Downs, 1957; Bimber, 2001; Jerit, Barabas and
Bolsen, 2006). A large uninformed population is likely particularly prelevant in developing coun-
tries, where low education levels and a lack of access to political information make the costs of
becoming informed prohibitively high.
In a political agency framework, better information on either incumbent policies or candidate
quality enables citizens to make more reasoned decisions about whether to reward or punish in-
cumbents at the polls (Besley, 2006). This notion is predicated on the twin assumptions that
individuals vote retrospectively and update their beliefs on government performance when con-
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fronted with new information. A central prediction in the literature is that new information that
reflects poorly on an incumbent will produce a decline in support while positive information will
yield rewards. Ferraz and Finan (2008) find support for this claim in showing that random audits of
municipal finances that reveal (at least two) instances of corruption reduce incumbent re-election
probabilities. In a survey experiment in Uganda in which the treatment group was exposed to
a scorecard on MP performance, Humphreys and Weinstein (2010) demonstrate that information
indeed affects incumbent support and the direction of the impact depends on whether the news is
positive or negative.
New information is also predicted to affect individuals’ decision of whether to participate in
politics at all. Much of the literature has focused on voter turnout, which is important because
high turnout ensures that election outcomes reflect the will and interests of the true majority
(Lijphart, 1997). According to models of strategic voting, better information typically should lead
to higher turnout. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) show that it can be optimal for less informed
voters to abstain from making a decision and leave the decision to the better informed, even when
voting is costless. Matsusaka (1984) highlights that turnout is not only a matter of being objectively
well-informed but also of feeling confident in one’s political knowledge.
Others have argued that voting is more of an expressive than a strategic act. Individuals will
turnout as long as the perceived benefits of taking political action exceed the actual costs of going
to the polls. Perceived benefits could include the social or psychological rewards of fulfilling a
duty or sending government a signal. In a model by Banerjee et al (2011), the polity is divided
between partisan and ‘ethical’ voters, where the latter can be swayed by new information on
incumbent performance, incumbent quality, or challenger quality. Better information distinguishes
candidates from one another and the authors predict that bad news will increase turnout and
decrease incumbent vote share.
The empirical evidence predominantly supports the notion that information increases turnout.
In their experimental test conducted in urban slums in India, Banerjee et al (2011) find that better
information on incumbent performance increased turnout by 3.5 percentage points in the treatment
group. These results are consistent with an existing empirical literature that has largely found a
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positive relationship between information and turnout in other contexts (Lassen, 2005; Stromberg,
2004). Yet, in a public awareness campaign experiment conducted at the municipal level in Mexico,
Chong et al (2011) find that negative information reduced turnout and increased apathy among
voters. This is consistent with the logic of expressive voting insofar as the negative information
reduced the perceived benefit of taking action, for instance by making people more cynical about
politics.
While much of the theoretical and empirical focus has been on voter turnout, it readily extends
to the propensity to join in a range of other forms of political action, from the more mundane (like
signing a petition) to the more costly (like joining a protest). Another type of political action that
has largely been over-looked empirically is government monitoring, with important implications for
restraining government misbehavior. Initially providing individuals with better information could
increase their willingness to remain informed in the long run, either by enhancing the perceived
benefits of being well-informed or by breaking-down the barriers that arise from complex and
intimidating subject matter. On the other hand, there could be decreasing marginal returns to
additional information, or individuals who find the information too confusing could be further
disempowered. All in all, information could have an important impact on non-electoral political
participation and, while it is difficult to predict ex ante whether the effect will be positive or
negative, the inquiry is nonetheless important.
Drawing on this literature, this paper tests the predictions that information on government
spending performance will affect incumbent support, political participation, and the willingness to
remain politically informed. Additionally, I investigate how information’s impact varies depend-
ing on individuals’ prior beliefs about government spending. There are at least three reasons to
investigate how prior beliefs condition information processing. First, theories of information are
based on the assumption that individuals are Bayesian updaters and studying priors both tests this
assumption and identifies what information content resonates. Second, the distance between prior
beliefs and the truth determines the magnitude of the scope for learning, with obvious implications
for the change in the perceived benefits of taking action. Third, as the expressive voting literature
suggests, whether news is good or bad determines higher or lower levels of political participation
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depending on the context, and taking into account prior beliefs clarifies what is driving the change.
Of course, prior beliefs are not the only factor that could affect the impact of better information
on political behavior; people’s ability to comprehend the information as well as the relevance of
the information to their lives most likely matters as well. Education is widely considered a leading
predictor of how well individuals comprehend new information (Lassen, 2005; Pande, 2011). The
literature also suggests that both women and the poor might find information on government
spending performance more relevant to their daily lives. Knowing the true cost of public goods
could be more pertinent to the poor because they rely more on government-provided services
than the well-off. Based on findings in a political campaign experiment in Benin, Wantchekon
(2003) suggests that women might care more about information on government performance in
providing public goods than men because they are more attunded to household welfare. I will
explore empirically how the effect of information on incumbent support and political participation
varies depending on an individual’s level of education, poverty, and sex.
3.3 The Indonesia Context
Indonesia is an important context to investigate the impact of information on political behavior.
After the collapse in 1998 of more than 30 years of autocratic rule under President Suharto, In-
donesia undertook a sweeping program of democratization and decentralization. Indonesia’s ‘big
bang’ decentralization in 2001 devolved substantial resources and decision-making authority to the
district-level, making district governments the second most important level of government for de-
velopment after the central level. Additionally, direct elections for local legislators were introduced
in 1999 followed by direct elections for executive district heads (bupatis/walikotas) in 2005 (on a
rolling basis) (Skoufias et al., 2011).
The promise of decentralization lies in its ability to bring government closer to the people,
enabling citizens to hold government accountable and improving public service delivery (Tiebout,
1956). Yet, effective accountability remains weak at the local level in Indonesia. Corruption
is rampant and it is widely believed that decentralization has spurred the devolution of what
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Indonesians call KKN—a common acronynm standing for corruption (korupsi), collusion (kolusi)
and nepotism (nepotisme)—to the local level. Budget-making is a key arena for local corruption and
common problems range from outright embezzlement and manipulation for personal gain to weak
capacity, large allocations for routine expenditures, and poor reflection of policy priorities (Bank,
2003). Rinaldi et al (2007) attribute the proliferation of corruption at the local level to a general
climate of enrichment and the strengthening of local legislatures vis-a-vis the executive so that
district heads must buy support to get elected. The authors also cite imperfect legal enforcement,
low levels of political scrutiny, and a weak independent media as contributing factors. While civil
society and independent media outlets have increasingly investigated budget mismanagement and
aimed to increase public awareness of poor budgeting practices at the local level, it is also difficult
for these actors to obtain information (Par, 2008; KOP, 2008).
Such problems with corruption and budget mismanagement are evident in Blora district, a
predominantly agricultural district in Central Java, Indonesia.2 Allegations of corruption were
rife during the tenure of the former legislative chairman, Pak Warsit, from 1999-2009. Warsit
was arrested and tried in 2008 for corruption amounting to 5.6 milier rupiah (USD $721,000 in
2011 dollars) in the 2004 district budget. He was originally convicted (along with three deputy
parliamentarians) by a provincial court but Warsit’s conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court
just prior to the official candidate registration date for district head elections.3 Relevant to the
results presented in Section 3.5.3 on vote choice, Warsit ran as a challenger to the incumbent district
head in the 2010 local elections in Blora.
Many citizens in Blora lack exposure to information on local politics and budgeting, as reflected
in the survey data collected for this project. While 92 percent of all respondents were able to
correctly identify the president, only 56 percent were able to identify the district head. Moreover,
when asked if they knew what the local budget was (the Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah, or
APBD) only 24 percent were able to correctly define it and only six percent said they had heard
2One reason for the selection of this district is because it is rich in oil and gas, which is the focus of Paler (2011)).
3The ruling was reversed for Warsit and not for his three deputies. The decision, and its timing, was widely regarded as
suspect by the media and civil society in Blora. According to Indonesian law (Law 32/2004 on Regional Governance,
sub-article 58f), anyone found guilty and sentenced to five or more years in prison cannot run for office.
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some or a lot about it in the previous 12 months. Respondents also reported having heard little
to nothing about the work of the local government in the previous 12 months—only nine percent
had heard about the district head and only eight percent had heard news about local legislators.
After asking respondents whether they had ever sought out information on government spending,
91 percent said no. Tellingly, the number one reason they gave for why was that they did not
know how to get the information (43 percent), which surpassed the share who claimed that the
information was not relevant to their daily life (36 percent). It was in this context that the “Your
Voice, Your Opportunity” public awareness campaign and information experiment was conducted.
3.4 Experimental Design
To test the impact of information on citizens’ support for the incumbent government, political par-
ticipation, and willingness to remain politically informed, an information experiment was embedded
in a public awareness campaign. A total of 1,863 participants from 93 villages around Blora were
randomly sampled from the adult population and assigned to treatment and control groups. The
treatment group received information on how the government spent the budget across a number of
different categories—including education, health, infrastructure, agriculture—as well as the share
politicians allocated to themselves. An original survey and postcard campaign are used to measure
the effect of the information on attitude change and the main outcomes of interest.
3.4.1 The campaign and information experiment
3.4.1.1 The Setup
The public awareness campaign into which the information experiment was embedded was designed
to familiarize all participants with what the district budget is and the role of elected officials in
managing it. The campaign was conducted by canvassers one-on-one in participants’ homes and
the canvassers used colorful visuals, real money, and interactive exercises to convey content. The
public awareness campaign began with introductory illustrations and a household budget exercise
(see Figure 3.1). The first illustration reminded participants that they vote for their elected leaders
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Figure 3.1: Campaign Setup. You elect your leaders, and then what do they do (top left)? They
make decisions about public services, like education, health, infrastructure, and farming (top right).
Think about what you want Blora to look like in the future (bottom left). The ‘My Budget’ household
budget exercise game board (bottom right).
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but it is often hard to know what those leaders do once in office. The second illustration informed
participants that the bupati and DPRD are responsible for providing public services like education,
health and infrastructure. To encourage participants not just to think in terms of their needs today
but also their needs in the future, the third illustration urged them to consider what they want
Blora to be like five to ten years from now. Participants then participated in an exercise involving
the allocation of funds across different household expenses to present the concept of a budget in
familiar terms. This exercise was followed by a revenue experiment designed to vary participants’
beliefs on where district government revenue comes from.4
3.4.1.2 The Treatment
The information experiment presented the treatment group with real information on government
spending in 2008.5 The information presented was based on an analysis of realized spending in
2008 performed by the author and partner organizations. To illustrate spending, the canvasser used
10,000 rupiah (representing district government income per capita, scaled) in small denominations
and a spending ‘game-board’ (shown in Figure 3.2). The game-board contained boxes for six
categories of spending: education, infrastructure, health, farming, ‘politicians’, and other. The
‘politicians’ category represented how much politicians allocated to themselves for salaries, health
benefits, travel and other private expenses as well as how much they spent to run the executive
and legislative offices.
Overall, the treatment emphasized the share of the budget that local politicians allocated to
programs and services for citizens (g), routine administration (b), and to themselves in the form of
private benefits (r), where g + b + r = 1. The canvasser first used the 10,000 rupiah to illustrate
the share of the total budget spent in each of the six categories.6 Second, within each category,
the canvasser disaggregated the share spent on programs and services for citizens versus routine
4The revenue experiment is the focus of a separate paper (2011).
5The 2008 budget was selected because it was the most recent year for which realized spending data was available
and for which the incumbent district head and former legislative chairman (both candidates in the 2010 district head
elections) were responsible.
6Overall 47 percent of the budget was spent on education; 12 percent on infrastructure; 9 percent on health; 2 percent
on agriculture, 18 percent on politicians; and 12 percent on other expenses.
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Figure 3.2: Spending ‘Gameboard’. This board and 10,000 rupiah in small denominations was used
to illustrate spending across and within six key sectors for development.
administration. The only exception was the ‘politicians’ category, where the canvasser disaggre-
gated spending into the share that went to routine administration versus the share that politicians
allocated to their private benefits. In sum, the treatment group learned that about 30 percent of
the budget goes to goods and services for citizens, 52 percent goes to the administration of those
goods and services, and 18 percent goes to politicians, of which 2 percent of the entire budget goes
to private benefits for 46 individuals.7
The control group received placebo information in the form of a list of facts and figures taken
from the 2008 Blora statistical yearbook (Blora dalam Angka). This information had no relevance
to the budget and included random facts, such as the annual rainfall in Blora and the composition
of trash collected in the district. It should be noted that this experimental design helps to overcome
the concern that it is difficult to disentangle the impact of new information from the motivational
effects of the campaigns and materials through which it is provided (Pande, 2011). Since both the
treatment and control groups received the public awareness campaign in this case, the motivational
7The campaign also primed participants on corruption in citing two recent cases of alleged corruption and removing 200
cents (ratus) from the board to make the point that not all funds designated for citizens reaches them. Participants
were told that the actual scale of corruption in the budget was not known and that the 200 cents removed was meant
to represent the fact that corruption exists.
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effect should be held constant and any effect can plausibly be attributed to the impact of treatment
content alone.
3.4.2 Sampling and randomization
Participants in the campaign were randomly sampled, using multi-stage cluster sampling, from the
adult population in Blora. The target population was all individuals between the ages of 17 (the age
of voter eligibility) and 65 who had resided in Blora for at least the previous six months. First, 93
of 295 villages were randomly sampled within strata formed by subdistrict and urban-rural status.
Within each village, one sub-village unit (dusun) was randomly sampled, followed by the random
selection of 20 households from an updated list of all households in the dusun. Canvassers then
sampled one participant in each household on arrival using simple random sampling from a full list
of eligible household members made in consultation with the head of household or first contact.
The random assignment of participants to treatment was done in advance by the author. Random
assignment was blocked at the village-level so that, within each village with 20 participants, 10
were randomly assigned to each of the experimental conditions.
A number of steps were also taken to minimize design and timing effects. To reduce effects
associated with variation in canvasser abilities, assigned to treatment in each village was also
blocked on individual canvassers so that each canvasser conducted two treatment and two control
campaign versions per village. Quotas were also set so that gender balance across experimental
conditions and canvassers was achieved. Finally, to minimize timing effects, villages were divided
geographically into three groups and the order in which implementation teams visited villages
was randomized within groups. Random assignment was implemented by providing canvassers
with a schedule for each village that matched a randomly selected household to an experimental
condition and informed canvassers of whether they should sample a male or female participant in
that household.8
8A more detailed description of the sampling and randomization procedure is available in the design memo, available
on the author’s website. The final sample consists of 1,863 individuals, including the original goal 1,860 plus three
additional participants randomly sampled in a small number of villages with non-compliance.
CHAPTER 3. HOW DOES INFORMATION AFFECT POLITICAL BEHAVIOR? 86
3.4.3 Data
Data comes from two sources: participation in a postcard campaign and an original survey. Sur-
vey data was collected by canvassers during the same visit. A pre-treatment module containing
questions on demographics, political knowledge and participation, and public goods usage was ad-
ministered upon obtaining participant consent and prior to beginning the campaign. Canvassers
also conducted a post-treatment module immediately following the information experiment (and
prior to introducing the postcard). The concern arises, however, that surveys do not provide reliable
measures of real political behavior because responses are costless and subject to social desirabil-
ity bias. I therefore use participation in a postcard campaign as a revealed measure of political
behavior.
At the end of the campaign, canvassers gave all participants the opportunity to return post-
cards. The postcard asked participants to indicate whether they were “satisfied with the district
government in Blora and don’t want to change anything about how it works” (a reward for good
performance) or whether they “want the district government in Blora to do a better job” (a sanc-
tion for bad performance).9 To crystallize the perceived benefits of taking action, participants were
informed that the results of the postcard campaign would be shared with candidates in the lead
up to the district head elections to encourage them to respond to public opinion.10 Returning the
postcard intentionally entailed a small cost. Participants had up to 24 hours to deposit their post-
cards in specially designated mailboxes located in their community. On average, participants lived
about a 10 minute walk from the mailbox location. This small cost in terms of time and energy is
akin to various types of low cost political action, like signing a petition or contacting an official.
The postcard campaign also resembles the voting decision in that participants had to decide both
whether to participation and whether to use their postcards to reward or punish the incumbent
government.
Table 3.1 provides descriptive data on the main outcome measures from both the survey and
9If they selected the latter, they were also asked to indicate their level of support for five different governance reforms
promoted by PATTIRO and LPAW, and to indicate their priority reform. I do not analyze the outcomes for each
reform here since those were primarily intended for the partner organizations.
10This was accomplished in a subsequent voter education experiment, results forthcoming.
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postcard campaign. Table 3.2 presents evidence using the pre-treatment survey data that random-
ization achieved balance in covariates across the experimental conditions (Panel A).
Range Confidence Interval
min max mean SD Lower Upper n
Panel A: Learning
1 Information newa -1 1 .68 .01 .66 .71 1,863
2 Budget knowledgeb 0 1 .29 .01 .27 .31 1,855
3 Changed opinionc -1 1 .67 .01 .65 .69 1,850
4 Performance worsed 0 1 .49 .01 .46 .52 1,851
5 Politicians are self-interestede 0 1 .44 .01 .42 .47 1,850
6 Distrust district headf 0 1 .55 .01 .53 .57 1,853
7 Distrust local legislatorsf 0 1 .61 .01 .59 .64 1,857
Panel B: Incumbent Support
8 Net sanctioning (postcard)g -1 1 .75 .01 .73 .77 1,857
9 Vote choiceh
(a) Incumbent 0 1 .53 .02 .48 .57 458
(b) Former Leg. Chairman (Challenger) 0 1 .09 .01 .07 .12 458
(c) Challenger 2 0 1 .38 .02 .33 .42 458
10 Won’t follow endorsementi 0 1 .73 .01 .71 .75 1,857
Panel C: Turnout and Participation
11 Political actionj 0 5 1.32 .02 1.27 1.36 1,863
12 Turnout (postcard campaign)k 0 1 .78 .01 .77 .80 1,863
Panel D: Remaining Politically Informed
13 Learn more about budgetl 0 1 .79 .01 .77 .80 1,863
14 Learn more about govt.m 0 1 .78 .01 .76 .80 1,862
Note: Table reports the summary statistics for the main dependent variables from both the survey and the
postcard campaign.
aWould you describe the information you just received as [totally new (=1)/somewhat new (=0)/not new at all
(-1)]
bYou have a pretty good understanding of issues related to the budget in Blora. (agree=1)
cWould you say the information you just heard [changed/did not change] your opinion about district government?
(changed=1)
dElected leaders in the district government are doing a [worse job (=1)/better job (=-1)/the same job (=0)] than
you thought they were?
eDistrict leaders in Blora came more about their personal interests than about the needs of the people. (agree=1)
fHow much do you trust the [district head/local legislators] to do the right thing for people in Blora? (distrust=1)
gTurned out and sanction=1, turnout and reward=-1, abstain=0
hSupport for the [incumbent district head=1/former legislative chairman=1/challenger 2=1].
iLet’s say that in the upcoming district head elections, you decide you like Candidate A, but you learn that a
village leader whom you respect supports Candidate B. How likely would you be to switch your preference from
Candidate A to Candidate B? (unlikely=1).
jRegarding a problem or an issue that was affecting your daily life of your community, would you in the future
[contact a village/subdistrict official, contact the district head, contact a local legislator, contact the media or an
NGO, take part in a demonstration]? (average response of 5)
kReturned postcard=1
lHow interested are you in learning more about how the district government spends money in the budget?
(interested=1)
mHow interested are you in learning more about what the government of Blora is doing? (interested=1)
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
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Range Sample Control Treated Diff (T-C) n
min max Mean Mean Mean RI p-value
Panel A: Demographics
Female (%) 0 1 .50 .50 .50 .999 1,863
Age 17 65 41.7 41.7 41.7 .983 1,818
Completed primary school (%) 0 1 .72 .72 .72 .679 1,862
Muslim (%) 0 1 .99 .99 .99 .593 1,863
Javanese (%) 0 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 .617 1,862
Married (%) 0 1 .90 .90 .91 .168 1,862
Can read a newspaper (%) 0 1 .81 .82 .80 .395 1,861
Numeracy (%) 0 5 1.9 1.9 1.9 .884 1,863
Want information (%) 0 1 .71 .71 .72 .873 1,860
Poor (subjective) (%) 0 1 .45 .46 .44 .762 1,863
Employed full-time (%) 0 1 .64 .64 .63 .833 1,863
Work in agriculture (%) 0 1 .70 .70 .70 .969 1,477
Mailbox distance (%) 0 80 9.85 9.64 10.06 .874 1,849
Panel B: Spending priors
Goods and services (all) (%) 0 100 54.8 54.9 54.8 .767 1,717
Education(%) 0 100 17.8 17.9 17.7 .628 1,521
Infrastructure (%) 0 100 14.5 14.7 14.4 .463 1,521
Health (%) 0 100 14.9 14.9 15.0 .731 1,521
Agriculture (%) 0 100 13.9 14.2 13.6 .034 1,521
Politicians (%) 0 100 23.2 22.8 23.7 .181 1,521
Panel C: Party ID
Support incumbent’s party (P1) 0 1 .22 .21 .23 .892 1,192
Support challenger 1’s party (P2) 0 1 .30 .32 .28 .668 1,192
Support challenger 2’s party (P3) 0 1 .42 .41 .44 .927 1,192
Notes: Table reports results from a randomization check, where column 6 reports randomization inference p-values for the
test of the null hypothesis that the difference in means between between the treatment and control groups on pre-treatment
covariates is zero.
Table 3.2: Randomization Check
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3.5 Main Results: How Information Affects Political Decisions
3.5.1 Estimation
This sections presents results for the effect of information on learning, participation, incumbent
support, and willingness to stay politically informed. Estimates of the average effect of information
are obtained by running a regression of the form:
Yij = αj + βTij + εij (3.1)
where Yij is the outcome for individual i in village j, β the coefficient of interest on the treatment
assignment indicator Tij , and εij the individual random error. Since random assignment was blocked
at the village-level, all estimates include village fixed effects, captured in the term αj
11 Standard
errors are clustered at the village-level except in cases where clustering produces smaller standard
errors due to negative intracluster correlation. In such cases, the more conservative uncorrected
standard errors are presented (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009).12 I also present randomization
inference p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no treatment effect.13
3.5.2 First stage: Updated priors
The results, presented in Panel A of Table 3.3, show that the information was new and caused par-
ticipants to change their beliefs about government performance, consistent with Bayesian updating.
While the information on government performance was overwhelmingly negative, the news on how
much politicians took for themselves was positive, which suggests the effects could be somewhat
11All analysis is based on treatment assignment rather than treatment take-up. There were only six cases of treatment
non-compliance, all due to canvasser error.
12The uncorrected standard errors do not account for heteroskedasticity as it has been shown that standard errors that
are unclustered but robust to heteroskedasticity are inconsistent with the fixed effects estimator (Stock and Watson,
2008).
13Randomization inference compares the observed treatment effect to a ‘reference’ distribution of treatment effects
that would occur under the null hypothesis. To obtain the reference distribution, I reproduce the random treatment
assignment process 10,000 times and obtain an estimate of the treatment effect each time. The randomization
inference p-value is the probability of seeing a treatment effect as big or bigger than the one produced by the actual
assignment, given the reference distribution (Imbens and Rubin, 2009).
CHAPTER 3. HOW DOES INFORMATION AFFECT POLITICAL BEHAVIOR? 90
off-setting.
The first three rows in Panel A provide strong evidence that the information was new and
affected beliefs about government. While 51 percent of the control group said that the campaign
information was new—reflecting the impact of the campaign itself—this number was 34 percentage
points higher for the treatment group. The treatment group was also 11 percentage points more
likely to agree that they “had a pretty good understanding of important issues related to the bud-
get,” a measure that plausibly reflects heightened confidence in political knowledge. The treatment
group was also 46 percentage points more likely to acknowledge that the campaign had “changed
[their] opinions about district government.”
Moreover, the information caused participants (on average) to view government performance in
a substantially worse light. Row four of Panel A presents a survey measure of whether participants
thought government was doing worse than previously believed. The results indicate that 23 percent
of the control group felt that government was doing worse than expected, compared to 75 percent
in the treatment group—a significant 52 percentage point difference. Yet, the treatment also had
a positive effect on views of the budget share that politicians allocated to themselves. When
asked to choose whether they agreed with the statement that “district leaders in Blora care more
about their personal interests than about the needs of the people,” the treatment group was 17
percentage points less likely to agree (Table 3.3, row seven). As discussed more in Section 3.6.1,
this is consistent with the fact that participants initially believed that politicians were taking more
for themselves than they actually were.
Nevertheless, it seems plausible that the effect of the information overall is negative. The
magnitude of the negative effects along the government performance dimension is greater than
the magnitude of the positive effect on politician self-interest. Moreover, the information harmed
impressions of both the district head and local legislators by a variety of additional metrics. For
instance, rows six and seven show that the treatment group was 30 percentage points more likely to
distrust the bupati (row five) and 28 percentage points more likely to distrust local legislators (row
six) compared to the control.14 The results nonetheless highlight the need to investigate further the
14Results of a similar pattern and magnitude apply for measures of dissatisfaction and beliefs about effort and ability
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role of prior beliefs and how individuals weight the different dimensions of information provided,
which I return to in subsequent sections.
3.5.3 Incumbent support
The literature predicts that negative information on the incumbent will produce a decline in support
while positive information will yield rewards. Whether bad news translates into reduced incumbent
vote share depends, however, on how willing voters are to switch support to other candidates. I
draw on both the survey and the postcard campaign to analyze the effects of the information on
incumbent support in both the absolute and relative to other candidates. The results, presented in
Panel B of Table 3.3, indicate that the information had little effect, despite the shift in attitudes
revealed in Panel A. If anything, the results are mixed: Participants sanctioned the incumbent in
the postcard campaign but rewarded him in comparison to challengers in the election.
Row eight of Table 3.3 presents whether participants used their postcards to reward or sanction
the incumbent for his performance. The postcard captures a referendum on the incumbent. I code
all those who returned their postcard and signaled that they want government to do better as
1, those who returned their postcard and indicated they were satisfied with the status quo as -1,
and those who abstained from participating as zero.15 In the control group, 74 percent used their
postcards to signal dissatisfaction with the incumbent government. While sanctioning was three
percentage points higher in the treatment group, the difference is not significant at conventional
levels.
I next check whether the information treatment affected anticipated vote choice in the upcoming
elections. As previously mentioned, the public awareness campaign was implemented in the three
months leading up to district head elections. The three candidates included the incumbent district
head, the former legislative chairman, and a third challenger with ties to the bureaucracy and a
popular Muslim organization. As discussed in Section 3.3, the former legislative chairman was
(available upon request).
15It is not possible to look solely at how participants voted on their postcard, conditional on returning it. Ninety-eight
percent of those who returned their postcard used it to signal dissatisfaction with the status quo, which raises concerns
about ceiling effects given how close the sanctioning rate is to the upper bound.
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α β se RI pvalue
Panel A: Learning
1 Information newa .51 .34*** (.02) .000
2 Feel knowledgeable about budgetb .23 .11*** (.02) .000
3 Opinion changedc .45 .46*** (.02) .000
4 Performance worsed .23 .52*** (.03) .000
5 Politicians self-interestede .53 -.17*** (.02) .000
6 Distrust bupatif .40 .30*** (.02) .000
7 Distrust DPRDf .47 .28*** (.02) .000
Panel B: Incumbent Support
8 Net sanctioning (postcard)i .74 .03 (.02) .238
9 Vote choicej
(a) Incumbent .20 .03 (.02) .139
(b) Former Leg. Chairman (Challenger) .13 -.03 (.03) .368
(c) Challenger 2 .31 -.02 (.04) .642
10 Won’t follow endorsementk .71 .05** (.02) .023
Panel C: Turnout and Participation
11 Political action (mean of 5)g 1.29 .04 (.04) .425
12 Turnout (postcard campaign)h .77 .02 (.02) .291
(a) Turnout if mailbox near (≤10 min) .77 .04* (.02) .114
(b) Turnout if mailbox far (>10 min) .80 -.04 (.04) .271
Panel D: Remain Politically Informed
13 Willing to learn more about budgetl .75 .08*** (.02) .000
14 Willing to learn more about govt.m .74 .08*** (.02) .000
Table reports results of from separate fixed effect regressions of the form Yij = αj +βTij + εij , where
column 1 is the mean for the control from a fixed effects regression, column 2 the treatment effect,
and column 4 the randomization inference p-value. Standard errors in the third column are clustered
at the village-level except when there is negative intracluster correlation, in which case uncorrected
standard errors are reported.
aWould you describe the information you just received as [totally new (=1)/somewhat new (=0)/not
new at all (-1)]
bYou have a pretty good understanding of issues related to the budget in Blora. (agree=1)
cWould you say the information you just heard [changed/did not change] your opinion about district
government? (changed=1)
dElected leaders in the district government are doing a [worse job (=1)/better job (=-1)/the same
job (=0)] than you thought they were?
eDistrict leaders in Blora came more about their personal interests than about the needs of the people.
(agree=1)
fHow much do you trust the [district head/local legislators] to do the right thing for people in Blora?
(distrust=1)
gTurned out and sanction=1, turnout and reward=-1, abstain=0
hSupport for the [incumbent district head=1/former legislative chairman=1/challenger 2=1].
iLet’s say that in the upcoming district head elections, you decide you like Candidate A, but you
learn that a village leader whom you respect supports Candidate B. How likely would you be to switch
your preference from Candidate A to Candidate B? (unlikely=1).
jRegarding a problem or an issue that was affecting your daily life of your community, would you in
the future [contact a village/subdistrict official, contact the district head, contact a local legislator,
contact the media or an NGO, take part in a demonstration]? (average response of 5)
kReturned postcard=1
lHow interested are you in learning more about how the district government spends money in the
budget? (interested=1)
mHow interested are you in learning more about what the government of Blora is doing? (inter-
ested=1)
Table 3.3: Average Treatment Effect of Information
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widely suspected of corruption. Participants were asked in the survey which candidate they most
supported at that time. Statistical power is low for these questions, but the results presented in
row 9a-c weakly suggest that the treatment caused greater support for the incumbent and weaker
support for both challengers. 16
Why might the information treatment have improved incumbent support vis-a-vis challengers,
despite the evidence that it was bad news for the incumbent? One possible explanation is that
the bad news on government performance was indeed offset by the good news on politician self-
interest. Another possibility is that the information reflected negatively on the performance of both
the incumbent district head and the former legislative chairman (since both were jointly in charge of
the 2008 budget), but that the treatment also primed participants’ own information that the former
legislative chairman was a lower quality candidate due to the corruption allegations. Participants
could therefore have decided to support the incumbent as a “lesser-of-two-evils” option.17
16There is low statistical power for analyzing these questions for two reasons. First, candidates officially registered
during the fourth week of implementation of campaign implementation, so the questions on vote preferences were
added to the survey only after the campaign had already been conducted with 400 participants (the highest possible
n is 1485). (The order in which villages were visited was randomized, however, so the remaining sample still reflects a
random sample of the population.) Second, the non-response rate on this question was high because it is a politically
sensitive question. Only 458 participants in total (across the four groups) responded with candidate choices.
17Little was known about the second challenger at the time of the public awareness campaign and voters might have
















































Perform Worsei Incumbentii Challenger 1 (Leg. Chair)ii Challenger 2ii Non-Responseii
Info .52*** .53*** .55*** -.06* .00 .08* -.04 -.04 -.12* .05 .03 -.08 .05 .00 .00
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.06) (.04) (.07) (.08) (.08) (.07) (.04) (.04) (.05)
Incumbent’s party (P1)a -.17** .24*** -.13* -.15 -.12
(.07) (.08) (.07) (.12) (.08)
Info*P1 .07 .19** -.06 -.12 -.11
(.09) (.09) (.11) (.14) (.10)
Challenger 1 party (P2)a .01 -.16*** .28** -.03 .08
(.06) (.05) (.10) (.07) (.06)
Info*P2 .04 -.02 -.05 -.07 .07
(.07) (.07) (.11) (.12) (.08)
Challenger 2 party (P3)a .07 .02 -.15* .03 .02
(.05) (.06) (.08) (.08) (.06)
Info*P3 -.04 -.21*** .15 .22* .04
(.07) (.08) (.09) (.13) (.07)
Constant .24 .20 .17 .24 .34 .29 .23 .11 .26 .42 .39 .37 .47 .42 .44
N 1187 1187 1187 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 656
Note: Table reports the results of separate fixed effects regressions of the form Yij = αj + β1Tij + β2Xij + β3(Tij ∗ Xij) + εij for different Xij reported in the rows.
All Xij are measured in the survey pre-treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the village-level except when there is negative intracluster correlation, in which case
uncorrected standard errors are reported.
aParty identification is measured in the survey by first asking participants how strongly they support the four leading political parties (Partai Demokrat, PDI-P, Golkar,
and PKB) and then asking them to select the party they identify with most closely (coded 1, otherwise 0). The incumbent district head belonged to Golkar, the former
legislative chairman PDI-P, and the second challenger represented a PD and PKB coalition.
iElected leaders in the district government are doing a [worse job (=1)/better job (=-1)/the same job (=0)] than you thought they were?
iiSupport for the [incumbent district head=1/former legislative chairman=1/challenger 2=1/non-response=1]
Table 3.4: The Effect of Information Conditional on Party ID
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Another possibility is that individuals with strong party ties continued to support the incumbent
or preferred to abstain rather than switch support to a candidate from a different party (Chong
et al., 2011). Table 3.4 investigates whether the effect of the information on vote choice varies
depending on the participants’ party identification. We see that the impact of the information on
perceptions that the government was performing worse than previously expected did not depend on
the participants’ party ID. Yet, the information increased support for the incumbent among party
supporters while undermining support from the challengers’ parties. There is also no evidence
that party ID conditioned non-response (either not knowing or refusing to answer), which is akin
to abstaining in the context of this survey question. Thus, despite receiving bad news on the
incumbent, the treatment caused members of the incumbent’s party to rally behind him.18
Interestingly, while the treatment did not have a significant impact on either incumbent support
or anticipated vote share, there is evidence that it affected how firmly participants planned to
stand by their expected vote choice. The susceptibility of voters to influence by opinion leaders is a
concern as it is associated with the propensity to take information shortcuts, like voting along party
or ethnic lines, without particular consideration for policy stances. To get a sense of how malleable
participants were to having their political opinions changed, the survey employed a hypothetical
question inquiring about a scenario in which the participant supported Candidate A and they
learned that a village leader whom they respected supported Candidate B. When asked how likely
they would be to switch their votes, the treatment group was five percentage points less likely to
say they would switch (row ten of Table 3.3). This suggests that the information might not have
made voters feel more confident about their political decision.
3.5.4 Participation
The expressive voting literature predicts that information will lead to higher levels of turnout and
political participation if it increases the perceived benefits of taking action vis-a-vis the costs. The
results presented in Panel C of Table 3.3 suggest that the information had a positive effect on
political participation, and this is particularly apparent when the costs of taking action are low.
18Party ID did not condition any of the other main outcomes of interest (results available from author).
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Importantly, information had a strong positive and significant effect on a less overt kind of political
action, however: willingness to monitor government in the future.
Row 11 of Table 3.3 reprots results from survey questions asking participants how many different
types of non-electoral political action they would take regarding an issue that affected their lives or
their community. Specifically, participants were asked about their willingness to contact a village
or subdistrict official, contact the district head, contact a local legislator, contact the media or
an NGO, or take part in a demonstration. On average, particpants were willing to take just over
one type of political action and there is no evidence that informed participants planned to take
more action than less informed ones. This pattern also holds when analyzing the types of action
individually. The survey also inquired into plans to vote in the upcoming district head elections.
An unrealistically high 99 percent in each group said they planned to vote in the elections, which
reflects the difficulty of relying on costless self-reported measures of political behavior when social
desirability bias is high.
Participation in the postcard campaign, as a revealed preference, provides a better measure of
actual willingness to take political action. As can be seen in row 12, 77 percent of participants in
the control group returned their postcards and the return rate was two percentage points higher in
the treatment group, although this difference is not significant. As an actual behavioral measure,
returning the postcard entailed a small cost. Such costs have been identified as an obstacle to
participation (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). I check whether the distance to the mailbox location
conditioned the propensity to return the postcard; if the information increased the perceived benefit
of returning the postcard vis-a-vis the costs, we would expect to see higher participation in the
treatment group than in the control among those who lived furthest from the mailbox location.
On average, participants lived about a 10 minute walk (in the rainy season) from the mailbox
location. Rows 12a-b of Table 3.3 indicate that the information increased participation by four
percentage points among those who lived at or below the mean mailbox distance. This suggests
that the information had a positive effect on turnout but only when the costs of participation were
low. These results are consistent with empirical studies showing that negative information has a
mobilizing effect on voters (Banerjee et al., 2011).
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The final outcome of interest is whether the information treatment made participants more
willing to take the less overt political action of remaining informed in the future. I measure
participants’ interest in remaining politically informed using survey questions that inquire into
their willingness to learn more in the future about how the district government spends public funds
and how the district government operates in general. As can be seen in Panel D of Table 3.3, the
desire to learn this information was a significant eight percentage points higher in the treatment
than in the control group.
3.5.5 Summary of main results
The information treatment gave participants new information that substantially affected their
attitudes towards the district government. While participants received good news on politician
self-interest, the content was overwhelmingly negative with respect to outlook on government per-
formance. Yet, despite the information being negative overall on average, the effects on incumbent
support were mixed: The information decreased support for the incumbent in the absolute but
increased support relative to challengers. The information had a weakly positive effect on par-
ticipation and other overt types of political participation but only when the costs of action were
low. Importantly, the information had a notable impact on participants’ willingness to remain
politically informed in the future. This suggests that initially providing people with information on
government spending can potentially have downstream effects that contribute to a more politically
informed society over time.
3.6 How Information Effects Vary
3.6.1 Prior beliefs
In this section I look at how prior beliefs on government spending condition the effect of information
on both incumbent support and political participation. This is particularly important given the
results presented so far, which show the information had a powerful effect on attitudes but resulted
in little change in incumbent support or political participation on average. The focus on average












Figure 3.3: Spending priors. Figure compares actual spending (as revealed by the treatment) to prior
ideals and beliefs about government spending across the six categories highlighted in the information
campaign.
treatment effects could be obscuring important underlying changes at the individual level. To assess
the role of prior beliefs, I estimate the following regression, where Pij is the measure of prior beliefs
on budget share for individual i in village j.
Yij = αj + β1Tij + β2Pij + β3(Tij ∗ Pij) + εij (3.2)
I measured participants’ initial ideals and beliefs about public spending using a district budget
exercize incorporated into the campaign just prior to the information experiment. All participants
were asked to use 10,000 rupiah and the spending ‘game-board’ to illustrate: (a) how they would
spend they would allocate funds across the categories if they were the district head (ideals); and (b)
how they think the district head actually allocates the funds (beliefs). Participants were also asked
to estimate the share they thought government actually spent both on all programs for citizens and
on programs in the categories of greatest priority to the participant.
Figure 3.3 compares actual spending (as revealed in the treatment) to participants’ initial beliefs
and ideals across the six spending categories. While actual spending on education was far greater
than expected, it was substantially lower than desired or anticipated for health, infrastructure and
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farming.19 Overall, participants estimated that government spent about 55 percent of its revenue
on public services and direct programs for them while the campaign revealed the true amount to be
about 30 percent in 2008, which is consistent with finding that the information had a substantially
negative effect on evaluations of government performance. The fact that the treatment reduced
perceptions of politicians as self-interested can plausibly be explained by the fact that individuals
believed that politicians were initially taking more for themselves.
I compose several versions of Pij using these measures, where Pij ∈ [0, 10] and 0 indicates the
extreme where none of the budget is spent on that category while 10 is the extreme where all of the
budget is spent on that category.20 This implies that a full point increase in the prior is equivalent
to a 10 percentage point increase in the perceived share of the budget spent in a category.21
As described in Section 3.4.1.2, the treatment emphasized the share of the budget that local
politicians allocated to programs and services for citizens (g), routine administration (b), and to
themselves in the form of private benefits (r), where g+b+r = 1. I focus on how priors on how the
budget share spent on programs and services for citizens and on politicians condition the effect of
information. I also assess whether the effect of information is conditioned by priors in each of the
four spending categories for development: education, infrastructure, health and agriculture. Figure
3.4 presents the distribution of each of the priors measures of interest (the red line denotes the true
budget share as revealed to the treatment group).
As can be seen in Table 3.5, while the key priors conditioned the effect of information on per-
ceptions of government performance, there is little evidence that they affected the main incumbent
support and political participation outcomes. I look first at whether the effect of information on
perceptions that government was performing worse varied depending on prior beliefs on the budget
share spent on goods and services for citizens, reported in Panel A of Table 3.5. The positive and
significant interaction term indicates that the information caused those with initially high priors
19The high share of spending on education is actually due to a central government earmark under the Bantuan Opera-
sional Sekolah program.
20The analysis in this section focuses on beliefs, although the results are similar for ideals. Available from the author
upon request.
21Using a dichotomous version of priors equal to 1 if the prior was above the true budget share and 0 otherwise produced
nonsensical results, which implies that participants did not register the exact cut-off when updating.
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Panel F: Politician Priors
Figure 3.4: Spending Priors, by Category. This figure presents the pre-treatment distribution of
prior beliefs on the different categories of spending highlighted in the information treatment.
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to downgrade their perceptions of government performance substantially more than those with low
priors. This is as expected since the information is most negative for those with initially high and
positive expectations of government performance. Interestingly, however, the information did not
improve evaluations of government performance for those who were poised for positive learning.
Even among those who believed that government spent nothing on overall goods (Pij = 0)—and
therefore learning it actually spent 30 percent could have had the biggest positive effect—the infor-
mation caused a 21 percentage point increase in the share who viewed government as performing
worse than expected. This suggests that other negative information in the campaign, such as the
corruption prime, must have overwhelmed this particular dimension.
Panel B shows that the effect of information on beliefs about goverment performance also
depended on prior beliefs about the budget share that politicians allocate to themselves. Here the
interaction is significant and negative because the information had a bigger effect for those with
low priors (who initially thought government took little for itself). Moreover, in this case, negative
learning harmed perceptions of government while positive learning brought rewards: For those who
initially believed politicians were taking nothing (Pij = 0), the marginal effect of information on
viewing government as performing worse was 76 percentage points; for those who initially thought
politicians took the most (here Pij = 8) the information caused a four percentage point decrease
in perceptions of government as bad. As can be seen in Panel C, the impact of information also
















































Performance Worsei Punish Incumbent (Postcard)ii Turnout (Postcard)iii Learn more about Budgetiv
Information .21** .76*** .44*** .37*** .41*** .31*** .05 .09* .00 .05 -.05 -.09 .00 .09** -.04 .06 -.04 -.09* .07 .09* .10* .05 .08 .06
(.09) (.06) -(.08) (.07) (.08) (.07) (.07) (.05)-(.06)(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.05)-(.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) -(.06)(.05) (.06) (.05)
Panel A: Goods (Overall)
Priors on goods (g) -.07*** .00 -.01 -.01
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Info*goods .06*** -.01 .00 .00
(.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Panel B: Politicians
Politician priors (0-10) .17*** .02 .01 .04***
(.02) (.02) (.01) (.01)
Info*politicians -.11*** -.03 -.03* .00
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Panel C: Development categories
Education priors (0-10) -.09*** -.04* -.04* -.03
(.03) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Info*education .04 .01 .03 -.01
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Infrastructure priors (0-10) -.09*** .06** .06*** -.02
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Info*infrastructure .09* -.03 -.03 .02
(.05) (.04) (.03) (.03)
Health priors (0-10) -.10*** -.03 -.01 -.03
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Info*health .06 .04 .04 .00
(.05) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Agriculture priors (0-10) -.13*** -.07*** -.06** -.02
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Info*agriculture .13*** .07* .08** .01
(.05) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Constant .64 -.12 .43 .41 .42 .46 .75 .70 .83 .67 .80 .86 .82 .75 .84 .68 .79 .85 .79 .66 .79 .78 .80 .78
Sample size 1,711 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,5151,5151,5151,5151,515 1515 1,7171,5211,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,717 1,521 1,5211,5211,5211,521
Note: Table reports the results of separate fixed effects regressions of the form Yij = αj + β1Tij + β2Pij + β3(Tij ∗ Pij) + εij for different Pij reported in the rows. All Pij
are measured in the survey pre-treatment as described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the village-level except when there is negative intracluster correlation,
in which case uncorrected standard errors are reported.
iElected leaders in the district government are doing a [worse job (=1)/better job (=-1)/the same job (=0)] than you thought they were?
iiReturned postcard and sanctioned=1, returned postcard and rewarded=-1, abstained=0.
iiiReturned postcard=1, abstained=0.
ivHow interested are you in learning more about how the district government spends money in the budget? (interested=1)
Table 3.5: The Effect of Information Conditional on Prior Spending Beliefs
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Yet, there is little evidence that individual priors conditioned the effect of information on
incumbent support, participation, and willingness to learn more about the budget. One possible
explanation for this is that the priors are working in competing directions. To assess this, I test
a triple interaction that captures the effect of information on political behavior for participants
that experienced negative learning on both overall goods and politicians, positive learning on both
dimensions, and mixed learning. The results in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.6 are telling: For those
who only learned positive things along these dimensions, the treatment resulted in both better
evaluations of government performance (Panel A) and lower turnout (Panel B). In contrast, for
those who learned at least some negative information, the information caused both a worsening
view on government performance and higher turnout. This was not the case for willingness to learn
more about the budget (Panel C), however, which suggests that the desire to remain informed in
the future was not driven by any specific information that participants learned.
Performance worsei Participation (Postcard)ii Learn about budgetiii
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment .75*** .40** .03
(.21) (.16) (.14)
Priors on overall goods (g) -.04 .04* -.01
(.03) (.02) (.02)
Treat*g -.01 -.06** .01
(.04) (.03) (.03)
Priors on politicians (p) .19*** .11** .00
(.06) (.04) (.04)
Treat*p -.24*** -.18*** .01
(.08) (.06) (.06)
g*p -.01 -.02*** .01
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Treat*g*p .03* .03*** .00
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Constant .17 .58 .73
Sample size 1488 1493 1493
Note: Table reports results from a triple interaction of the form Yij = αj + β1Tij + β2P
1
ij + β3(Tij ∗ P 1ij) + β4P 2ij + β5((Tij ∗
P 2ij)+β6(P
1
ij ∗P 2ij)+β7(Tij ∗P 1ij ∗P 2ij)+εij for priors on government spending on citizens and politicians. All Pij are measured
in the survey pre-treatment as described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the village-level except when there is
negative intracluster correlation, in which case uncorrected standard errors are reported.
iElected leaders in the district government are doing a [worse job (=1)/better job (=-1)/the same job (=0)] than you thought
they were?
iiReturned postcard=1, abstained=0.
iiiHow interested are you in learning more about how the district government spends money in the budget? (interested=1)
Table 3.6: Effect of Information on Political Behavior Conditioned on Beliefs

























































Panel C: Learn more about Budget
Figure 3.5: Priors on Actual Spending. This figure shows the triple interaction between the informa-
tion treatment, prior beliefs on government spending (g), and prior beliefs on how much politicians
allocated to themselves (r). Substantively, this can be interpreted as assessing whether the interac-
tion between the information and priors on g also depends on the priors on r. Results are reported
for three main outcomes of interest as defined in Table 3.
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Overall, the evidence suggests that prior beliefs on two dimensions—the share of revenue that
politicians spend on goods and services for citizens and take for themselves—indeed conditioned
the effect of information on perceptions of government as performing worse than previously ex-
pected. There is little indication that individual priors conditioned incumbent support or political
participation, however.
I explore the possibility that this is because participants received information on multiple dimen-
sions and these dimensions can work in complementary or competing ways. I find that information
decreased participation for those who learned positive information on multiple dimensions but in-
creased participation among those who obtained at least some bad news. These findings suggest
the need to account for how multiple dimensions of information affect political decisions at the
individual-level. Finally, participants’ willingness to stay informed in the future did not depend on
prior beliefs. This suggests that the treatment inspired future monitoring through some channel
other than the content, possibly heightened confidence or capacity.
3.6.2 Other contextual factors
As a final step, I explore how other individual characteristics affect the impact of information
on political behavior. I begin with level of education, which is a strong predictor of how well a
person can understand and process new information. Panel A of Table 3.7 investigates whether
the impact of information on the four main outcomes of interest varied depending on the level of
education, where all those with no formal education were coded as 1 and those who had at least
completed primary school were coded as zero. While those with some formal education were more
likely to acknowledge the information treatment was new, there is little evidence that effects on
incumbent support or political participation dependend on education. The use of colorful visuals
and interactive exercises in the campaign was designed intentionally to facilitate comprehension
among those with low levels of education; these results suggest that these efforts succeeded.
In contrast, initial demand for better information on government spending did condition the ef-
fect of information on both incumbent support and political participation. Demand for information
is captured by the pre-treatment survey question: “How interested are you in learning more about




























Figure 3.6: Demand for information. The figure shows how the effect of information on willingness
to remain informed in the future varies depending on initial demand for that information. Demand
for information is measured both pre- and post-treatment with the survey question: “How interested
are you in learning more about how district government spends money in the budget” (interested=1).
how the district government spends money in the budget.” As can be seen in Panel B, those who
initially wanted the information were also significantly more likely both to return the postcard and
sanction the incumbent. Interestingly, whether participants wanted to remain politically informed
also varied by initial demand; those who were originally un-interested in the information expressed
the greatest willingness to learn more about government in the future (see also Figure 3.6). This
reinforces the finding that one-off information provision can potentially have beneficial downstream
effects on the overall information environment by elevating demand for information among those
who initially seem unengaged.
Finally, I check whether the effect of information depended on poverty and sex, both factors
that are closely associated with demand for public goods and, consequently, the potential relevance
of information on government spending performance. Panel C presents shows that the effect of
the information did not have a bigger impact on women than men for any of the main outcomes
of interest. For poverty, I employ a subjective measure where an individual is coded as 1 if they
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consider their household among the poorest in the village and 0 otherwise.22 The poor were
substantially more likely to return their postcard and use it to punish the incumbent than the
better-off. They also expressed a greater interest in remaining better informed in the future. This
indicates that the kind of information intervention employed in this paper can succeed at mobilizing
a target, but traditionally politically marginalized, audience.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of better information on government spending on incumbent
support and political participation at the individual level. In using an experiment, in which the
treatment group received better information on actual government spending performance, I identify
the causal effect of better information on political behavior. Theories of information are predicated
on the notion that people update prior beliefs when confronted with new information. This is
one of the first studies to use rich pre-treatment survey data on individuals’ expectations about
government spending to examine how the effect of information varies depending on prior beliefs.
The results suggest that the information had a powerful effect on causing individuals to view
government as performing substantially worse than previously expected. Despite this strong ev-
idence of attitudinal change, there is little indication that the information decreased incumbent
support or affected levels of participation on average. Only when exploring how costs of political
participation and prior beliefs matter does it become clear that negative information increased
participation. These results are consistent with the predictions of expressive voting models that
information increases turnout when it strengthens the perceived benefits of taking political action
(Banerjee et al., 2011). They also highlight the importance of thinking about the different di-
mensions that information operates under and how individuals might weight those dimensions in
understanding how political decisions are made at the individual-level.
Another significant finding is that one-off information provision had a positive effect on individ-
uals’ desire to remain informed in the future. Moreover, this gain comes primarily from those who
22Income data is notoriously unreliable.
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were initially uninterested in becoming better informed. This finding sheds light on how informa-
tion might buttress non-electoral forms of accountability, like public scrutiny. It also has important
policy implications in suggesting that one-off information campaigns—initiated by the media or
civil society, for instance—could stimulate demand for information and an overall improvement to

















































Info Newi Performance Worseii Punish Incumbentiii Turnout (Postcard)iv Learn more about Budgetv
Information .36*** .29*** .34*** .36*** .49*** .49*** .49*** .50*** .01 -.05 -.02 .05 .02 -.04 -.01 .05* .07*** .18*** .03 .10***
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.04) (.02) (.02)
Panel A: Education
Education (low)a .19*** -.25*** -.02 .03 -.14***
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.04)
Info*education -.10** .10* .05 -.01 .04
(.05) (.06) (.04) (.04) (.05)
Panel B: Demand for Information
Want infob -.03 .06 -.06 -.09*** .59***
(.05) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03)
Info*Want info .07 .03 .10** .09** -.16***
(.05) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.04)
Panel C: Relevance of Information
Femalec .09*** -.02 .06** .05** .02
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Info*Female -.05 .03 -.05 -.05 -.05
(.03) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.03)
Poord .02 -.04 .00 .02 -.10***
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.03)
Info*Poor .00 .06 .11** .07* .11***
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.03)
Constant .46 .54 .51 .47 .30 .19 .25 .24 .74 .78 .74 .71 .77 .84 .76 .75 .79 .33 .79 .74
N 1862 1860 1863 1863 1850 1848 1851 1851 1856 1854 1857 1857 1862 1860 1863 1863 1862 1860 1863 1863
Note: Table reports the results of separate fixed effects regressions of the form Yij = αj + β1Tij + β2Xij + β3(Tij ∗Xij) + εij for different Xij reported in the
rows. All Xij are measured in the survey pre-treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the village-level except when there is negative intracluster correlation,
in which case uncorrected standard errors are reported.
aNo formal education=1, completed at least primary school=0.
bHow interested are you in learning more about how district government spends money in the budget? (interested=1)
cI would like you to think of your village in terms of three levels of poverty/wealth. Imagine that each level has about the same number of households in it. In
your opinion, is your household on the lowest level (=1), the middle/top level (=0).
dFemale=1, male=0
iWould you describe the information you just received as [totally new (=1)/somewhat new (=0)/not new at all (-1)]
iiElected leaders in the district government are doing a [worse job (=1)/better job (=-1)/the same job (=0)] than you thought they were?
iiiReturned postcard and sanctioned=1, returned postcard and rewarded=-1, abstained=0.
ivHow interested are you in learning more about how the district government spends money in the budget? (interested=1)
Table 3.7: The Effect of Information Conditional on other Contextual Factors
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Chapter 4
Is Bigger Always Better? The Effect
of Windfall Size on Welfare and
Conflict
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4.1 Introduction
For the many developing countries that rely on natural resources or foreign aid for revenue, such
windfalls have the potential to foster growth and develolopment. Yet, as large discretionary inflows
of income, revenue windfalls can be more harmful for development than beneficial. Natural re-
sources are associated with poor economic performance and rent-seeking (Sachs and Warner, 2001;
Leite and Weidemann, 1999). Others have argued that foreign aid often fails to facilitate devel-
opment (Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2008).
Increasingly, researchers are asking the question: Why are revenue windfalls beneficial in some
contexts and harmful in others?
This paper investigates whether the impact of windfalls on development depends on the un-
derlying degree of fragmentation and power competition in society. I do this by looking at how
relations between former combatants and civilians conditioned the effectiveness of aid windfalls at
the village-level in post-conflict Aceh. The BRA-KDP aid program was implemented in Aceh in
2007 to facilitate reconstruction following nearly 30 years of separatist conflict between the Free
Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) and the Indonesian government. The central
component of the program was the disbursement to villages of varying-sized aid windfalls for local
development. BRA-KDP also promoted a transparent and inclusive process for village decision-
making on how to spend the windfall. Yet, as is typical in post-conflict contexts, recipient villages
varied greatly on the ex ante degree of amicability between civilians and resettled former com-
batants. Moreover, BRA-KDP potentially, if unintentionally, exacerbated divisions between these
groups: The program sought primarily to deliver benefits to civilian conflict victims and prohib-
ited former combatants from directly benefitting. This paper investigates whether bigger windfalls
incentivized former combatants to appropriate the wealth in villages where relations with civilians
were already contentious as opposed to those in which they were more cooperative. It explores, in
turn, whether such appropriation undermined the economic benefits of bigger windfalls for civilians
and exacerbated social divisions.
In exploring how social fragmentation and competition affect the allocation of resources, this
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paper draws on a rich political economy literature. It is widely appreciated that more ethnically
fragmented societies are less successful at public goods provision and strong economic performance
(Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Habya-
rimana et al., 2007). It has also long been suggested that windfalls contribute to conflict onset
by exacerbating grievances or giving rebels greater incentives to capture the bounty (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2005b; Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2004). Particularly relevant to this paper is an influential
literature on group rent-seeking contests, which focuses on how both windfall size and the pre-
existing degree of social fragmentation determine whether windfalls are beneficial or harmful for
development (Tullock, 1980; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane,
1998; Svensson, 2000). The key insight from this literature is that windfalls are good for devel-
opment when they arrive in settings were groups are homogeneous or cooperative; they yield few
gains when received in settings where multiple powerful and competitive groups exist.
To identify how social fragmentation conditions the impact of aid windfalls on local development
in Aceh—ruling out possible reverse causality or other potential explanatory variables—I exploit a
feature of how windfall amounts were assigned to villages. Specifically, the size of the windfall that
each village received was determined on the basis of arbitrary cutoffs in two continuous measures
of eligibility. I use a regression discontinuity around a subset of the 12 thresholds created by the
BRA-KDP assignment process to estimate the causal effect of bigger windfalls.1 The data in this
paper comes from original surveys conducted with a random sample of civilians, former combatants,
and village heads in 212 villages that participated in the BRA-KDP program. The surveys provide
measures not only for the main outcomes of interest—appropriation, economic welfare, and social
divisions—but also for how outcomes vary across ‘high’ and ‘low’ competition villages, or villages
where ex-GAM were likely more and less predisposed to compete for the wealth based on both
group strength and interest alignment with civilians.
The empirical approach taken here improves on previous studies on aid windfalls and develop-
ment in several ways. Most existing studies use cross-national aggregate data and observational
1It should be emphasized that this paper identifies the effects of windfall size. It does not compare villages that
received aid windfalls to a ‘control’ group that did not, which is the focus of Barron et al (2009).
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or instrumental variables approaches to study the relationship between aid and development.2
Such approaches raise concerns about cross-country comparisions and whether the assumptions for
causal identification hold. Using a regression discontinuity approach from data collected within a
single geographic region has the potential to identify cleanly the causal effect of windfall size on
development at the local level.3 Moreover, using micro-level data makes it possible to explore new
contexts for group competition. A central empirical challenge for the rent-seeking contest literature
has been deriving measures of the existence of multiple powerful and competing groups. Previous
studies have tended to use measures of ethnic fractionalization in cross-national tests (Svensson,
2000; Hodler, 2006). Yet, relying on ethnic fractionalization as the proxy for group competition
overlooks a number of other relevant settings in which such dynamics might occur. This paper
extends such analyses by focusing on power dynamics in a post-conflict setting at the local level.
The main results show that, in high competition villages, former combatants were more likely to
appropriate the windfall and receive benefits from BRA-KDP than in low competition villages. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that bigger windfalls incentivize appropriation in more divided
societies. Yet, contrary to predictions, there is little indication that bigger windfalls resulted in
fewer economic benefits for civilians in high competition villages, despite appropriation by former
combatants. The findings also do not indicate that bigger windfalls exacerbated social tensions
in high vis-a-vis low competition villages, as originally hypothesized. One possible explanation
for these results is that bigger windfalls caused more high competition villages to distribute funds
equally across all households, although this contradicted the program’s intention to deliver greater
benefits to the most conflict-affected civilian households. Yet, if this was the case, the results raise
questions about why bigger windfalls did not deliver even greater economic benefits to civilian
households in low competition villages compared to high competition ones. Thus, while this paper
is motivated by a concern for the effect of bigger windfalls in socially fragmented places, the results
also suggest the need to consider decision-making dynamics in more cohesive communities as well.
2For a review of this literature, see Wright and Winters (2010).
3This paper is most closely related to recent studies that use regression discontinuities to identify the effects of bigger
windfalls (in the form of central transfers) on welfare and governance outcomes at the municipal level in Brazil (Brollo
et al., 2010; Litschig, 2010; Litschig and Morrison, 2010).
CHAPTER 4. IS BIGGER ALWAYS BETTER? 114
This paper contributes not only to the literature on windfalls, aid, and development but also to a
growing body of research on whether community-driven development (CDD) or community-driven
reconstruction (CDR) programs deliver welfare benefits, strengthen local democratic institutions,
and foster social cohesion (Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Bank, 2007; Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein,
2009; Casey, Glennerster and Miguel, 2011; Gugerty and Kremer, 2008). By investigating whether
aid windfalls actually exacerbate community tensions in certain contexts, this paper emphasizes
the need to think about the different contexts in which program impacts might vary. Additionally,
in focusing on windfall size, it highlights a so far under-discussed question: What is the optimal
windfall size for facilitating development in different contexts?
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the BRA-KDP program and motivates
the inquiry into why the nature of power relations between civilians and former combatants could
condition its effectiveness. Section 4.3 draws on theory to formulate hypotheses for testing. The
data and strategy for causal identification are described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents evidence
of how bigger windfalls affect appropriation, economic welfare and social divisions, and whether
that effect varies in villages with more and less contentious relations between civilians and former
combatants. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Context
For nearly 30 years, beginning in the mid-1970s, GAM waged a separatist struggle in Aceh against
the Indonesian government. While the conflict evolved in several stages, civilians frequently suf-
fered the brunt of hostilities as the Indonesian military sought to undercut popular support for
GAM by terrorizing suspected civilian supporters. The conflict resulted in approximately 30,000
deaths as well as widespread instances of murder, torture, rape, internal displacement and economic
destruction.
The peace agreement reached in August 2005 contained provisions to reintegrate GAM combat-
ants and to provide assistance to civilian conflict victims. The Aceh Peace Reintegration Agency
(Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh, or BRA) was established to manage this process. In an ef-
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fort to reach conflict-affected communities broadly, BRA opted for a partnership with the World
Bank-supported Kecamatan (Subdistrict) Development Program (KDP). The resultant BRA-KDP
project was designed to deliver assistance to local conflict-affected communities. Specifically, it
provided aid windfalls ranging in size from 60 to 170 million rupiah (about USD $6,000-$17,000)
to more than 1,700 villages in 67 subdistricts.
On one hand, BRA-KDP emphasized both welfare gains and social reconciliation among conflict-
affected groups. The main goal of the program was to improve the welfare of the most conflict-
affected civilian households. It aimed to do this by having villages allocate funds to livelihood
support through a transparent, democratic, and inclusive decision-making process. BRA-KDP was
implemented by following the same steps in all villages. First, villages held information meetings
about the program. Community members subsequently identified the conflict-affected households
and developed project proposals that addressed their needs, although communities had discretion
over whether to use the funds for local public goods like infrastructure, private goods like livelihood
assistance, or some combination thereof.4 Villagers then voted on proposals in an open meeting and
aid windfalls were deposited in the village’s bank account upon final approval by the subdistrict
government.
Yet, BRA-KDP potentially, if unintentionally, exacerbated social divisions between civilians and
former combatants. Former combatants were expressly prohibited from benefitting directly from
BRA-KDP. While this was because ex-combatants were supposed to receive assistance through
other channels, at the time BRA-KDP was implemented, many were growing frustrated that their
reintegration funds had not been distributed fairly or transparently (Morel, Watanabe and Wrobel,
2009). Anecdotal evidence suggests that former combatants attempted to extort funds or otherwise
influence how funds were allocated within communities (Morel, Watanabe and Wrobel, 2009). Re-
portedly, in some villages, former combatants demanded that funds be spent on public goods that
would benefit all community members. In other villages, former combatants pressured community
4Communities were encouraged to use their own subjective criteria based on local knowledge but were also provided
with guidance from BRA. BRA defined conflict victims as those who had experienced the death or disappearance
of family members due to conflict, house or property destruction, displacement, physical disability, psychological
trauma, or loss of economic livelihood.
CHAPTER 4. IS BIGGER ALWAYS BETTER? 116
members to divide the windfall equally among all households in the village, called bagi rata, despite
the objections of program designers. Such equal distribution was strongly discouraged by program
designers because it divided the windfall into such small amounts that it could not be used mean-
ingfully for investment and sustainable welfare improvements. There are also reports that former
combatants blatantly attempted to extort funds in some villages.
Of particular relevance to this paper, a World Bank report conjectures that GAM tried different
strategies in different contexts (Morel, Watanabe and Wrobel, 2009). Namely, GAM extorted funds
in villages where it dominated local politics; demanded bagi rata in villages where relations with
civilians were fractious but it had less power; and supported civilians in villages where GAM
was popular and not too powerful. A quasi-experimental impact evaluation of the BRA-KDP
program also finds evidence that the program had a negative effect on civilian acceptance of former
combatants (Barron et al., 2009). All in all, BRA-KDP presents an important setting for testing
political economy theories of the conditions under which bigger windfalls induce competition and
appropriation and undermine development.
4.3 Literature and Hypotheses
Political economy theory provides insights into why bigger windfalls improve development in some
contexts but not in others. Several recent studies have investigated how windfalls alter politicians’
incentives to secure political control. For instance, Robinson et al (2006) theorize that resource
booms increase the value to politicians of holding office and induce them to allocate resources to
patronage. Similarly, Brollo et al (2010) show that bigger windfalls cause lower quality politi-
cians to seek office. While these papers present compelling theories for why bigger windfalls affect
politicians’ incentives, the focus on politicians is likely less relevant in the BRA-KDP context. To
minimize the risk of elite capture, BRA-KDP was implemented by facilitators employed directly
by the program itself and not affiliated with the village government. While the reliance on facilita-
tors does not eliminate the possibility that local elites influenced the program—as discussed more
below—it does suggest the need to focus attention on group dynamics in the allocation process.
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Another prominent literature, influenced by the seminal work of Tullock (1980), reveals how
competition among multiple powerful groups over the allocation of funds determines whether wind-
falls are beneficial or harmful to development. Tornell and Lane (1999; 1996; 1998) use a model of
economic growth to explain why windfalls cause groups to make excessive demands for redistribu-
tion that undermine economic growth, a phenomenon they dub the voracity effect. They show that
positive terms of trade shocks—for instance from foreign aid inflows or natural resource booms—
spur growth when there is only one group in society, when there are multiple groups that cooperate,
or when multiple competing groups are constrained by institutions in their demands for transfers.
In societies with multiple competing groups and few institutional constraints—a situation common
in many developing countries—windfalls trigger excessive demands for transfers that harm growth.
More immediately relevant to BRA-KDP, Svensson (2000) investigates how group competition
affects the impact of aid windfalls on rent-seeking and corruption. In his model, groups can either
decide to spend the windfall on public goods or compete to appropriate the wealth for private
gain. When groups are capable of cooperation, all resources are spent on public goods and optimal
welfare gains are realized. When groups compete, the windfall is appropriated and welfare is lower
because rent-seeking is a costly activity. Svensson focuses on how cooperation is sustained among
groups that engage in repeated interactions over resource allocation and highlights the role that
punishment plays in preventing groups from deviating from cooperation. As windfalls get bigger
and surpass a critical threshold, however, the incentives for groups to capture the wealth for private
gain exceeds the drawbacks of punishment. All in all, this model clarifies the micro-foundations for
why bigger windfalls might have beneficial effects in homogeneous or cooperative societies but not
in competitive ones.
In addition to harming development and welfare, windfalls in such contexts most likely result in
heightened social divisions and antagonism between groups, with important implications for social
stability. While this notion follows implicitly from Tornell and Lane (1999) and Svensson (2000)
and has also been captured in models in which group competition and conflict are synonymous
(Hodler, 2006).
I draw on theories of group rent-seeking competition in formulating three hypotheses for testing
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in Aceh as to why bigger windfalls undermine development:
H1 Bigger windfalls induced former combatants to appropriate the wealth in villages
where relations with civilians was contentious, compared to villages with more co-
operative relations.
H2 Bigger windfalls improved economic welfare for civilians in villages where relations
with former combatants was cooperative compared to more divided villages.
H3 Bigger windfalls exacerbated social divisions between former combatants and civil-
ians in villages with already contentious relations compared to villages with more
cooperative ones.
The first hypothesis predicts that bigger windfalls gave former combatants stronger incentives
to appropriate wealth in villages with a history of more contentious relations with civilians. In
this context, appropriation could take a variety of forms, from blatant extortion to more subtle
efforts to pressure communities to spend on public goods or to distribute the wealth equally across
all households in the village. The second two hypotheses follow from the first in predicting that
appropriation would result in a reduction in the economic benefits of bigger windfalls for civilian
households and a deepening of the social divisions between former combatants and civilians in high
competition villages compared to low competition ones.
4.4 Identification Strategy
The way in which the BRA-KDP program was implemented makes it possible to identify whether
a bigger windfall caused appropriation, undermined economic welfare, and exacerbated social divi-
sions. Because windfall size was determined on the basis of arbitrary cutoffs in continuous measures
of two assignment variables—subdistrict conflict intensity and village population—it is possible to
use the cutoffs and a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the causal effect of a bigger
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windfall. This section first describes the survey data and then details the regression discontinuity
approach.
4.4.1 Data
This paper employs original survey data from civilians, former combatants, and village heads. The
surveys ask about individual, household, and village-level characteristics a year after the BRA-
KDP program, providing a variety of measures for the main outcomes of interest. Additionally,
the surveys included questions about the conflict period, which provide relevant ‘pre-treatment’
covariates at the heart of the analysis of group competition.5 Of the 1,724 villages in 67 subdistricts
that received BRA-KDP grants, approximately 18 were randomly selected, producing a sample of
212 villages.6
The main source of data comes from the household surveys conducted with civilians. Within
each of the 212 villages, five households were randomly sampled from an updated list of all house-
holds in the village. A main respondent in each household was then selected from all household
members aged 18 to 65 using simple random sampling. While most measures for the main outcomes
of interest were only included on the civilian survey, where possible I also draw on survey data from
former combatants to corroborate the evidence. In each village, former combatants were sampled
with a 610 probability from an exhaustive list compiled in collaboration with village leaders and
KPA (the political incarnation of GAM) representatives.7 A survey was also conducted with the
head of each sampled village and this data primarily provides village-level context measures. Table
4.4 provides descriptive statistics for the main outcomes of interest.
5The surveys were commissioned by the World Bank in Indonesia and designed in collaboration with Patrick Barron
(formerly at the World Bank), Macartan Humphreys (Columbia University), Yuhki Tajima (UC-Riverside), and
Jeremy Weinstein (Stanford University). Implementation was managed by the survey firm A.C. Nielsen and conducted
from July-September 2008, approximately 12 months after BRA-KDP had concluded.
6For more on the sampling methodology see the research design memo for the Aceh Reintegration and Livelihood
Studies available on the author’s website. While 219 of the villages surveyed were in BRA-KDP subdistricts, seven
were dropped from the analysis because they were newly formed and did not exist at the time of initial BRA-KDP
treatment assignment, and the parent village is not known.
7A former combatant was defined as anyone who had fought in GAM’s fighting arm or was in the military command
structure for at least one month since 1998. In 21 of the 212 villages—predominantly former GAM strongholds—we
were not permitted to conduct surveys with former combatants.
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Range Mean SD C.I. n
min max Lower Upper
Panel A: Appropriation (%)
Did not benefit enough people 0 1 .06 .02 .02 .10 282
Did not benefit victims enough 0 1 .07 .02 .03 .11 282
Benefitted ex-combatants too much 0 1 .15 .03 .10 .20 281
Corruption 0 1 .06 .02 .03 .09 268
Extortion 0 1 .04 .01 .01 .06 269
Panel B: Project Selection
Unimportant activities selected 0 1 .04 .01 .02 .07 282
Village approved equal division 0 1 .48 .03 .41 .55 377
Village approved public goods 0 1 .10 .02 .06 .14 377
Civilians: Received goods from BRA-KDP† (%) 0 1 .70 .04 .61 .79 377
Civilians: Received cash 0 1 .91 .04 .83 .98 264
Civilians: Amount of cash received† (’000,000 rupiah) 0 6 .64 .06 .52 .75 377
GAM: Received goods from BRA-KDP† (%) 0 1 .59 .07 .44 .73 126
GAM: Received cash 0 1 .96 .03 .90 1.02 74
GAM: Amount of cash received (’000,000 rupiah) 0 6 .65 .11 .44 .86 126
Panel C: Welfare (Civilians)†
Assets (’000,000 rupiah) 0 100 16.26 .87 14.50 18.01 377
Protected drinking water (%) 0 1 .41 .05 .30 .51 377
Concrete walls (%) 0 1 .18 .03 .11 .24 377
Land farmed (’000 m2) 0 70 3.47 .37 2.72 4.22 377
Share of school age children in school 0 1 .47 .03 .41 .52 377
Share of HH members sick 0 1 .06 .01 .04 .08 377
Perceive household as poor (%) 0 1 .69 .03 .63 .74 377
Living conditions better now (%) 0 1 .35 .04 .28 .42 377
Panel D: Welfare (Ex-Combatants)
Assets (’000,000 rupiah) 0 100 17.45 1.00 15.42 19.48 126
Protected drinking water (%) 0 1 .45 .08 .28 .62 126
Concrete walls (%) 0 1 .09 .03 .03 .15 126
Land farmed (’000 m2) 0 70 4.16 .72 2.69 5.62 126
Share of school age children in school 0 1 .38 .05 .29 .48 126
Share of HH members sick 0 1 .05 .01 .03 .06 126
Perceive household as poor (%) 0 1 .74 .04 .66 .82 126
Living conditions better now (%) 0 1 .29 .05 .18 .40 126
Panel E: Divisions (%)
Divisions: Ex-com and villagers 0 1 .02 .01 .00 .04 376
Benefit more: Former Combatants -1 1 .08 .05 -.01 .18 371
Benefit more: KPA members -1 1 -.01 .04 -.10 .07 370
Willing to accept former combatants 0 5 4.92 .02 4.88 4.96 377
Notes: Table reports descriptive statistics for main outcome variables. Panels A, B, and D are for civilian respondents use
individual sampling weights, except for Panel B which uses household weights. Panel C contains the same measures as Panel
B but for the ex-combatant sample. Individual question wordings can be found in the respective results tables.
†Responses in this section weighted at the household (not individual) level.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables








(Majority supported Indonesian i=222 i=179
government or neither) j=37 j=26
The table shows the over-lapping measures of GAM strength and cooperation
taken at the village-level (in the village head survey) and used as the main
conditional measure in the analysis. GAM strengh is determined by whether the
village was a GAM stronghold during the final phase of the conflict. Relations are
considered cooperative if the majority of village members supported GAM during
the conflict (as opposed to the Indonesian military or neither side). The first row
in each cell shows the predicted likelihood of appropriation, where appropriation
is most likely where GAM was strong but relations were not cooperative (bottom
right cell). The analysis reduces this 2x2 table to a binary measure, where all
observations are coded 1 in the likely appropriation context and 0 otherwise.
The table also shows the sample sizes for individuals i in villages j obtained by
pooling thresholds 1 and 2.
Table 4.2: GAM Strength and Cooperation
4.4.1.1 Measuring Group Competition
The main goal of this paper is to examine whether the effect of aid windfalls on economic welfare
and social reconciliation varied across villages depending on the likelihood that groups competed to
appropriate the funds. As discussed in Section 4.3, the likelihood of group competition is a function
of the relative power of the different groups and the ability for groups to cooperate. The main type
of competition of interest in this paper is between civilian conflict victims, who were entitled to
receive the lions share of benefits from BRA-KDP, and former GAM combatants.
To form a single measure of a village’s predisposition to experience competition, I overlap
two measures from the village head survey. As a measure of GAM strength, I code all villages
that were considered GAM strongholds during the final years of the conflict (‘basis GAM’) as 1
(and 0 otherwise). To measure whether relations with civilians were likely cooperative, I code all
villages in which “the majority (at least half) of the members of the village supported GAM” as
1. Villages that primarily supported the Indonesian government or that supported neither group
were coded zero. Table 4.2 shows how I overlap these measures to form my main indicator of
group competition. Specifically, I anticipate that group competition is most likely in villages where
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GAM was strong but where it did not enjoy majority support, implying contentious rather than
cooperative relations with civilians (bottom right cell). In the analysis, I compare the impact of
bigger windfalls on outcomes in these high competition villages to outcomes in what I refer to as low
competition villages, namely all those where the possibility of competition was unlikely (because
GAM was weak and relations were supportive) or only somewhat likely (because GAM was strong
(weak) but relations were cooperative (competitive)).
4.4.2 The regression discontinuity
4.4.2.1 Windfall Allocations in BRA-KDP
The World Bank initially selected 67 subdistricts to participate in BRA-KDP, with all villages in
these subdistricts guaranteed a windfall of some amount.8 The amount that each village received
was determined by its score on two criteria: conflict intensity (measured at the subdistrict level)
and village population. The subdistrict conflict intensity score was produced by the World Bank
from a factor analysis of several measures of conflict exposure.9 The subdistricts were then divided
into three groups by imposing two arbitrary cutoffs in the continuous measure. Specifically, 2.5
was used as the cutoff between subdistricts with ‘high’ and ‘medium’ conflict exposure and 1.9 as
the threshold dividing ‘medium’ and ‘low’. Villages were also assigned to one of three population
categories by establishing a threshold at 300 persons between ‘small’ and ‘medium’ villages and at
700 persons between ‘medium’ and ‘large’ villages.
All in all, by over-lapping the two assignment tables—each with two cut-points—the World Bank
produced a 3x3 table with nine cells. Table 4.3 shows the assignment table and the windfall size
allocated to each cell of the table. Windfalls ranged in size from 60 million rupiah (approximately
8In selecting subdistricts, the World Bank followed a complex but well-defined rule, described in detail in Barron et al
(2009). In brief, first a target number of subdistricts was selected in each of Aceh’s 17 rural districts. Subdistricts were
then ranked by the conflict intensity score described in this section and were selected up to the target, conditional on
having disbursed at least 60 percent of their KDP funds in the previous year. Including this fiscal capacity criterion
has an implication for external validity in that only subdistricts with a proven ability to manage windfalls were
eligible for BRA-KDP. While subdistrict capacity does not necessarily reflect on village-capacity, it is plausible that
those villages least capable of managing windfall wealth are excluded.
9The nine measures included the number of conflict victims in the three years preceding 2005, the number of reported
clashes between GAM and the military, and perceptions of conflict intensity from survey data. See the complete list
in the online appendix.
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USD $6,000) to 170 million rupiah (approximately USD $17,000). To estimate whether a bigger
windfall causes appropriation, undermines welfare, and exacerbates conflict, I exploit the arbitrary
cutoffs used to determine windfall size using a regression discontinuity (RD) approach. An RD is
appropriate when the probability of receiving treatment is determined by an arbitrary cutoff in one
(or more) continuous assignment (also known as running) variables (Imbens and Lemieux, 2007;
Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw, 2001). With an exogenous cutoff, the area in the immediate
vicinity on either side resembles a randomized experiment. An unbiased estimate of the treatment
effect is obtained by comparing the outcomes for units on either side of the cutpoint, conditional
on correctly modeling the relationship between the assignment and running variables.
A particular challenge here is that the 3x3 matrix produced a total of 12 thresholds. The top
panel if Figure 4.1 labels the thresholds and the bottom panel shows the distribution of the 212
sampled villages across the nine treatment groups. While it would be ideal to estimate effects
at each of the 12 thresholds individually, this is not possible for two reasons.10 First, there are
not enough observations near the cutoffs at some of the thresholds to make analysis possible (see,
for instance, thresholds five and six). Second, some cutoffs exhibit sorting, where the density of
observations on either side of the cutpoint is discontinuous (see thresholds seven and eight). Such
sorting could indicate that assignment scores were manipulated to affect treatment status and
introduces selection concerns.
Thus, the main focus of this paper is on estimating the treatment effect at the first threshold.
As discussed more in Section 4.4.3 and in the online appendix, this is the only threshold that both
has sufficient observations at the cutpoint and that passes the density test. Specifically, the first
threshold represents a jump from 120 to 150 million rupiah ($12,000-$15,000)—an increase of 30
million rupiah ($3,000) at the cutoff. This is equivalent to an increase in 100,000 rupiah ($10)
per capita, or 560,000 rupiah ($56) per household.11 Additionally, I analyze the data by pooling
10Estimating effects at each threshold would be ideal because it would reveal how both windfall magnitudes and
increases in windfall size affect the outcomes of interest. For instance, a jump of 30 million rupiah from 60 to 90
could have a different effect than a jump from 120 to 150 million rupiah. Similarly the impact of a jump of 10 million
rupiah from 60 to 70 could vary significantly from a 50 million rupiah jump from 100 to 150.
11This estimate of household size of 5.6 people per household comes from the survey data.
CHAPTER 4. IS BIGGER ALWAYS BETTER? 124
Popula'on	  
Conflict	   Small	  (<299)	   Med(300-­‐699)	   Large	  (≥700)	  
High	  (≥2.5)	   	  	  
Med	  (≥1.9)	   	  	  
Low	  (<1.9)	   	  	  
1 2 
7 8 9 
3 4 
































0 100 500 900 1500 2000 2500 3000300 700
Population (Village)
Figure 4.1: The regression discontinuity design. The top panel shows the 12 thresholds created by
BRA-KDP assignment process. The bottom panel shows the distribution across thresholds of actual
observations in the data. Analysis in the paper focuses on the two population thresholds in the high
conflict areas. Threshold 1 observations are red triangles and are based on a symmetric bandwidth
of ± 200 around the population cutoff P = 300. Threshold 2 observations are blue squares and are
based on a symmetric bandwidth of ± 200 around the population cutoff P = 700.
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Village Population
Small (P1) Medium (P2) Large (P3) Diff Diff
(<299) (300-699) (≥700) (P2-P1) (P3-P2)
High (C1) 120 150 170 30 20
Conflict Medium (C2) 80 100 120 20 20
Score Low (C3) 60 70 80 10 10
Diff (C1-C2) 40 50 50
Diff (C2-C3) 20 30 40
Windfall size expressed in terms of rupiah ’000,000. Table shows absolute windfall sizes for the nine
different village-level treatments (upper left cells) and the jumps in windfall size across thresholds.
The paper focuses on the jumps in windall size in the high conflict strata (first row), where threshold
1 is a jump of 30 million rupiah from 120 to 150 and threshold 2 is a jump of 20 million rupiah from
150 to 170 million rupiah.
Table 4.3: Village-level Aid Windfalls
observations from thresholds 1 and 2. While there are insufficient observations to obtain a separate
effect for the second threshold, this approach both boosts power and allows me to analyze data from
both thresholds in the high conflict score strata—the strata of greatest substantive interest in this
paper. At threshold 2, windfall size jumps 20 million rupiah from 150 to 170, which is equivalent
to an additional $2.90 per capita or about $16 per household. By pooling I estimate the effect of
an increase in windfall size from about 132 to 154 million rupiah for individuals in 106 villages (53
villages on each side of the cutpoint).
4.4.2.2 Estimation Strategy
Formally, the treatment effect of interest (τ) is the difference in limits as the cutoff is approached
from both sides:
τ = E[Y 1ij − Y 0ij |Pj = c] = lim
Pj↓c
E[Yij |Pj = c]− lim
Pj↑c
E[Yij |Pj = c] (4.1)
where Y 1ij and Y
0
ij refer to outcomes for individual i in village j in the treatment and control groups,
respectively; Pj the assignment variable (population); and c the cutoff (at Pj = 300 for threshold
1). This can be estimated in a regression framework using the following equation:
Yij = α+ τZj + f(P̃j) + f(P̃j)Zj +Xj + eij (4.2)
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where Zj is a dummy for treatment assignment that equals one for villages to the right of the
cutoff (the treatment group) and zero for those to the left (the control). The function f(·) denotes
polynomials of P̃j , where P̃j is the running variable centered at zero (obtained by subtracting the
value of the cutoff from the assignment variable). The term Xj denotes pre-treatment covariates
included as controls. The error term eij consists of both individual and village random compo-
nents; standard errors are clustered at the village level in all analysis. All analysis also takes into
account appropriate survey sampling weights to return the population average treatment effect at
the threshold.
The baseline model in Equation 2 reflects the fact that obtaining an unbiased estimate of τ
requires modeling correctly the relationship between Yij and P̃j in the vicinity of the cutoff (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010). Since regression takes into account observations located far from the cutoff,
polynomials in P̃j and interactions with Zj reduce the risk that distant data points drive the
estimation of treatment effects. The main specification I use is highly flexible: It employs both
both linear and quadratic forms of P̃j and fully interacts them with Zj so that separate regressions
are estimated on each side of the threshold (a quadratic spline). As a robustness check, I also
present results from a logistic regression with a linear spline in the online appendix.12
Estimation in RD also depends on the choice of bandwidth, or the size of the neighborhood
around the cut-point used in analysis. I restrict the data to a symmetrical population bandwidth of
± 200 around the centered cutoff (an actual population range of 100-500 for Pj = 300 and of 500-
900 for Pj = 700. I pool thresholds 1 and 2 by dividing the observations around the two population
thresholds into two groups, with all observations in the population range 100-500 assigned to the
first threshold and 501-900 to the control so that there is no overlap. Within each group, I center
the population threshold by subtracting the value of the cutoff and pool the groups together such
that all observations in the range [0,200] are designated Zj = 1 and from (0,-200] Zj = 0. It should
be noted that centering P̃j implies that the treatment effect at the cutoff (where P̃j = 0) is wholly
captured in τ .
12Because of the singularity of some of the data, it is not possible to get convergence on many logistic models with
quadratic splines.
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This is a ‘sharp’ RD in that I proceed as if the cutoff completely determined treatment assign-
ment. While the vast majority of villages received windfalls in the amount originally assigned, it is
possible that windfall size for some villages differed in actuality (typically called ‘non-compliance’).
According to program designers, when there were discrepancies in the number of villages or in
village population size, allocations could be readjusted at the village-level, although overall subdis-
trict allocations could not be changed (Morel, Watanabe and Wrobel, 2009, 45). In the presence
of such non-compliance, it is common to use a ‘fuzzy’ RD approach in which the treatment effect
is estimated only for those units that complied with their treatment assignment (Angrist, Imbens
and Rubin, 1996). In the absence of complete documentation of such non-compliance, as is the
case here, the intent-to-treat estimate provided by a sharp RD is appropriate.13
Importantly, the main goal of the empirical analysis is not to identify the average treatment
effect at the threshold but rather to assess how the impact of a bigger windfall varies across villages
that are more or less predisposed to group competition. I accomplish this by introducing into
Equation 2 the binary variable for group competition, Gj , discussed in Section 4.4.1.1:
Yij = α+ βZj + γZjGj + f(P̃j) + f(P̃j)Zj +Gj + f(P̃j)Gj + f(P̃j)ZjGj +Xj + eij (4.3)
where γ captures the interaction between windfall size and group competition. A positive and
significant coefficient would indicate that a bigger windfall caused more appropriation in a divided
village than a cohesive one.
4.4.3 Validity tests
Under-pinning the validity of regression discontinuity is the assumption that, when the assignment
variable is accounted for, the neighborhood in the immediate vicinity of the cutoff approximates
a randomized experiment. One possible violation of this assumption occurs if units manipulate
their scores on the assignment variable so as to receive (or avoid) treatment. A widely used check
13In one extreme case, all villages in the subdistrict Manyak Payed negotiated a re-allocation of the total subdistrict
grant. Another case recorded by the World Bank was in village Gampong Mesjid, which demanded and received an
extra five million rupiah from a separate fund. Manyak Payed is not in the high conflict strata and Gampong Mesjid
did not enter the sample so these instances of known non-compliance do not affect the analysis.
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for such sorting, proposed by McCrary (2008), is a test of the density of the observations in the
immediate vicinity of the threshold. A significant difference in the density of observations at the
cutoff is regarded as an indication of selection bias. Figure 4.2 presents the results of density tests
performed around the first threshold (top panel), the second threshold (middle panel), and both
panels pooled (bottom panel). There is no evidence that sorting occurred around these thresholds.14
Additionally, regression discontinuity designs are based on the assumption that only variables
affected by the treatment should exhibit a discontinuity at the cut-off. This implies that there
should be continuity in pre-treatment covariates at the cut-point (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). To
check this assumption, I conduct placebo tests in which I estimate Equation 2 on several pre-
treatment covariates measured at the village level (the level at which treatment was assigned).
Panel A reports a test of the pre-treatment covariates used in formulating the group competition
measure. Panel B presents general measures of village characteristics, including the terrain of the
village and village revenue and expenditures in 2006, that are included as controls in the analysis.
Finally, Panel C reports several measures of village conflict-affectedness and proxies for GAM
strength, including village conflict-affectedness, the number of GAM living in the village in 2005
(when the conflict ended) and whether GAM was sufficiently supported by the village during the
conflict to sleep in the village and plan operations there. While the sample size is small, there
are two things to note in this table. The first is that the data suggests a jump in terrain at the
threshold, which I account for by including it as a control in all specifications. The second is that
there is weak evidence of a jump downward in the group competition measure at the threshold.
This jump is in the opposite direction of the predictions, however, and should bias me against
finding support for the hypotheses.
14This is implemented in Stata by code provided by McCrary on his website http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/
~jmccrary/DCdensity/. See the online appendix for additional density tests of the other thresholds, which help
to confirm the focus on the first two thresholds.
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Figure 4.2: McCrary Density Tests. McCrary tests of discontinuities in the densities of observations
around threshold 1, threshold 2, and both thresholds pooled.
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Threshold 1 Threshold 1+2
mean (s.e.) obs mean (s.e.) obs
Panel A: Main Measures for Appropriation Context
1) Strength: Village was GAM stronghold (2001-2005)a -0.32 (.31) 73 -0.22 (.27) 104
2) Cooperation: Majority of village supported GAMb 0.33 (.39) 71 0.02 (.31) 99
3) Appropriation context (strength*cooperation)c -.58* (.29) 70 -0.38 (.25) 98
Panel B: Village Characteristics (controls)
4) Hilly terraind -.58* (.34) 74 -.53** (.25) 105
5) Village revenue in 2006e (million rupiah) -0.62 (1.03) 71 -0.09 (.86) 101
6) Village expenditures in 2006f (million rupiah) -1.08 (1.05) 70 -0.43 (.89) 100
7) Village was high-conflict affectedg -0.17 (.22) 74 0.06 (.21) 105
Panel C: Additional Measures of Village Conflict-Affectedness
8) Average number of civilian conflict victimsh 37.52 (77.36) 75 77.52 (73.98) 106
9) Number of GAM living in villagei 0.65 (6.28) 51 -2.94 (5.73) 75
10) GAM spent nights sleeping in villagej 0.06 (.36) 71 0.17 (.30) 101
11) GAM planned operations in villagej -0.13 (.41) 69 -0.16 (.29) 98
Notes: The table reports estimates of jumps in village (assignment) level pre-treatment covariates at threshold 1 and thresholds
1 and 2 pooled. Results are estimated (as in the main analysis) using a linear regression of the outcome on a model that fully
interacts the indicator for being to the right of the cutoff with linear and quadratic forms of the population running variable.
All measures come from the village head survey.
aVillage was a ‘basis GAM’ (GAM stronghold) during the period from 2001-2005.
b[During the period from 2001-2005], the majority (at least half) of the members of the village supported GAM (=1) or
supported the Indonesian military or neither side (=0).
cComposite of the above two measures that equals 1 if the village was a GAM stronghold but the majority of the village did
not support GAM and 0 otherwise.
dVillage located on hilly (=1) or flat (=0) terrain.
eLog of total village revenue in 2006.
fLog of total village expenditures in 2006.
gArmed confrontations, abductions or house burnings occurred every month from 2001-2005 (=1) or sometimes/never (=0).
hAverage number of conflict victims in village, based on individual-level survey responses aggregated to village-level.
iNumber of GAM living in village at the end of the conflict in August 2005.
jYes=1, no=0.
Table 4.4: Estimates of Jumps in Village-Level Pre-Treatment Covariates
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4.5 Main Results
4.5.1 Did bigger windfalls cause appropriation?
I begin by investigating whether a bigger windfall induced former combatants to appropriate the
wealth (H1). The first set of data, presented in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3, come from five measures
of perceptions of appropriation in BRA-KDP implementation in the civilian survey. Panel A in
the table reports average treatment effects at the cutpoint for the first threshold as well as the
marginal effect of a bigger windfall in villages where group competition was more and less likely.
Panel B presents the results obtained by pooling thresholds 1 and 2. Of greatest interest is whether
the interaction terms are positive and significant, indicating that more appropriation occurred in
villages predisposed to group competition than in those that were not.
The first two columns report perceptions that not enough people in general, and not enough
victims in particular, benefitted from BRA-KDP. The positive coefficients on the average effects
(significant in Panel B) indicate that a bigger windfall caused an increase in the share who felt
that too few people and too few victims benefitted. The positive (but not significant) interaction
term in both panels supports the possibility that the bigger windfall caused more people to feel
that few benefitted in high competition villages compared to low competition ones. The following
three columns present more direct questions of appropriation. The question in column 3 asked
respondents whether the agreed or disagreed with the statement that the activities selected in
BRA-KDP benefitted former GAM combatants too much. The positive and significant interaction
term in both panels strongly suggests that the bigger windfall caused more people to feel that
GAM benefitted too much in high competition compared to low competition villages. A similar
pattern holds for the subsequent two questions asking whether people thought that money was
































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Too few Too few Excom Corruptiond Extortione
people victims benefittedc
benefitteda benefittedb
Panel A: Threshold 1
1[Pop≥Cutoff] .06 -.03 -.03 -.06 -.02
(.09) (.07) (.12) (.11) (.11)
N 263 263 262 250 251
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -.14 -.12 -.52*** -.25*** -.23***
(.13) (.13) (.10) (.08) (.06)
High possibility .10 .02 .52*** .12 .10
(.09) (.06) (.16) (.08) (.09)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition .24 .14 1.04*** .37*** .33***
(.19) (.17) (.20) (.10) (.11)
N 254 254 253 244 245
Panel B: Threshold 1 + 2 (Pooled)
1[Pop≥Cutoff] .16** .11* .04 -.12 -.09
(.07) (.06) (.14) (.07) (.07)
N 350 350 349 335 334
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility .08 .04 -.32** -.32*** -.24***
(.06) (.08) (.13) (.06) (.07)
High possibility .13 .13 .52*** .12 .07
(.09) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.11)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition .05 .09 .84*** .44*** .31**
(.09) (.11) (.16) (.12) (.13)
N 331 331 330 319 318
Notes: Panel A reports regression results around threshold 1 for separate estimates of the average treatment effect at the cutoff and of
the average treatment effect at the cutoff conditional on group competition. Panel B reports the same for thresholds 1 and 2 (pooled). All
estimates are obtained by linear regression with a quadratic spline. Analysis is of the civilian sample; sampling weights are employed and
standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
†Group competition equals 1 (for high possibility) if GAM was strong in the village but was supported by less than half the villagers
during the conflict and is 0 otherwise (for low/medium possibility of group competition).
aDo you agree or disagree that the activities selected did not benefit enough people in the village (agree=1).
bDo you agree or disagree that the activities selected did not benefit conflict victims (agree=1).
cDo you agree or disagree that the activities selected benefitted ex-GAM combatants, PETA and/or IDPs too much (agree=1).
dThere were diversions of money/KKN (corruption, collusion, nepotism) (agree=1.)
eMoney was extorted from the process(agree=1).
Table 4.5: First Stage: Effect of Bigger Windfalls on Perceptions of Appropriation
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Figure 4.3: Effect of Bigger Windfalls on Perceptions of Appropriation. The left panel presents the
effect of bigger windfalls for the full threshold 1 sample of civilians. The right panel presents the
effect on civilians in low competition (red triangle) and high competition (blue square) villages. The
plot is a fitted regression of the outcome on the cutoff indicator and linear and quadratic forms of
the assignment variable (without controls), estimated separately on each side of the cutoff (quadratic
spline). All regressions include sampling weights and standard errors are clustered at the village
level.
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I next evaluate the possibility that a bigger windfall affected which projects were selected for
funding. As discussed above, the program aimed to deliver the largest share of benefits to civilian
conflict victims but gave communities discretion over which projects to fund. The primary options
were funding livelihood assistance or investing in public goods; disbursing the wealth equally across
all households was strongly discouraged. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that former
combatants tried to appropriate the BRA-KDP windfall by pressuring community members to do
equal distribution or to fund public goods. Columns 1-3 in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.4 investigate
whether windfall size affected how community members allocated BRA-KDP funds in high versus
low competition villages.
The first column in Table 4.6 presents results from a broad survey question asking respondents
whether they felt “the activities selected [in BRA-KDP] were not the most important ones for the
village.” There is little evidence that bigger windfalls caused greater dissatisfaction among civilians
in how the funds were spent in high competition villages. The second and third columns report
the share of people who recall that their village opted for equal division among all households or
for public goods. Notably, consistent with H1, high competition villages were significantly more
likely to select equal distribution than low competition villages (Panel A, column two). There is































Projects Selected Received Aid (Civilians) Received Aid (Combatants)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Bad Equal Public Received Received Amt. Received Received Amt.
projects Divisionb Goodsc assistanced moneye money assistanced moneye money
selecteda receivedf receivedf
Panel A: Threshold 1
1[Pop≥Cutoff] .03 -.35*** -.03 -.27 .35 -.22 -.30* .19 -.23
(.03) (.13) (.09) (.18) (.27) (.42) (.16) (.21) (.39)
N 263 351 351 351 245 351 121 69 121
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -.02 -.56*** -.06 -.40* -.10 -1.20*** -.73*** -.04 -.80**
(.03) (.15) (.11) (.20) (.11) (.36) (.19) (.06) (.33)
High possibility .00 .29 -.11 .09 .56* 1.00** .32 .60* .76
(.03) (.23) (.10) (.29) (.31) (.39) (.36) (.29) (.66)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition .02 .86*** -.05 .49 .66** 2.21*** 1.05*** .64** 1.56**
(.04) (.22) (.16) (.35) (.33) (.50) (.39) (.28) (.67)
N 254 332 332 332 236 332 113 64 113
Panel B: Threshold 1 + 2 (Pooled)
1[Pop≥Cutoff] -.02 .12 .00 .15 .23 .03 -.17 .19 -.30
(.08) (.23) (.07) (.21) (.22) (.27) (.16) (.18) (.36)
N 350 498 498 498 325 498 181 98 181
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -.12 .17 -.01 .25 -.04 -.26 -.45** -.01 -.25
(.09) (.33) (.10) (.27) (.05) (.42) (.21) (.03) (.36)
High possibility -.03 .14 -.20 .01 .51 .87** .25 .63** .59
(.07) (.26) (.13) (.26) (.35) (.39) (.38) (.28) (.74)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition .10 -.03 -.19 -.23 .55 1.13** .70 .64** .84
(.12) (.39) (.17) (.37) (.36) (.56) (.50) (.28) (.78)
N 331 464 464 464 305 464 168 88 168
Notes: Panel A reports regression results around threshold 1 for separate estimates of the average treatment effect at the cutoff
and of the average treatment effect at the cutoff conditional on group competition. Panel B reports the same for thresholds 1 and
2 (pooled). All estimates are obtained by linear regression with a quadratic spline. Analysis is of the civilian sample; sampling
weights are employed and standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
†Group competition equals 1 (for high possibility) if GAM was strong in the village but was supported by less than half the
villagers during the conflict and is 0 otherwise (for low/medium possibility of group competition).
aLooking back at the implementation of BRA-KDP do you agree or disagree that the activities selected were not the most
important ones for the village? (agree=1)
bEqual cash disbursement among all households=1.
cPublic goods (agriculture/traders/aquaculture/savings and loans) =1
dReceived assistance from BRA-KDP=1.
eReceived cash from BRA-KDP=1.
fAmount of money received (in millions of rupiah).
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Figure 4.4: Effect of Bigger Windfalls on Allocation I. The left panel presents the effect of bigger windfalls for the full threshold
1 sample of civilians. The right panel presents the effect on civilians in low competition (red triangle) and high competition (blue
square) villages. The plot is a fitted regression of the outcome on the cutoff indicator and linear and quadratic forms of the
assignment variable (without controls), estimated separately on each side of the cutoff (quadratic spline). All regressions include
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Figure 4.5: Effect of Bigger Windfalls on Allocation (Civilians) II. The left panel presents the effect of bigger windfalls for
the full threshold 1 sample of civilians. The right panel presents the effect on civilians in low competition (red triangle) and
high competition (blue square) villages. The plot is a fitted regression of the outcome on the cutoff indicator and linear and
quadratic forms of the assignment variable (without controls), estimated separately on each side of the cutoff (quadratic spline).
All regressions include sampling weights and standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Columns 4-6 in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.5 look more closely at the share of civilian households
that received assistance from BRA-KDP. If bigger windfalls induced appropriation by GAM in high
competition villages, then we would expect to see a negative interaction, indicating that civilians
received greater benefits in low than in high competition villages. Among these measures, the
most notable finding is that bigger windfalls resulted in civilians receiving more money in high
competition than low competition villages (Panels A and B, column six). There is also some
indication that households in high competition villages were more likely to receive cash (compared
to goods for livelihood assistance), which is consistent with the previous finding that these villages
were more likely to opt for equal disbursement. To shed more light on whether appropriation
occurred, I use data from the former combatant surveys to assess whether bigger windfalls resulted
in more direct benefits to ex-GAM combatants, despite the prohibition. The evidence indicates
that former combatants were significantly more likely to receive assistance—and to receive a bigger
amount—in high competition villages (Panels A and B, columns 7-9), which is consistent with H1.
All in all, on one hand, these results indicate support for the first hypothesis that bigger windfalls
induced appropriation in fractious villages. Critically, bigger windfalls increased perceptions of
appropriation; the equal distribution of funds across all households; and the share of benefits going
to GAM in high competition vis-a-vis low competition villages. On the other hand, the data
points to a puzzle in that civilians also did better in high competition villages. Granted, equal
distribution implies that civilian households would also be somewhat better off since the bigger
windfall translated into an additional 560,000 rupiah ($56) per household (for threshold 1). Yet,
we would still expect that civilians would have received even more had GAM not appropriated a
share of the wealth. Instead, the data suggests that bigger windfalls actually resulted in civilians
receiving less in low competition villages (Table 4.6, columns 4-6). In sum, while the results suggest
some support for the hypothesis that windfall size affects appropriation, they also highlight the need
to dig deeper into how allocation decisions were made in low competition villages.
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4.5.2 Did bigger windfalls yield welfare dividends?
I next investigate whether bigger windfalls delivered more economic benefits to civilians and, in
particular, whether the outcomes vary across villages that were more and less prone to group com-
petition to appropriate the wealth. The second hypothesis predicts that bigger windfalls resulted
in greater welfare benefits for civilians in low competition than in high competition contexts, where
appropriation was more likely to occur. The results from the previous section indicate that bigger
windfalls indeed resulted in former combatants in high competition villages receiving more. Yet,
civilians in these villages also apparently received more. This section explores the impact of bigger
windfalls on economic welfare by looking at how both civilians and former combatants fared under
BRA-KDP.
Table 4.7 presents eight different indicators of well-being and the results for the civilian popula-
tion. It is possible that BRA-KDP assistance enabled households to buy assets, such as cell phones,
motorbikes, or livestock. This possibility is captured in the first measure, which is an estimate of
total asset value based on a list of 17 assets (and 2008 prices). The questions in the subsequent two
columns measure whether assistance from BRA-KDP facilitated improvements in quality of living,
including better access to water from a protected source (column two) and more usage of quality
materials in housing construction or repairs (column three). Question four inquires into the total
land area farmed by the household.
It is also possible that households used BRA-KDP funds to pay school fees or to obtain medical
help for sick family members. Columns 5 and 6 accordingly report the share of school-aged children
in the household attending school and the share of household members who suffered from any
sickness or injury in the past one month that prevented work. The final two measures in Table
4.7 capture perceptions of poverty. The seventh column measures whether the respondent believed
her household was among the poorest third of all households in the village while the final column
reports whether living conditions had improved over the past 12 months. For all measures (except
perceived poverty in column 7, which is reversed), a negative interaction should be regarded as
support for H2, indicating that bigger windfalls led to greater improvements in economic welfare






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Asset Protected Concrete Land Share of Household Poorb Living
valuea waterb wallsc farmedd kids in members conditions
source schoole sickg improvedh
Panel A: Threshold 1
1[Pop≥Cutoff] -2.13 .31 -.05 -1.27 .07 -.05 .19 -.04
(3.81) (.27) (.21) (2.53) (.13) (.04) (.15) (.13)
N 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -7.59* .33 .02 -6.10** .13 -.05 .12 -.13
(3.97) (.32) (.17) (3.06) (.11) (.04) (.26) (.13)
High possibility 6.27* -.08 -.14 2.04 .01 -.02 .21 -.14
(3.55) (.30) (.23) (3.14) (.19) (.07) (.13) (.18)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition 13.85*** -.42 -.16 8.14* -.12 .03 .09 -.01
(5.24) (.44) (.28) (4.39) (.23) (.08) (.29) (.22)
N 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332
Panel B: Threshold 1 + 2 (Pooled)
1[Pop≥Cutoff] -2.53 -.08 -.06 1.02 -.03 -.01 -.06 -.07
(3.01) (.21) (.13) (1.88) (.12) (.04) (.15) (.15)
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -4.10 -.19 .04 .99 -.09 -.01 -.28* -.21
(3.64) (.24) (.13) (2.84) (.16) (.04) (.15) (.14)
High possibility 8.16** -.05 -.05 1.35 .00 .03 .07 -.13
(3.32) (.28) (.22) (3.11) (.17) (.08) (.17) (.19)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition 12.25** .14 -.09 .36 .09 .04 .34 .08
(4.85) (.35) (.25) (4.14) (.24) (.08) (.22) (.23)
N 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464
Notes: Panel A reports regression results around threshold 1 for separate estimates of the average treatment effect at the cutoff and of the average treatment effect
at the cutoff conditional on group competition. Panel B reports the same for thresholds 1 and 2 (pooled). All estimates are obtained by linear regression with a
quadratic spline. Analysis is of the civilian sample; sampling weights are employed and standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
†Group competition equals 1 (for high possibility) if GAM was strong in the village but was supported by less than half the villagers during the conflict and is 0
otherwise (for low/medium possibility of group competition).
aTotal asset value calculated based on a list 17 assets and 2008 prices.
bWhat is your main source of drinking water? (unprotected well or spring=0, all other options=1).
cWhat is the material used most in your house wall (concrete=1, timber/bamboo/other=0).
dHow much land is being farmed by this household (in thousands of meters-squared)?
eShare of school-age children in household currently attending school.
fShare of family members in household who have suffered from any sickness or injury that prevented them from work or going to school in the past one month.
gIn your opinion, relative to others in your village, how poor is your household? (in the middle/among the richest third=1, among the poorest third=0)
hLooking back, how do you rate your living conditions now compared to 12 months ago? (better=1, same/worse=0)































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Asset Protected Concrete Land Share of Household Poorb Living
valuea waterb wallsc farmedd kids in members conditions
source schoole sickg improvedh
Panel A: Threshold 1
1[Pop≥Cutoff] -2.65 .24 .15 -.12 -.08 .12** .31 -.09
(5.29) (.32) (.09) (3.30) (.17) (.05) (.24) (.13)
N 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -10.45 .17 .12 3.82 -.33* .15** .28 -.47***
(7.43) (.25) (.07) (2.52) (.18) (.06) (.20) (.14)
High possibility -2.86 -.39 -.17 -9.25** -.24 .10 .30 .20
(11.20) (.45) (.12) (3.80) (.19) (.07) (.45) (.16)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition 7.59 -.56 -.29** -13.07*** .08 -.05 .01 .68***
(13.09) (.53) (.11) (4.52) (.23) (.09) (.50) (.16)
N 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
Panel B: Threshold 1 + 2 (Pooled)
1[Pop≥Cutoff] -1.50 .08 .18* -2.69 -.07 .07* .16 .01
(4.62) (.24) (.11) (2.86) (.14) (.04) (.19) (.12)
N 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 181
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -3.85 -.12 .13 .36 -.22 .08* .04 -.24
(7.05) (.23) (.12) (3.02) (.16) (.05) (.18) (.16)
High possibility -3.71 -.38 .15 -9.94*** -.09 .13* .10 .23
(10.20) (.45) (.17) (2.98) (.27) (.08) (.40) (.23)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition .14 -.25 .02 -10.30** .13 .06 .07 .46
(11.83) (.52) (.17) (4.00) (.31) (.09) (.43) (.30)
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
Notes: Panel A reports regression results around threshold 1 for separate estimates of the average treatment effect at the cutoff and of the average treatment effect
at the cutoff conditional on group competition. Panel B reports the same for thresholds 1 and 2 (pooled). All estimates are obtained by linear regression with a
quadratic spline. Analysis is of the former combatant sample; sampling weights are employed and standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
†Group competition equals 1 (for high possibility) if GAM was strong in the village but was supported by less than half the villagers during the conflict and is 0
otherwise (for low/medium possibility of group competition).
aTotal asset value calculated based on a list 17 assets and 2008 prices.
bWhat is your main source of drinking water? (unprotected well or spring=0, all other options=1).
cWhat is the material used most in your house wall (concrete=1, timber/bamboo/other=0).
dHow much land is being farmed by this household (in thousands of meters-squared)?
eShare of school-age children in household currently attending school.
fShare of family members in household who have suffered from any sickness or injury that prevented them from work or going to school in the past one month.
gIn your opinion, relative to others in your village, how poor is your household? (in the middle/among the richest third=1, among the poorest third=0)
hLooking back, how do you rate your living conditions now compared to 12 months ago? (better=1, same/worse=0)
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Figure 4.6: Effect of Bigger Windfalls on Welfare (Civilians) I. The left panel presents the effect of bigger windfalls for the
full threshold 1 sample of civilians. The right panel presents the effect on civilians in low competition (red triangle) and high
competition (blue square) villages. The plot is a fitted regression of the outcome on the cutoff indicator and linear and quadratic
forms of the assignment variable (without controls), estimated separately on each side of the cutoff (quadratic spline). All
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Figure 4.7: Effect of Bigger Windfalls on Welfare (Civilians) II. The left panel presents the effect of bigger windfalls for the
full threshold 1 sample of civilians. The right panel presents the effect on civilians in low competition (red triangle) and high
competition (blue square) villages. The plot is a fitted regression of the outcome on the cutoff indicator and linear and quadratic
forms of the assignment variable (without controls), estimated separately on each side of the cutoff (quadratic spline). All
regressions include sampling weights and standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Overall, however, the results provide little support for the second hypothesis. Interestingly, there
is little indication from any of the measures that bigger windfalls improved welfare on average.
Moreover, in evaluating whether welfare outcomes varied across competition contexts, civilians
actually appear to be better off in high competition villages. Specifically, the evidence indicates that
bigger windfalls increased the value of asset holdings for civilians in high vis-a-vis low competition
villages (Panels A and B, column 1). There is also a weak indication that bigger windfalls enabled
civilians in high competition villages to clear more land for farming. While these results provide
little support for H2 they are consistent with the findings in Table 4.6 that bigger windfalls delivered
more assistance to civilians in high competition villages.
While former combatants were prohibited from benefitting directly from BRA-KDP, I use the
same eight indicators from the former combatants survey to corroborate whether ex-GAM nonethe-
less also enjoyed welfare benefits from bigger windfalls. The results are presented in Table 4.8. Here
a positive interaction is taken as evidence of appropriation, implying that former GAM members
benefitted more from BRA-KDP in high competition villages. The most notable result is that
bigger windfalls caused a decrease in land farmed in high competition compared to low competition
villages (Panels A and B, column 4). A possible explanation is that this is not actually evidence
of a decline in welfare but rather that former combatants used BRA-KDP assistance to move out
of agriculture and into another sector, such as trade. Tellingly, bigger windfalls also caused former
combatants in high competition villages to feel that their living conditions had improved (Panel A,
column 8).
In sum, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that bigger windfalls realized greater
welfare dividends for civilians in low competition vis-a-vis high competition villages. Rather, the
data suggests that bigger windfalls led to improved welfare for both civilians and former combatants
in more fractious villages compared to less divided ones. While this finding is contrary to H2, it
is consistent with the earlier results presented in Table 4.6 that bigger windfalls resulted in more
direct assistance for both civilians and former combatants in high competition contexts.
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4.5.3 Did bigger windfalls facilitate cohesion or exacerbate social conflict?
Finally, I evaluate the evidence for H3, which predicts that bigger windfalls exacerbated social
divisions in high competition villages compared to low competition ones. Table 4.9 and Figure
4.8 present five measures of civilian attitudes towards former combatants. The first measure is
the most direct in asking civilians whether they feel that divisions exist in the village between
former combatants and other village members. Interestingly, the results in both Panels A and B
suggest that bigger windfalls caused divisions between these groups on average. In other words,
the evidence suggests that bigger windfalls might have enhanced divisions in both low and high
competition villages alike. There is little direct support for H3, however, in that bigger windfalls did
not exacerbate tensions more in high competition than low competition villages. This is indicated
by the lack of a positive and significant interaction term in either panel.
The second and third questions in Table 4.9 inquire into whether people feel that former com-
batants and members of KPA (GAM’s post-conflict political incarnation) benefit more than other
groups in the village when decisions about how to allocate resources are made. These measures are
considered proxies for social tensions insofar as redistribution that benefits one group over other
groups in the village could be a source of discontent. Any indication that GAM or KPA benefitted
more in high competition than in low competition villages would be taken as support for H3. Yet,
not only are the interaction terms not positive or significant, there is some evidence that bigger
windfalls reduced perceptions in high competition villages that KPA benefitted more (Panels A
and B, column three). These results again point to a lack of support for H3.
Finally, questions four and five are proxies for broader acceptance of, and trust in, former
combatants. Specifically, question four asked respondents about their willingness to embrace former
combatants in a number of different types of roles, from membership in village associations to
welcomed into the respondent’s family through marriage. Contrary to H3, there is little evidence
that bigger windfalls produced a greater reluctance to accept former combatants in high competition
villages. The final question asked the civilian respondents if they could think of at least one former
combatant or KPA member that they would trust to watch their children. Here the result is






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Divisions: Benefit more: Benefit more: Willing to Trust GAMe
GAM vs. civiliansa GAMb KPAc accept GAMd
Panel A: Threshold 1
1[Pop≥Cutoff] .12** -.14 -.07 .05 -.01
(.05) (.25) (.16) (.15) (.09)
N 350 346 344 351 350
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility .16 .11 .21 -.03 -.25***
(.10) (.22) (.20) (.10) (.07)
High possibility .07 -.29 -.63** .31 .23**
(.06) (.32) (.24) (.22) (.10)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition -.09 -.40 -.84*** .34 .48***
(.12) (.40) (.28) (.21) (.12)
N 331 327 325 332 331
Panel B: Threshold 1 + 2 (Pooled)
1[Pop≥Cutoff] .08** -.07 -.16 .01 .19**
(.03) (.21) (.13) (.12) (.09)
N 497 491 489 498 497
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility .09* .01 -.10 .01 .02
(.05) (.22) (.15) (.15) (.09)
High possibility .09 -.25 -.61*** .31* .24**
(.06) (.33) (.22) (.18) (.12)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition .01 -.26 -.51* .30 .23
(.08) (.36) (.25) (.19) (.15)
N 463 458 456 464 463
Notes: Panel A reports regression results around threshold 1 for separate estimates of the average treatment effect at the cutoff and of the average
treatment effect at the cutoff conditional on group competition. Panel B reports the same for thresholds 1 and 2 (pooled). All estimates are obtained
by linear regression with a quadratic spline. Analysis is of the civilian sample; sampling weights are employed and standard errors are clustered at
the village-level.
†Group competition equals 1 (for high possibility) if GAM was strong in the village but was supported by less than half the villagers during the
conflict and is 0 otherwise (for low/medium possibility of group competition).
aTo what extent do differences between ex-combatants and village members divide people in the village? (Major/minor source of division=1, not a
source of division=0).
bWhen the community has to make a decision about how to allocate resources in the village, sometimes some groups benefit more than others.
Generally, do you think GAM/KPA do especially well or badly relative to other people? (Better=1, worse=-1, the same=0). cShould GAM be: (1)
welcomed in the village, (2) allowed to join community associations, (3) allowed to be village leaders, (4) among close friends, (5) welcomed into your
family through marriage? (mean of five possible roles).
dIf you suddenly had to go away for a day or two, could you think of at least one person who is a former combatant/KPA member that you could
turn to to take care of your children? (yes=1).
Table 4.9: Effect of Bigger Windfalls on Social Divisions







-200 -100 0 100 200
Population (centered)





-200 -100 0 100 200
Population (centered)






-200 -100 0 100 200
Population (centered)







-200 -100 0 100 200
Population (centered)







-200 -100 0 100 200
Population (centered)






-200 -100 0 100 200
Population (centered)






-200 -100 0 100 200
Population (centered)





-200 -100 0 100 200
Population (centered)







-200 -100 0 100 200
Population (centered)







-200 -100 0 100 200
Population (centered)
Threshold 1: Trust GAM
Figure 4.8: Effect of Bigger Windfalls on Social Divisions. The left panel presents the effect of
bigger windfalls for the full threshold 1 sample of civilians. The right panel presents the effect on
civilians in low competition (red triangle) and high competition (blue square) villages. The plot
is a fitted regression of the outcome on the cutoff indicator and linear and quadratic forms of the
assignment variable (without controls), estimated separately on each side of the cutoff (quadratic
spline). All regressions include sampling weights and standard errors are clustered at the village
level.
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Overall, the results present little evidence that bigger windfalls exacerbated social tensions in
villages more prone to group competition ex ante than in less divided villages. If anything, the
findings suggest that bigger windfalls reduced perceptions that KPA members benefit more, and
increased trust in former combatants, in high competition villages. There is a plausible explanation
for this pattern that is consistent with the previous findings that bigger windfalls induced equal
distribution of wealth across households. If bigger windfalls caused former combatants in high
competition villages to lobby for equal distribution across households, then civilian households
that were not prioritized as the most conflict-affected would have benefitted as well. It is possible
that these households were grateful to former combatants for ensuring that they too received a share
of the wealth. This would be consistent with the fact that, by requiring communities to identify
civilian households that were ‘more’ and ‘less’ conflict-affected, the targeting process potentially
also created divisions among civilians (Morel, Watanabe and Wrobel, 2009).
4.5.4 Discussion and robustness checks
Overall, the results paint a surprising picture of how bigger windfalls affected appropriation, wel-
fare, and social divisions across villages in post-conflict Aceh more and less predisposed to group
competition. On one hand, the evidence supports the notion that bigger windfalls induced group
competition over resources in villages with a history of more contentious relations between former
combatants and civilians. In high competition villages, bigger windfalls led to the more frequent
adoption of equal distribution and also increased perceptions of appropriation in BRA-KDP im-
plementation. Bigger windfalls also resulted in former combatants obtaining a greater share of the
wealth in high competition villages.
On the other hand, the fact that GAM benefitted more in high competition villages did not
reduce benefits to civilians, as anticipated. This paper tested the hypothesis (H2) that bigger
windfalls would deliver greater welfare benefits to civilians in low competition villages because
former combatants took less of the wealth. Yet, the evidence indicates that bigger windfalls also
generated more benefits for civilians in high competition environments. Specifically, bigger windfalls
resulted in more direct assistance from BRA-KDP as well as higher levels of economic welfare
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on measures of asset value and land farmed for civilians in more divided villages compared to
those in more cooperative ones. The data also does not indicate that bigger windfalls exacerbated
social tensions between civilians and former combatants in high competition villages. While this
is contrary to H3, it is consistent with the evidence that bigger windfalls were more beneficial to
civilians in high competition villages than in low competition villages.
What explains why civilians enjoyed more BRA-KDP benefits, better economic welfare, and
improved social relations with GAM in high competition villages vis-a-vis low competition ones,
despite the evidence that GAM also captured wealth in these villages? I explore a few plausible
explanations, with additional data presented in Table 4.10. One possibility is that villagers were
better able to coordinate on assistance in the form of livelihood goods (rather than cash) in low
competition villages. This would be consistent the findings that bigger windfalls reduced perceived
appropriation (Table 4.5, columns 3-6), equal distribution (Table 4.6, column two), and cash al-
locations (Table 4.6, columns 4-6) in low competition villages. The first column in Table 4.10
investigates whether bigger windfalls resulted in more low competition villages opting for private
goods and finds little support for this explanation.
Another possibility is that low competition villages did a better job of channeling bigger wind-
falls to the most conflict-affected civilian households. If this were the case, bigger windfalls might
only produce greater benefits for the subset of civilian conflict-affected households rather than
among all civilian households in the village. To assess whether this is the case, I restrict the data
to conflict victims and analyze whether bigger windalls resulted in bigger benefits from BRA-KDP
for this group alone.15 As can be seen in columns 2-3 of Table 4.10, however, there is no evidence
that bigger windfalls delivered greater assistance to conflict victims in low competition villages
compared to high competition ones. Similarly, there is little indication that bigger windfalls ex-
acerbated social divisions between conflict victims (rather than civilians in general) and former
combatants in high competition versus low competition villages (columns 4-5).
15Conflict victims are defined subjectively, as they were in the BRA-KDP process. Respondents are considered conflict
victims if they responded affirmatively when asked in the survey if they consider themselves a conflict victim. To
corroborate this response, the survey also collected data on why individuals were victims, with response options
ranging from death of a family member to internal displacement to mental illness.
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Finally, I explore whether civilians benefitted less in low competition environments because
bigger windfalls induced an alternate type of rent-seeking: elite capture. In other words, while
former GAM combatants might not have had the will or ability to appropriate BRA-KDP wealth
in low competition villages, bigger windfalls could have induced more appropriation by village
leaders. To investigate this, column six in Table 4.10 presents a measure of whether people felt that
those well-connected to the village leader tend to benefit more from how resources are distributed
within the village. The negative and weakly significant interaction term in Panel A suggests that,
indeed, bigger windfalls might have resulted in more elite—rather than ex-combatant—capture of
BRA-KDP funds in low competition villages. All in all, the results suggest that the impact of aid
windfalls on development indeed varies by the nature of social fragmentation and power competition
and highlight the need for further research into decision-making dynamics in both high and low
competition contexts.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper uses a post-conflict reconstruction program in Aceh to investigate whether bigger rev-
enue windfalls induce appropriation, undermine welfare, and exacerbate social tensions in more
and less socially fragmented contexts. The main findings are that bigger windfalls induced former
combatants to appropriate wealth in villages that were ex ante more prone to group competition,
determined by both the strength of the former combatant group and its support among villages.
Yet, surprisingly, bigger windfalls also resulted in greater economic benefits for civilians and did
not exacerbate social tensions in high compared to low competition villages. The results raise
important questions about why bigger windfalls did not deliver even greater economic benefits to
civilian households in low competition villages.
This paper was motivated by an influential political economy literature on group rent-seeking
contests, which has generated important insights into the conditions under which bigger windfalls
might help or harm development. The central prediction in this literature is that windfalls are good
for development where groups are homogeneous or cooperative and bad for development where there
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exists multiple, powerful and competing groups. In finding that rent-seeking competition did not
dissipate the benefits of windfalls and, moreover, that bigger windfalls did not lead to greater
benefits in more cohesive villages, the results point to the need for more theoretical research on
how different group dynamics condition the impact of bigger windfalls on development.
This paper also raises important questions for a growing literature on the effectiveness of
community-driven development and community-driven reconstruction programs. In recent years,
programs like BRA-KDP have achieved prominence as a means for promoting development at the
local level (Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Bank, 2007). Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of such
programs is mixed, however. In a large-scale randomized evaluation conducted in Liberia, Fearon
et al (2009) find that a CDD program caused higher levels of social cohesion. In contrast, a recent
randomized evaluation in Sierra Leone shows that the program improved local public goods but had
no democratic or collective action dividends (Casey, Glennerster and Miguel, 2011). Gugerty and
Kremer (2008) find that the influx of resources crowded out participation by the socially disadvan-
taged and attracted involvement by more elite community members. By investigating whether aid
windfalls actually exacerbate community tensions in certain contexts, this paper explores whether































Projects Received Aid Divisions Who
Selected (Conflict Victims) (Conflict Victims) Benefits?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private Received Amt. money Divisions: GAM Willing to Connected
Goodsa assistanceb receivedc vs. civiliansd accept GAMe to leadersf
Panel A: Threshold 1
1[Pop≥Cutoff] -.02 -.08 .47 .21* .07 .02
(.16) (.21) (.38) (.12) (.12) (.13)
N 351 200 200 200 200 344
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility .11 -.20 -.84** .29* -.06 .22
(.11) (.23) (.39) (.16) (.09) (.17)
High possibility .01 .18 1.66*** .06 .19 -.29
(.30) (.26) (.50) (.10) (.12) (.26)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition -.10 .38 2.50*** -.23 .25* -.51*
(.32) (.34) (.62) (.21) (.13) (.27)
N 332 193 193 193 193 325
Panel B: Threshold 1 + 2 (Pooled)
1[Pop≥Cutoff] -.02 .00 .22 .15* .09 -.04
(.08) (.24) (.31) (.07) (.10) (.15)
N 498 255 255 255 255 490
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility .03 .04 -.49 .15 .00 .25
(.05) (.29) (.43) (.09) (.10) (.18)
High possibility -.02 .05 1.36*** .10 .31*** -.26
(.29) (.26) (.39) (.10) (.09) (.31)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition -.05 .01 1.85*** -.05 .31** -.51
(.29) (.37) (.57) (.14) (.12) (.31)
N 464 241 241 241 241 456
Notes: Panel A reports regression results around threshold 1 for separate estimates of the average treatment effect at the cutoff and of the average treatment effect
at the cutoff conditional on group competition. Panel B reports the same for thresholds 1 and 2 (pooled). All estimates are obtained by linear regression with a
quadratic spline. Analysis is of the civilian sample; sampling weights are employed and standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
†Group competition equals 1 (for high possibility) if GAM was strong in the village but was supported by less than half the villagers during the conflict and is 0
otherwise (for low/medium possibility of group competition).
aPrivate goods (agriculture/traders/aquaculture/savings and loans) =1
bReceived assistance from BRA-KDP=1.
cAmount of money received (in millions of rupiah).
dTo what extent do differences between ex-combatants and village members divide people in the village? (Major/minor source of division=1, not a source of
division=0).
eShould GAM be: (1) welcomed in the village, (2) allowed to join community associations, (3) allowed to be village leaders, (4) among close friends, (5) welcomed
into your family through marriage? (mean of five possible roles).
fWhen the community has to make a decision about how to allocate resources in the village, sometimes some groups benefit more than others. Generally, do you
think those well-connected to leaders do especially well or badly relative to other people? (Better=1, worse=-1, the same=0).
Table 4.10: Additional Analysis
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4.7 Online Appendix
This online appendix contains supplementary results, discussion, and robustness checks for the
main paper. The appendix is organized roughly in the order in which additional analysis is referred
to in the paper.
4.7.1 The confict intensity score
The subdistrict-level conflict intensity score was based on a factor analysis, performed by the World
Bank, of nine indicators. The list of indicators is reported in Table 4.11.
No. Indicator Source Coverage (%)
1 Number of conflict victims (2002) Department of Social Welfare 61
2 Number of conflict victims (2003) Department of Social Welfare 81
3 Number of conflict victims (2004) Department of Social Welfare 81
4 Military conflict intensity Provincial Military Command 92
5 GAM returnee estimates World Bank 100
6 Political prisoner estimates Int’l Organization for Migration 100
7 Conflict incidents (2005) Coded newspapers 100
8 Perceptions of safety (pre-MoU) World Bank survey 63
9 Perceptions of conflict (2004) World Bank survey 63
Table 4.11: Data and Sources for Conflict Intensity Index
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4.7.2 Density tests
An unbiased estimate of the treatment effect in a regression discontinuity design depends on the
assumptions that the cutpoint was arbitrary and that observations did not manipulate their as-
signment scores to either get or avoid treatment. The BRA-KDP treatment assignment process
creating 12 possible thresholds that could be used in analysis, but the main analysis focuses on
estimating effects for the first threshold as well as for thresholds 1 and 2 pooled. The remaining
thresholds either exhibit data sparsity near the cutpoint or discontinuities in density and thus are
not included in the main analysis.
To illustrate this point, Figure 4.9 presents histograms of the density of observations for each
population threshold (as well as all population thresholds pooled) and Figure 4.10 presents McCrary
density tests for each population threshold. As can be seen by visual inspection in Figure 4.9,
both thresholds 1 and 2 have observations near the cutpoint and do not indicate any density
discontinuities. This is confirmed in the McCrary density tests. This is not true for thresholds 3-6,
which do not pass the density tests.
Similarly, Figure 4.11 shows histograms for each of the conflict thresholds (as all as all conflict
thresholds pooled). As above, the conflict assignment variable is centered at zero for each cutoff,
indicated by the dashed line. These historgrams emphasize the problems of data sparsity and
sorting. Thresholds 7, 8, and 9 all exhibit a steep increase in the density of observations just to the
right of the cutoff while thresholds 10, 11 and 12 have few observations located near the cutpoint.
Figure 4.12 presents density tests and the data was insufficient to calculate the log difference in
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Figure 4.12: McCrary Tests of Conflict Thresholds
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4.7.3 Robustness checks
The main specification in the paper is a regression of the outcome variable on the treatment
assignment indicator fully interacted with linear and quadratic forms of the centered population
assignment variable (a quadratic spline). Many of the dependent variables are binary and some
estimates are outside of the range of the dependent variable, but in many cases it was not possible to
get convergence in a logistic model with a quadratic spline. As a robustness check for consistency,
I present all results estimated using linear regression (for continuous dependent variables) and
logistic regression (for binary dependent variables) and a linear spline (a separate linear regression
performed on each side of the threshold). In some rare cases, it was still not possible to get
convergence in logistic regression and here I resort to linear regression (noted in the tables). The
results are presented in Tables 4.12-4.16 following the same format used for the main results.
As can be seen, while several of the estimates lose significance, the direction of effects are largely
robust. Moreover, many of the key findings are robust. For perceptions of appropriation (Table
4.12), the result that bigger windfalls led more people to say that ex-combatants benefitted more
in high competiton compared to low competition villages is robust. The positive and significant
interaction on corruption also remains in Panel A, column 4. Table 4.13 presents less clear evidence
that bigger windfalls caused more high competition villages to adopt equal division compared to
low competition villages (column 1). Moreover, while the data still suggests that civilians received
more money in high competition villages (column 6), there little indication that former combatants
received more benefits from BRA-KDP in high competition villages.
For economic welfare outcomes for civilians, reported in Table 4.14, the finding that bigger
windfalls increased asset value in high competition villages is robust (column 1). Similarly, the
result that bigger windfalls decreased land farmed for former combatants is robust (Table 4.15,
Panel A, column 4). Finally, regarding social divisions, the finding that bigger windfalls increased
trust in GAM in high competition villages holds (Table 4.16, column 5). But, surprisingly, the data
now says that divisions were also greater in high competition villages compared to low competition































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Too few Too few Excom Corruptiond § Extortione §
people victims benefittedc
benefitteda benefittedb
Panel A: Threshold 1
1[Pop≥Cutoff] .08 .05 -.05 .04 .10
(.05) (.03) (.12) (.10) (.20)
N 263 263 262 250 251
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility .03 .03 -.24 -.04 -.05
(.05) (.04) (.17) (.06) (.11)
High possibility .04 .04 .45*** .23* .08
(.04) (.05) (.13) (.12) (.08)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition .01 .01 .69*** .27** .13
(.07) (.08) (.19) (.11) (.14)
N 254 254 253 319 245
Panel B: Threshold 1 + 2 (Pooled)
1[Pop≥Cutoff] .07 .05 .00 .02 .08
(.05) (.04) (.13) (.04) (.09)
N 350 350 349 335 334
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility .09 .04 -.12 .02 .05
(.08) (.04) (.16) (.08) (.11)
High possibility .02 .00 .39** .14 .05
(.04) (.04) (.19) (.09) (.08)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition -.06 -.04 .51** .12 .00
(.10) (.06) (.24) (.11) (.13)
N 331 331 330 319 318
Notes: Panel A reports regression results around threshold 1 for separate estimates of the average treatment effect at the cutoff and of
the average treatment effect at the cutoff conditional on group competition. Panel B reports the same for thresholds 1 and 2 (pooled). All
estimates are obtained by logistic regression with a linear spline. The symbol § denotes that linear regression with linear spline was used
instead of logistic regression with linear spline because of singularity in the data. Analysis is of the civilian sample; sampling weights are
employed and standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
†Group competition equals 1 (for high possibility) if GAM was strong in the village but was supported by less than half the villagers during
the conflict and is 0 otherwise (for low/medium possibility of group competition).
aDo you agree or disagree that the activities selected did not benefit enough people in the village (agree=1).
bDo you agree or disagree that the activities selected did not benefit conflict victims (agree=1).
cDo you agree or disagree that the activities selected benefitted ex-GAM combatants, PETA and/or IDPs too much (agree=1).
dThere were diversions of money/KKN (corruption, collusion, nepotism) (agree=1.)
eMoney was extorted from the process(agree=1).































Projects Received Aid (Civilians) Received Aid (Combatants)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Equal Public Received Received Amt. Received Received Amt.
Divisiona Goodsb assistancec moneyd money assistancec moneyd money
receivede receivede
Panel A: Threshold 1
1[Pop≥Cutoff] -.09 -.17* .00 .22 .09 -.27*** -.17 -.39
(.14) (.08) (.14) (.15) (.26) (.10) (.12) (.29)
N 351 351 351 351 351 121 121 121
Marginal effect conditional on group competition
Low/some possibility -.17 -.30** -.06 .02 -.38 -.36** -.34** -.31
(.13) (.11) (.16) (.17) (.31) (.13) (.14) (.21)
High possibility .14 -.06 .06 .39* .65** -.01 .29 -.46
(.26) (.12) (.12) (.22) (.31) (.22) (.18) (.69)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition .31 .24 .13 .37 1.03** .35 .63** -0.14
(.29) (.19) (.19) (.28) (.43) (.27) (.24) (.67)
N 332 332 332 332 332 113 113 113
Panel B: Threshold 1 + 2 (Pooled)
1[Pop≥Cutoff] .07 -.09 .19 .30** .01 -.10 -.02 -.52**
(.14) (.05) (.14) (.13) (.19) (.10) (.11) (.25)
N 498 498 498 498 498 181 181 181
Marginal effect conditional on group competition
Low/some possibility .00 -.11 .13 .19 -.21 -.15 -.13 -.20
(.18) (.08) (.18) (.18) (.27) (.14) (.13) (.29)
High possibility .30 -.21 .20 .52** .53* -.11 .08 -.66
(.27) (.18) (.17) (.20) (.31) (.18) (.17) (.55)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition .30 -.10 .07 .33 .74* .04 .21 -.46
(.32) (.20) (.24) (.26) (.41) (.25) (.23) (.62)
N 464 464 464 464 464 168 168 168
Notes: Panel A reports regression results around threshold 1 for separate estimates of the average treatment effect at the cutoff and of the average treatment effect at the
cutoff conditional on group competition. Panel B reports the same for thresholds 1 and 2 (pooled). All estimates are obtained by linear (for continuous dependent variables) or
logistic (for binary dependent variables) regression with a linear spline. Analysis is of the civilian sample; sampling weights are employed and standard errors are clustered at
the village-level.
†Group competition equals 1 (for high possibility) if GAM was strong in the village but was supported by less than half the villagers during the conflict and is 0 otherwise (for
low/medium possibility of group competition).
aEqual cash disbursement among all households=1.
bPublic goods (agriculture/traders/aquaculture/savings and loans) =1
cReceived assistance from BRA-KDP=1.
dReceived cash from BRA-KDP=1.
eAmount of money received (in millions of rupiah).






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Asset Protected Concrete Land Share of Household Poorb Living
valuea waterb wallsc farmedd kids in members conditions
source schoole sickg improvedh
Panel A: Threshold 1
1[Pop≥Cutoff] -3.48 .01 -.08 -.50 -.09 -.02 .01 .02
(2.60) (.20) (.16) (1.51) (.09) (.03) (.10) (.10)
N 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -7.18** -.15 .10 -1.03 -.05 -.02 .11 -.08
(2.82) (.25) (.12) (2.32) (.10) (.03) (.16) (.11)
High possibility 2.68 .02 -.11 1.32 -.20 -.01 -.08 -.02
(3.70) (.22) (.23) (2.50) (.17) (.06) (.14) (.14)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition 9.86** .17 -.20 2.35 -0.15 0.01 -.19 .06
(4.67) (.33) (.27) (3.49) (.21) (.07) (.22) (.18)
N 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332
Panel B: Threshold 1 + 2 (Pooled)
1[Pop≥Cutoff] -3.78* -.06 -.08 -.86 -.06 -.03 .03 .00
(1.99) (.15) (.09) (1.10) (.08) (.02) (.11) (.11)
N 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -3.87 -.07 .05 -1.56 -.05 -.03 -.10 -.03
(2.50) (.19) (.09) (1.58) (.12) (.03) (.13) (.13)
High possibility .87 -.06 -.18 .87 -.19 -.03 .09 -.05
(3.80) (.25) (.19) (2.43) (.15) (.06) (.14) (.14)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition 4.74 .02 -.23 2.43 -.15 .01 .19 -.02
(4.49) (.30) (.21) (2.97) (.19) (.07) (.19) (.18)
N 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464
Notes: Panel A reports regression results around threshold 1 for separate estimates of the average treatment effect at the cutoff and of the average treatment effect
at the cutoff conditional on group competition. Panel B reports the same for thresholds 1 and 2 (pooled). All estimates are obtained by linear (for continuous
dependent variables) or logistic (for binary dependent variables) regression with a linear spline. Analysis is of the civilian sample; sampling weights are employed
and standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
†Group competition equals 1 (for high possibility) if GAM was strong in the village but was supported by less than half the villagers during the conflict and is 0
otherwise (for low/medium possibility of group competition).
aTotal asset value calculated based on a list 17 assets and 2008 prices.
bWhat is your main source of drinking water? (unprotected well or spring=0, all other options=1).
cWhat is the material used most in your house wall (concrete=1, timber/bamboo/other=0).
dHow much land is being farmed by this household (in thousands of meters-squared)?
eShare of school-age children in household currently attending school.
fShare of family members in household who have suffered from any sickness or injury that prevented them from work or going to school in the past one month.
gIn your opinion, relative to others in your village, how poor is your household? (in the middle/among the richest third=1, among the poorest third=0)
hLooking back, how do you rate your living conditions now compared to 12 months ago? (better=1, same/worse=0)































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Asset Protected Concrete Land Share of Household Poorb Living
valuea waterb wallsc farmedd kids in members conditions
source schoole sickg improvedh
Panel A: Threshold 1
1[Pop≥Cutoff] 1.53 .07 .06 -4.24* -.13 .08** .03 -.14
(5.87) (.16) (.10) (2.46) (.12) (.04) (.15) (.16)
N 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -.09 .06 .04 -.82 -.22* .14*** -.16 -.25
(9.54) (.17) (.04) (2.19) (.13) (.05) (.24) (.17)
High possibility 1.55 -.37 -.08 -10.93*** -.33* -.02 .16 .11
(7.07) (.33) (.12) (3.81) (.18) (.06) (.36) (.14)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition 1.64 -.44 -.13 -10.11** -0.11 -.16** .33 .37*
(12.43) (.37) (.13) (4.26) (.21) (.08) (.44) (.21)
N 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
Panel B: Threshold 1 + 2 (Pooled)
1[Pop≥Cutoff] .88 -.03 .12 -3.00 -.05 .01 -.04 .01
(4.54) (.17) (.09) (1.93) (.10) (.03) (.14) (.12)
N 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 181
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -.73 -.08 .19* -.99 .01 .06* -.26 .10
(7.06) (.20) (.10) (1.99) (.13) (.03) (.17) (.14)
High possibility 2.08 -.33 -.19 -6.23* -.46** -.06 -.13 -.27
(6.18) (.28) (.13) (3.25) (.19) (.06) (.34) (.27)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition 2.81 -.25 -.38** -5.24 -.47** -.12* .13 -.37
(9.21) (.33) (.17) (3.73) (.23) (.07) (.38) (.31)
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
Notes: Panel A reports regression results around threshold 1 for separate estimates of the average treatment effect at the cutoff and of the average treatment effect
at the cutoff conditional on group competition. Panel B reports the same for thresholds 1 and 2 (pooled). All estimates are obtained by linear (for continuous
dependent variables) or logistic (for binary dependent variables) regression with a linear spline. Analysis is of the former GAM sample; standard errors are clustered
at the village-level.
†Group competition equals 1 (for high possibility) if GAM was strong in the village but was supported by less than half the villagers during the conflict and is 0
otherwise (for low/medium possibility of group competition).
aTotal asset value calculated based on a list 17 assets and 2008 prices.
bWhat is your main source of drinking water? (unprotected well or spring=0, all other options=1).
cWhat is the material used most in your house wall (concrete=1, timber/bamboo/other=0).
dHow much land is being farmed by this household (in thousands of meters-squared)?
eShare of school-age children in household currently attending school.
fShare of family members in household who have suffered from any sickness or injury that prevented them from work or going to school in the past one month.
gIn your opinion, relative to others in your village, how poor is your household? (in the middle/among the richest third=1, among the poorest third=0)
hLooking back, how do you rate your living conditions now compared to 12 months ago? (better=1, same/worse=0)






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Divisions: Benefit more: Benefit more: Willing to Trust GAMe
GAM vs. civiliansa § GAMb KPAc accept GAMd
Panel A: Threshold 1
1[Pop≥Cutoff] .04 -.13 -.13 .00 -.12
(.10) (.22) (.14) (.07) (.08)
N 250 346 344 351 350
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility -.14* -.04 -.06 -.02 -.46***
(.07) (.21) (.15) (.08) (.14)
High possibility .22** -.13 -.30 .16 .03
(.09) (.23) (.25) (.14) (.03)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition .36*** -0.09 -0.24 0.18 .49***
(.10) (.26) (.26) (.18) (.12)
N 244 327 325 332 331
Panel B: Threshold 1 + 2 (Pooled)
1[Pop≥Cutoff] .02 -.12 -.10 -.04 -.04
(.04) (.14) (.11) (.06) (.07)
N 335 491 489 498 497
Marginal effect conditional on group competition†
Low/some possibility .02 -.07 -.07 .00 -.23*
(.08) (.14) (.12) (.10) (.13)
High possibility .14 -.35 -.31 .02 -.02
(.09) (.23) (.22) (.12) (.06)
Interaction
1[Pop≥Cutoff]*competition .12 -.28 -.24 .02 .21*
(.11) (.23) (.19) (.17) (.12)
N 319 458 456 464 463
Notes: Panel A reports regression results around threshold 1 for separate estimates of the average treatment effect at the cutoff and of the average
treatment effect at the cutoff conditional on group competition. Panel B reports the same for thresholds 1 and 2 (pooled). All estimates are obtained
by linear (for continuous dependent variables) or logistic (for binary dependent variables) regression with a linear spline. The symbol § denotes that
linear regression with linear spline was used instead of logistic regression with linear spline because of singularity in the data. Analysis is of the civilian
sample; sampling weights are employed and standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
†Group competition equals 1 (for high possibility) if GAM was strong in the village but was supported by less than half the villagers during the conflict
and is 0 otherwise (for low/medium possibility of group competition).
aTo what extent do differences between ex-combatants and village members divide people in the village? (Major/minor source of division=1, not a
source of division=0).
bWhen the community has to make a decision about how to allocate resources in the village, sometimes some groups benefit more than others. Generally,
do you think GAM/KPA do especially well or badly relative to other people? (Better=1, worse=-1, the same=0). cShould GAM be: (1) welcomed in
the village, (2) allowed to join community associations, (3) allowed to be village leaders, (4) among close friends, (5) welcomed into your family through
marriage? (mean of five possible roles).
dIf you suddenly had to go away for a day or two, could you think of at least one person who is a former combatant/KPA member that you could turn
to to take care of your children? (yes=1).
Table 4.16: Robustness Check for Effect of Bigger Windfalls on Social Divisions
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The three chapters in this dissertation uncover the micro-foundations of political failure by
evaluating how both revenue and information affect the will or ability of citizens to take political
action to curb political rent-seeking and to hold politicians accountable. In assessing how different
types of government revenue (windfalls and taxes) affect citizen political behavior, the dissertation
contributes to a literature that has long advanced the claim that a government’s source of revenue
determines whether it works in the best interest of citizens. This dissertation was motivated by the
belief that the challenge for this literature now lies in identifying which theoretical explanations
find empirical support, in what contexts, and how different explanations relate.
Chapters 2 and 4 both address this challenge by investigating why windfalls cause citizens to
fail to mitigate rent-seeking behavior. Chapter 2 provides the first micro-level, causal test of the
predominant political science claim that windfalls, compared to taxes, weaken citizen demand for
good governance. The innovation in this chapter was its approach to identifying the causal mecha-
nism. In particular, the experiment was designed to test the validity of the demand mechanism by
blocking a potential alternate channel—that windfalls undermine political action by exacerbating
information asymmetries. In finding evidence that taxes produced more monitoring and sanction-
ing than windfalls, this chapter provides evidence for the validity of the demand mechanism and
lays the foundation for future research.
Chapter 4 takes a different approach by considering when and why windfalls induce citizens
to engage in rent-seeking themselves. The contribution of this chapter is its test of a causal story
that emphasizes the importance of context to understanding why windfalls are beneficial in some
cases and harmful in others. In particular, this chapter draws on the main predictions in the
rent-seeking contest literature to evaluate whether bigger windfalls caused civilians and former
combatants to compete to appropriate aid windfalls in post-conflict Aceh. The chapter reveals that
bigger windfalls increased appropriation by former combatants but did not lessen the benefits for
civilians in more divided societies. In so doing, it highlights the need for additional theory-building
on how social divisions mediate the relationship between aid windfalls and development when the
revenue is targeted to benefit certain groups.
Another contribution of the dissertation is to advance the resource curse literature by considering
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how competing explanations for why windfalls undermine accountability and development might,
in fact, relate. This is one of the purposes of Chapter 2, which notes that citizen apathy in windfall
environments is often attributed either to weak incentives (due to the lack of taxation) or to weak
information. While the main goal of the chapter is to evaluate support for the incentive channel,
the chapter takes the additional step of considering the implications of empirical support for the
incentive mechanism for the information mechanism. In finding that citizens are more motivated
to acquire information when they pay taxes but not more intolerant of waste or misuse, the results
paint a more nuanced picture of how the information mechanism might work.
Chapter 3 highlights the importance of information to citizen political behavior in its own right.
This chapter is motivated by the literature in the political agency tradition that has long noted
that information asymmetries are dangerous to effective accountability and that such asymmetries
exist in a wide variety of settings, not just where government has access to revenue windfalls.
This chapter focuses on how citizens use information to make political decisions by looking at the
role played by prior beliefs in conditioning the impact of new information and by evaluating how
information affects political behavior when it has multiple, and possibly competing, dimensions.
All in all, the dissertation chapters reveal not only whether windfalls and information shape citizen
political behavior but also when and why. In focusing on how windfalls and information affect
citizen attitudes and actions it also, by extension, speaks to the prospects for good governance and
efficient public goods provision in developing democracies.
Considered together, the dissertation chapters also raise additional questions and lay the foun-
dation for future research. The dissertation focused on testing mechanisms by which windfalls
have adverse effects on citizen political behavior. Yet, this reveals a tension between the finding
in Chapter 2 that windfalls reduce demand for good government and the finding in Chapter 4
that windfalls can provoke rent-seeking competition. This suggests the need for more theoretical
and empirical research on why windfalls provoke inaction in some contexts and action in others.
Additionally, there is scope for future research into exactly how windfalls and taxes affect citizens.
While the possibility that windfalls also exacerbate information asymmetries was intentionally not
explored in Chapter 2, this remains an interesting claim that merits further investigation. Similarly,
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Chapter 2 explored why taxation motivates political action, namely whether citizens respond to the
tax burden, the share of taxes in total revenue, or the ratio of taxes to spending. Future research
along these lines can continue to uncover the micro-foundations of how windfalls and taxes affect
citizen polititcal behavior and governance and development more broadly.
While this dissertation focused exclusively on the political behavior of citizens, it is also im-
portant to consider how good governance and efficient public goods provision emerge from the
strategic interaction of citizens and politicians. Both Chapters 2 and 3 show that taxation and
one-off provisions of information increased citizen willingness to want to monitor government and
remain informed in the future. In other words, these chapters suggest that fiscal transparency could
be the outcome of taxation or one-off improvements in access to information. This is an important
avenue for future research since, while many have studied the effects of fiscal transparency on po-
litical behavior (as in Chapter 3), much less is known about its causes. Exploring more fully how
windfalls and information affect not just citizen political action but also good government, namely
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